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This dissertation studies the eect of the changes in corporate dividend policy on the
predictability of stock returns. The rst two chapters re-visit the question of what drives
stock returns after controlling for these market-wide changes in the cross-sectional prole
of dividend paying rms, and the third chapter studies the nature of these changes across
dierent industry groups, stock market indexes, size and age.
There have been several signicant changes in the nature of corporate payout policy of
US rms over the last several decades. We focus our work on the eect of two of these
changes, using the present value model, into the question of what drives stock returns-
cash ows or discount rate news. Chapter 1 studies the eect of the large decrease in the
proportion of dividend paying rms in changes in expected cash ows and/or discount
rates by focusing on portfolios of dividend paying rms rather than aggregate portfolios
of all listed rms. Our results, from Chapter 1, imply that the relatively importance of
cash ows and discount rate news is intimately related to the cross-sectional variation in
the patterns of dividend payers in the stock market and provide an intuitive explanation
for the contradictory results documented in the existing literature.
Chapter 2 builds on Chapter 1 and tries to reconcile and explain why results using
the return and the book-to-market decomposition dier for the post-WW II period. It
also provides with an alternate explanation dierent from dividend smoothing for the
apparent absence of dividend growth predictability in post-WW II U.S. data. We nd
that predictive regressions based on the return on equity decomposition are sensitive
to the way in which rm-level data is aggregated. Specically we nd that when rm-
level data is weighted by value both decomposition methods -the Campbell-Shiller and
the Voulteenaho return decompositions provide strong support for cash ow news as a
driver of stock returns in post-WW II data. We also nd that, in post-WW II data,
the existence of cash ow news is driven by the fact that the biggest rms by market
capitalization are not always those that generate the biggest earnings or pay the largest
dollar dividends.
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In Chapter 3, the nal part of this work, we investigate the anatomy of corporate payouts.
Specically, we use rm-level data to understand which rms drive the changing patterns
of payouts over time and in the cross-section. Our work extends the current literature
by studying rms payouts based on industry sectors, rm age and other attributes. Our
main nding is that we nd support for our conjecture - in Chapter 2, that the biggest
rms by market capitalization are not always those that generate the biggest earnings
or pay the largest dollar dividends.
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Chapter 1
What do Dividend Paying Firms
tell us about the Return
Decomposition?
1.1 Introduction
The question of what drives stock returns - changes in expected cash ows or discount
rates is central to nance theory and has attracted much research attention. Campbell
and Shiller (1988) and Campbell (1991), using a stock return decomposition and
estimations based on VARs, nd that discount rate news is more important than news
about cash ows. In contrast, at the rm-level (Vuolteenaho, 2002), cash ows news
dominates news about expected discount rates. However, Chen, Da, and Zhao (2013)
using an alternate estimation method nd that cash ow news, in contrast to prior
research, is as important as discount rate news especially after 1985. These papers
use either an aggregate market index or large samples of listed stocks. We know
from Fama and French (2001) that the proportion of rms that pay and do not pay
dividends has changed considerably over time. In this paper, we explore what drives
stock returns focusing on investible portfolios that include only rms that pay dividends.
These portfolios have real world counterparts in for example the S&P 500 Dividend
Aristocrat Index and in mutual funds that invest in either dividend paying or non-
dividend paying stocks. Using these portfolios, we are able to focus on the component
of the aggregate market that is relevant for constructing an adjusted dividend price
ratio. This adjusted ratio reduces the noise introduced in to the denominator due to the
signicant and changing proportion of rms that do not pay dividends and for whom
the return decomposition is not dened. Using sub-periods based on observed changes
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in the patterns of dividend payments we are able to provide an intuitively appealing
rationale for the relative importance of cash ow and discount rate news documented in
the data.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 provide the motivation for studying portfolios of rm disaggregated
on their dividend payments. It depicts the proportion of rms traded on US stock
exchanges over the period 1926-2011, using the four categories in Fama and French
(2001); dividend payers and non payers, those that never paid and those that always
paid dividends. The pattern is striking. If we focus on dividend payers (the non-payers
are a mirror image of this proportion) we nd that prior to WW II (till 1938) there
was a huge drop in dividend payers from about 60% in prior to the Great Depression
to half that gure in the early 1930s. This proportion recovered by 1938 reaching again
the level achieved during the early 1920s. Subsequently (after considering the spikes
due to the addition of AMEX stocks in 1961 and NASDAQ in 1973 to the CRSP data
base) this proportion remained between 60-80% and started falling during the 1980s to
reach about 30% by 1990. However, the period after 1990 also saw a dramatic rise in
the number of rms that always paid dividends from less than 5% to more than 20% of
all CRSP rms. These changes, albeit for dierent reasons prior to 1938 and after 1990
lie behind the relative changes in the role of cash ow and discount rate news.
Our main results are as follows. First, we nd, dierent from the literature, that after the
WW II period there have been two distinct periods; from 1938-1990 when discount rate
news is more important than cash ow news and after 1990 when cash ow news is more
important than DR news. Next, we conrm earlier results that prior to WW II cash ow
news dominates discount rate news as a driver of stock returns. Finally, we nd that the
underlying cause of the changes in what drives stock returns is not dividend smoothing
but rather market-wide changes in the cross-sectional prole of dividend paying rms.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature.
Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results
and results of robustness tests. Section 6 concludes the paper.
1.2 Prior Related Research
A large literature (comprehensively reviewed in Koijen and Nieuwerburgh (2011)) has
used the stock return decomposition proposed in Campbell and Shiller (1988) and
Campbell (1991) to study the relative contribution of news about expected cash ows
and discount rates to innovations in expected stock returns. For example, Campbell
and Ammer (1993), using data on NYSE and AMEX stocks over the 1952-1987 period,
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nd that excess returns on the aggregate stock market portfolio are driven largely by
news about expected returns (70%) as compared to news about future cash ows (15%).
Vuolteenaho (2002), using annual data from 1954-1996 for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
stocks, estimates cash ow news and discount rate news at the rm-level. He nds, in
contrast to the decomposition using aggregate market returns, that at the individual
rm level CF news accounts for 70-80% of stock return variance. Voulteenaho shows
that rm-level cash ow news is largely idiosyncratic and is diversied away in aggregate
portfolios. As a result, discount rate news remains important at the portfolio level.
Chen and Zhao (2009) however, nd that the stock return decomposition obtained using
VARs can be sensitive to the choice of the predictive state variables used. They also
claim that it therefore matters whether the discount rate news is modeled (via expected
returns) or whether cash ow news is estimated as a residual. Engested, Pederson, and
Tanggaard (2011) argue that for the decomposition to be valid the asset price needs to
be included as a state variable in the VAR. Specically, if in estimating equity return
decompositions the dividend-price ratio is included then it does not matter whether a
component is directly estimated or backed out as a residual. In this paper, we follow
this advice and use the dividend-price ratio as a state variable in the VAR model.
In order to avoid issues related to the specication of the VAR, Chen, Da, and Zhao
(2013) estimate the implied cost of capital from analysts' forecasts. They then dene
cash ow news as the price change calculated by holding the implied cost of capital
constant. Their results cover a shorter period from 1985-2010 when data on analyst's
forecasts is available. They nd that, over their 1985-2010 period, there is a signicant
amount of cash ow news at both short and long horizons. This holds for both at
aggregate and rm level.
Campbell, Giglio, and Polk (2013) use quarterly data, over the 1929-2010 period,
to estimate the relative magnitudes of discount rate and cash ow news. They use
unrestricted VARs and VARs with restrictions imposed by an intertemporal CAPM.
They nd that the Great Depression, the recession of 1937-1938 and the nancial crises
of 2007-2009 are largely driven by bad news about future cash ows. However some
episodes such as the market downturn in 2000-02 are largely driven by discount rates
news.
Our paper builds on the corporate nance literature on changes in patterns of dividends
payouts at the rm and aggregate level both over time and across the cross-section of
listed rms. Fama and French (2001) are the rst to document a large decline over
1978-1999 in the proportion of industrial rms that pay dividends. They nd that this
dramatic change is due both to changes in the population of rms that are now publicly
held and to a reduced propensity to pay dividends. It is important to note that Fama
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and French (2001) emphasize that their results show a reduction in the number and
percent of dividend paying rms rather than the notion that dividends themselves are
disappearing.
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004) conrm this radical transformation in
corporate dividend practices and also report that it does not indicate that dividends
are disappearing. They nd that dividends paid by industrial rms actually increased
over 1978-2000, both in nominal and in real terms (by 224.6% and 22.7% respectively)
although there was a more than 50% decline in the number of payers. They suggest two
reasons for this; the rst is that the reduction in payers occurred almost entirely among
rms that paid very small dividends. Hence the loss of these rms' dividends has only
a small impact on the aggregate supply of dividends. Second, the amount of dividends
paid increased substantially among the largest payers reecting a marked increase in
their real earnings.
In short, the increase in real dividends paid by rms at the top of the dividend
distribution was much larger than the dividend reduction associated with the loss of
many small payers at the bottom. They show that these secular changes reect high
and increasing dividend concentration.
Fuller and Goldstein (2011) further examine whether portfolios of dividend-paying rms
outperform those of non-dividend-paying rms. They nd that dividend-paying rms
outplay non-dividend-paying rms by more when the market declines than when the
market is increasing. Floyd, Li, and Skinner (2013) also study the payout polices of US
rms over the 1980-2010 period. They nd a strong rise in payouts for both industrials
and nancials starting in 2001. Of interest to our study is their creation of portfolios
of rms in six dierent payer groups: rms that only pay dividends, rms that pay
both dividends and repurchases, rms that only pay repurchases, rms that do not pay
dividends or repurchases (non-payers), all rms that pay dividends, and all rms that
pay repurchases. Floyd, Li, and Skinner (2013) nd (similar to Fama and French (2001))
that the fraction of industrials paying dividends declines steadily over time, from a high
of 57% in 1980 to a low of 15% in 2002. Further they nd that the fraction of rms that
only pay dividends declines from 57% in 1980 to a low of 7% in 2000. After this, however,
the decline reverses; the fraction of dividend-payers increases from 15% in 2002 to 23%
in 2006 to 2008 before declining slightly to 22% in 2009 and is back to 25% in 2010.
Floyd, Li and Skinner also document that repurchases are of any signicance only after
1980 and hence we also use this as the date after which study the role of repurchases
and dividends together.
To sum up, we bring together in this paper the literature on return decomposition
and that in corporate nance by focusing on portfolios of rms that pay dividends. It
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turns out that at various periods beginning from 1926 the proportion of rms that pay
dividends and those that do not pay dividends at all has changed dramatically over
relatively short time periods. We use these changes to determine data driven episodes
to which we apply the return decomposition to estimate the relative role of cash ows
news and discount rates. Since we use dividend paying rms we can remove from the
sample non-dividend payers to whom the return decomposition does not apply. This
allows us to reduce the noise in the data and to get a clearer picture of what drives stock
returns.
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 The Return Decomposition framework
Campbell and Shiller (1988) provide a convenient framework for analyzing cash-ow
and discount-rate shocks. They develop a loglinear approximate present-value relation
that allows for time-varying discount rates. Linearity is achieved by approximating the
denition of log return on a dividend-paying asset, rt+1  log(Pt+1 + Dt+1)   log(Pt),
around the mean log dividend-price ratio, (dt   pt), using a rst-order Taylor expansion.
Above, P denotes price, D dividend, and lower-case letters log transforms. The resulting
approximation is:
rt+1 ' + pt+1 + (1  )dt+1   pt (1.1)
where  and  are parameters of linearization dened by   1
(1+exp(dt pt)) and  is a
linearization constant     log()  (1  )log( 1 1). When the dividend-price ratio is
constant, then  = P(P+D) , the ratio of the ex-dividend to the cum-dividend stock price.
This approximation replaces the log sum of price and dividend with a weighted average
of log price and log dividend, where the weights are determined by the average
relative magnitudes of these two variables. Solving equation (1.1) by iterating forward,
imposing the "no-innite-bubbles" terminal condition that limj!1 jpt+j = 0, taking
expectations, and subtracting the current dividends, results in:
pt   dt = 
(1  ) + Et
1X
j=0
j [dt+1+j   rt+1+j ] (1.2)
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where d denotes log dividend growth. Equation (1.2) says that the log price-dividend
ratio is high when dividends are expected to grow rapidly, or when stock returns are
expected to be low. It needs to be noted that the above equation is an accounting
identity rather than a behavioral model. Intuitively, if the stock price is high today,
then from the denition of the return and the terminal condition that the dividend-
price ratio is non-explosive, there must either be high dividends or low stock returns in
the future. Campbell (1991) extends the loglinear present-value approach to obtain a
decomposition of returns. Substituting (1.2) into the approximate return equation gives
rt+1   Etrt+1 = (Et+1   Et)
1X
j=0
jdt+1+j   (Et+1   Et)
1X
j=0
pjrt+1+j
= eCF;t+1   eDR;t+1 (1.3)
where NCF denotes news about future cash ows (i.e dividends or consumption), and
NDR denotes news about future discount rates (i.e expected returns). This equation says
that unexpected stock returns must be associated with changes in expectations of future
cash ows or discount rates. In other words, an increase in expected future cash ows
is associated with a capital gain today, while an increase in discount rates is associated
with a capital loss today. This is because with a given dividend stream, higher future
returns can only be generated by future price appreciation from a lower current price.
If this decomposition is applied to the returns on the investor's portfolio then these
return components can also be interpreted as permanent and transitory shocks to the
investor's wealth. Since neither expected cash ows nor discount rates are observable,
the procedure most often used in the literature and the one we rely on, is to predict cash
ows and discount rates as functions of the predictive variables using VAR estimates.
We will see later that this mechanism is subject to estimation errors
1.3.2 The VAR model
Campbell (1991) uses vector vector autoregressive (VAR) model to estimate the cash-
ow-news and discount-rate-news series. This method rst estimates the terms Etrt+1
and (Et+1  Et)
P1
j=0 p
jrt+1+j and then uses realizations of rt+1 and Equation (1.3) to
back out the cash-ow news. It is assumed that the data are generated by a rst-order
VAR model
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zt+1 = a+  zt + ut+1 (1.4)
where zt+1 is a m-by-1 state vector with rt+1 as its rst element, a and   are m-by-1
vector and m-by-m matrix of constant parameters, and ut+1 an i.i.d. m-by-1 vector
of shocks. Of course, this formulation also allows for higher-order VAR models via a
simple redenition of the state vector to include lagged values. Provided that the process
in equation (1.4) generates the data, t + 1 cash-ow and discount-rate news are linear
functions of the t+ 1 shock vector:
NDR;t+1 = e
0
1ut+1 (1.5)
NCF;t+1 = (e
0
1 + e1)ut+1
Above, e1 is a vector with rst element equal to unity and the remaining elements equal
to zeros. The VAR shocks are mapped to news by , dened as  =  (I    ) 1.
e1 captures the long-run signicance of each individual VAR shock to discount-rate
expectations. The greater the absolute value of a variable's coecient in the return
prediction equation (the top row of  ), the greater the weight the variable receives
in the discount-rate-news formula. More persistent variables should also receive more
weight, which is captured by the term (I    ) 1.
To measure the relative importance of returns news and dividend news in explaining
the variability of return innovations, usually the variances and covariances of each of
the components (1.5) are computed. Due to the covariance term such variance ratios
may be dicult to interpret, so instead one can orthogonalize the components using
a Cholesky decomposition. The drawback of orthogonalizing, however, is that the
Cholesky decomposition is not independent of the ordering of the variables and it is
not clear whether returns or dividends should be ordered rst. In the literature one
can nd both unorthogonalized and orthogonalized decompositions, and with various
orderings of the variables. Our results are based on a unorthogonalized decomposition
including the covariance term of returns news and dividend news.
There are a number of issues in estimation of the unobservable cash ow and discount
rate news using this VAR methodology as indicated Campbell (1991) and Campbell
and Ammer (1993). In recent work, Chen and Zhao (2009) nd that the VAR-based
decompositions are sensitive to the variables included in the VAR. Engested, Pederson,
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and Tanggaard (2011) underline the requirements needed for VAR decompositions to
be valid. They suggest, rst that if the decomposition is for excess returns an extra
news component appears in addition to cash ow news and excess return news, namely
interest rate news. Second, in order for the decomposition to be valid the asset price
needs to be included as a state variable in the VAR. They also observe that for equity
return decompositions the dividend-price ratio is the theoretically correct variable to
include. Finally, they note that if the VAR system is properly specied it does not
matter whether cash ow news or discount rate news are computed directly or one
of them is backed out as a residual. Due to the sensitivity of DR and CF news to the
choice of sample periods or predictive variables there is a growing literature that explores
some alternative methods of CF and DR news estimation that do not rely entirely on
predictive regressions and try to use direct expected cash ow measures (e.g Chen, Da
and Zhao (2013) and Da, Jagannathan and Shen (2014)). In the same line, Chapter 2
also shows that the choice of dierent denitions of the "market" portfolio inuence the
role of CF and DR news over time when using predictive regressions.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Sample Selection
We use the full sample of rms in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
monthly master le excluding American Depository Receipts (ADRs) (share code 3),
for the period 1926-2011. We do this in order to mimic the CRSP value weighted index
which is used as a proxy for the return on the stock market. For each rm, we collect
its monthly return, share volume and prices data. We exclude from the sample all
companies without a valid price, share volume or return. It is common in the literature
to exclude utility and nancial forms as well as foreign rms and ADRS (see example
Skinner (2008) among others). We therefore report also results separately for industrial
rms. We nd that they are qualitatively similar to those using our larger sample.
1.4.2 Portfolio Construction
We follow Fama and French (2001) in forming portfolios of dividend and non dividend
paying stocks. We use data on all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ listed stocks with data
in CRSP over the period from January 1926 to December 2011 except for ADRs. We
dene a rm as a dividend payer in calendar year t if its with-dividend return exceeds
its without dividend return in any month of year t (ret and retx codes in the CRSP
monthly master le). We consider all regularly scheduled dividend payments (monthly,
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quarterly, and yearly) when classifying rms as dividend-paying. We have also tried
using other dividend schedules but these produce qualitatively similar results.
Next, for each month we classify rms as either dividend-paying or non-dividend paying.
Following Black and Scholes (1974) and Kalay and Michaely (2000), we dene a stock
as a dividend-paying stock if that rm has paid dividends in the past and is expected
to continue paying on a regular basis. Hence, if a rm pays a quarterly dividend in a
month, it is classied as a dividend-paying rm. Further we also classify the months
between quarterly-dividend payments as dividend-paying months. In the case of yearly
dividend payments, we follow a similar classication in regard to the months between
the payments. In the case where rm does not pay dividends but then begins paying it
later we classify it as a non-dividend paying rm until the month the dividend is paid.
We do this in all cases except where a rm has paid dividend in its rst year in which
case it is considered as a dividend rm.
In order to facilitate replication of our work we now provide specic illustrations of how
we have classied rms in our sample in various dividend categories. First, for example,
consider a rm listed on January 2000 that does not pay any dividend until September
2002. We classify this as a non-dividend rm during the period January 2000 to August
2002. After September 2002 we classify it as a dividend-paying rm till the time the
rm stops paying a dividend, or is delisted or the sample period ends. In cases where a
rm pays a dividend and then stops paying it, we classify it as a dividend-paying rm
until the month after the scheduled dividend. For example, if a rm is lists in January
2000 and starts paying a dividend in March 2001 and then stops paying it in June 2003
we regard it as a non-dividend company for the period January 2000 to February 2001,
a dividend-paying rm for the period March 2001 to March 2003 (the month of the last
quarterly dividend in this case), and a non-dividend paying rm for the period April 2003
until it is either delisted, pays a dividend again, or the sample period ends. Finally, in
some cases a rm may reduces its scheduled dividend payment scheme. In such cases we
consider the rm to be a dividend-paying rm up until the month of the new scheduled
dividend scheme. If in the subsequent year the rm announces a new dividend scheme
or continues with the previous scheme, we again consider it as a dividend rm. For
example, suppose a rm lists in January 2000 and begins paying a quarterly dividend
as of March 2001 but stops paying in December 2003. In this case we treat it as a
non-dividend company from January 2000 through April 2003, a dividend-paying rm
from March 2001 to September 2003 and a non-dividend till the end of 2003. If the
rm starts paying a quarterly dividend in 2004 we again treat it as a dividend-paying
company again.
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To sum up, each rm is classied as either dividend-paying or non-dividend paying
for every month of the sample period in which data is available, resulting in a total
of 3,551,386 rm months in our sample period, of which 1,700,986 rm months are
dividend-paying rm months and 1,850,400 are non-dividend-paying rm months. When
forming portfolios we use both value and equal weighting and report results for each case
separately.
1.4.3 Estimation of the Cash Flow and Discount Rate News
We use a VAR to estimate the relative importance of CF and DR news. Our
VAR is specied as suggested in Engested, Pederson, and Tanggaard (2011) for the
decomposition to be valid. The rst element in the VAR when using the aggregate
market is the log real return on the market usually calculated as the dierence between
the monthly log return on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-
weighted stock index and the log return on the Consumer Price Index. In our paper
we also use value and equally weighted portfolios of dividend payers, as outlined earlier,
when we study the decomposition for these categories of rms.
The second element in the VAR is the term yield spread (TY), provided by Global
Financial Data and computed as the yield dierence between ten-year constant-maturity
taxable bonds and short-term taxable notes, in percentage points. This last variable is
only available until 2002, from that year until the end of the sample we compute the
TY series as the dierence between the yield on the 10-Year US Constant Maturity
Bond (IGUSA10D) and the yield on the 1-Year US Constant Bond (IGUSA1D). The
third variable is the CRSP log dividend-price ratio (DP), that is the dierence between
the log of the cumulative dividends received within the year without reinvestment, and
the log of the price of the monthly CRSP value weighted index (excluding dividends).
Finally, we use the small-stock value spread (VS), which we construct using the data
made available by Professor Kenneth French on his web site. These portfolios, which
are constructed at the end of each June, are the intersection of two portfolios formed
on size (market equity, ME) and three portfolios formed on the ratio of book equity to
market equity (BE/ME). We generate intermediate values of VS by accumulating total
returns on the portfolios in question.
The motivation for the use of these variables is the following. Term yield spread tracks
the business cycle, as pointed out by Fama and French (1988), and there are several
reasons why we should expect aggregate returns to be correlated to the business cycle.
Second, the dividend-price ratio is included, following Campbell and Shiller (1988) and
Fama and French (1988), because it should reect any changes that may occur in future
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expected returns, and also because it is the theoretically correct variable to include in the
VAR. Finally, the small-stock value spread is included given the evidence that relatively
high returns for small growth stocks predict low aggregate returns in the market.
1.5 Empirical Results
We begin by describing Figures 1.1-1.3 that depict, over our full sample period 1926-
2011, the changes in four portfolios classied following Fama and French (2001) as
including rms; that pay dividends, do not pay dividends, always paid and never paid
dividends. Next, we describe the results of the variance decomposition of returns on
the aggregate market portfolio and separately for portfolios of rms sorted on the basis
of their dividend-payment history. We compare our results to those reported in the
literature in Campbell (1991) and Chen, Da, and Zhao (2013) using similar sample
periods. Next, we turn to our results using the three sub-periods or regimes seen in
the data. In all periods we report results of variance decompositions for the aggregate
market benchmark and other dividend category portfolios. Finally, we describe the
determinants of changes in the relative weights of the components of the expression we
use to compute the long-run news components. These weights provide further insights
in to the determinants of the cash ow and discount rate components of the return
decomposition.
1.5.1 Preliminary Data Analysis
Figure 1.1 is an updated version of the stylized facts rst reported in Fama and French
(2001). It depicts the proportion, over the period 1926-2011, of CRSP rms in four
dierent dividend categories from 1926 to 2011. Our sample includes all rms in the
CRSP universe (excluding only ADRs) that are constituents of the CRSP Indices. We
use this sample in order to reect the fact that aggregate market index commonly
used in this literature also consists of this set of rms. Following the literature in
corporate nance we separately report results for a sample where we exclude nancial
rms, utilities as well as foreign rms and ADRS (following Skinner (2008)). We nd
that the pattern seen over time of this smaller sample of rms is qualitatively similar.
In interpreting Figures 1.1-1.3 it should be noted that there are sharp shifts upwards in
the number of rms in 1961 when AMEX stocks were included in the CRSP and in 1973
when NASDAQ stocks were added to the CRSP (see for example Figure 1.3).
We rst comment on, in Figure 1.1, the variation over time between the proportion of
rms that are dividend payers and those that are non payers. These two groups have
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seen dramatic shifts during rst and the third of our sub-periods: 1926-1938, 1938-1990
and 1990-2011. For example, during the period 1926-1938 (or prior to WW II) the
proportion of dividend payers fell from over 60% to just over 30%. It rose again between
1932 and 1938 back to over 60%. After 1938 up till 1990, there were no large changes and
this proportion was between 50-70%. After the mid-1970s this proportion started falling
steadily. Similar to the pre-WW II period, after 1990 there have been large variations
in this proportion from 50% to between 30-40% in rst decade of this century. The
proportion of rms that have been non-payers is a mirror image over time of the pattern
for rms that were payers and shows again the large changes prior to WW II and after
1990.
Figure 1.1 also shows that there is a marked change prior to WW II and after 1990 in
the number of rms that never paid dividends and those that always paid dividends.
Specically, prior to WW II, there was a steady fall in the number of rms that never
paid dividends from a level of about 15% in 1926 to less than 5% after 1938. This
proportion rose with the addition of AMEX stocks and NASDAQ stocks to about 20%
of the CRSP rms. However it rose dramatically during the 1980s and by 1990 almost
40-50% of all rms had never paid dividends. The period after 1990 has also seen a rise
in the proportion of rms that always paid dividends from under 10% prior to 1990 to
around 20% by the end of the sample period in 2011.
Figure 1.2 shows the evolution over time from 1926 to 2011 of the market value of all
CRSP rms in the four dividend portfolios. It clearly shows that little attention has
been given to the constituents of the aggregate market portfolio whose relative number
has changed over time. These changes aect directly the computation of cash ow and
discount rate news as well as the dividend yield. We see, from this graph, that there are
three distinct regimes. Specically, between the start of the sample and prior to WW
II (1938) there was a huge drop in the market values of dividend payers (from above
90% to less than 70%). The market value of dividend payers again increased during
the 1930s to a level of about 75% in 1938. Then from 1938 to about 1990, the market
value of dividend payers did uctuated but remained at between 80-95% of the market
capitalization. However after 1980, the market value of dividend payers started falling.
The decade after 1990 saw a dramatic fall and rise in the market value of dividend
payers reaching a low of about 50% and rising again to around 80% by 2011. Again,
the market capitalization of non-payers is a mirror image of these changes in value of
dividend paying rms. We nd that in the 1930s the market value of dividend paying
rms decreased as rms either stopped paying dividends or were de-listed due to the
Great Depression and the recession of 1937-38. In contrast in the 1990s the decrease
appears to be due to the emergence of new rms with large market capitalization that
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never paid dividends during the technology boom. Figure 1.3 conrms this point as it
depicts the evolution of the number of rms in dierent dividend payer categories.
The take away from this exploratory data analysis is the following. It is clear that using
measures of the aggregate market for computing the dividend yield masks the nature of
dividend patterns in the constituent rms. This does not matter for the computation of
dividend growth which is based on the actual cash paid out by all the rms included in
the sample whether they pay or do not pay dividends. However, as seen above the full
sample of all rms includes rms to whom the dividend decomposition does not apply
since the rms do not have any dividend payments at all. Thus, the dividend yield
obtained using the market value of all rms does not reect the actual dividend yield
since not all stocks in the "market" portfolio pay dividends. The noise introduced in the
dividend yield computation by the use of the aggregate market value rather than data on
rms that pay dividends turns out to be important for the variance decomposition. This
is because the return decomposition is not dened for rms that do not pay dividends.
We now turn to our results for the variance decomposition using the return on the market
as a benchmark and compare results using portfolios of rms that paid dividends and
the extreme case of rms that always paid dividends.
1.5.2 Variance decomposition
We rst report results for the full sample period we use (1927-2011) and our three
sub-periods: Pre-WW II, 1938-1990 and 1990-2011. Next we report results using time
periods similar to Campbell (1991) and Chen, Da, and Zhao (2013) for comparison.
1.5.2.1 Results for 1926-2011 sample period
Table 1.1 reports results of the return decomposition for the full sample period i.e.
1927:1-2011:12 and for the three sub-periods that we nd based on Figure 2, to have
dierent regimes and patterns for the cross-sectional distribution of dividend payment
characteristics of rms. We report results for our benchmark case i.e. value weighted
portfolios of all rms or the market index used in the prior literature and then using a
portfolio of dividend paying rms and rms that have always paid dividends. We see
that for the benchmark case i.e. in eect the value weighted CRSP index CF news (36%)
and DR news (31%) are equally important for the full sample period 1926-2011. These
results echo those reported in Campbell (1991) and Campbell and Ammer (1993). Again
for the full sample period, in the case of dividend paying rm our results are similar
to those for all rms. This is due to the fact that dividend paying rms, on average,
play a dominant role across the full sample period. Finally, in the case of rms that
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always pay dividends the CF news component is twice that for the discount rate. This
is as expected since focusing on this portfolio of rms gives a dominant role to cash ow
news.
We now turn to our main results based on our subperiods; 1927-1938, 1938-1990 and
1990-2011. In our rst sub-sample period, i.e. prior to WW II, CF news (78%) is
much more important than DR news (6%) for the sample of all rms. We note that
these results are similar to those in Campbell, Polk and Giglio (2013). This period
was marked by the Great Depression and the recession of 1937-38 where investors were
particularly impacted by (bad) cash ow news.
Subsequently, during the period from 1938-1990, we see that this pattern is completely
reversed. Now DR news (96%) dominates CF news (15%). Except for the spikes in the
data due to the addition of AMEX and NASDAQ rms this entire period did not see
large changes in either the number or market value of dividend paying rms. However, in
the most recent sub-period (1990-2011), again characterized by large swings in dividend
payment patterns, discount rate news becomes less important and now contributes only
half of the variation seen in period 2 while the cash ow component increases to about
25% from 15%.
Using portfolios of dividend payers and rms that always paid dividends we nd results
that are dramatically dierent from those for the aggregate market return. During the
rst sub-period, compared to the all rms benchmark sample, CF news is much more
important than DR news (91%) for dividend payers. In the case of rms that always pay
dividends almost all the variation now comes only from cash ow news. The economic
intuition for these results lies in the large fall in the proportion of rms that stopped
paying dividends around 1930 and the rapid reversal of this within a few years leading
up to 1938. In addition rms that still paid out dividends reduced the amount of their
dividend payments. There is further support for this fact in the data when we look at
changes in dividend growth in this sub-period. We see a large fall in dividend growth
around the 1930s and a subsequent positive spike in the late thirties. The eect of these
volatile changes in dividend payments resulted in the predominant role for cash ow
news in determining innovations to real returns.
During, the second sub-period 1938-1990, in contrast to the pre-WW II period, the
market value of dividend payers did not uctuate much and remained around 80-90% of
the total market capitalization. During this sub-period, there is a reversal in the relative
importance of the two news components. Now, for the full sample, for the aggregate
market return discount rate news dominates (96%) compared to cash ow news (15%).
Remarkably, in the case of dividend payers discount rate (92%) dominates cash ow
news (15%). Even in the case rms that have always paid dividends, discount rate
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news is still dominant but is slightly less at 76% with cash ow news at 25%. The
intuition for these results is based on the fact that, unlike in the rst period, there is
little variation in the proportions of rms paying dividends and thus the contribution
to return variation comes largely from discount rate changes. Further, compared to the
rst period, dividend growth is also much less volatile through this whole period again
emphasizing the role of discount rates in contributing to innovation in real returns.
Now we turn to the third and most recent sub-period from 1990-2011. In the benchmark
case i.e. all sample rms discount rate news still dominates (51%) but this is only half of
that in the previous period. The average results of all rms however mask an interesting
change in the relative contribution of discount rate and cash ow news. In the case of
dividend paying rms, cash ow news (48%) is more important than DR news (28%).
This is in complete contrast to the results when all rms are included in the sample. For
the rms that always paid dividends the cash ow component increases dramatically and
now 71% of variation is from CF news and only 27% from discount rate news. We see
that this period is marked by a large increase in the proportion of rms that never paid
dividends from a level of about 10% to over 40% of all rms. In contrast the proportion
of rms that paid dividends was fairly stable at around 40-50% of all rms in the market.
A consequence of this was that the market value of rms that paid dividends decreased
dramatically from 90% to less than 60% over a short period of time. In the last few
years of the sample, there is also a fall in the number of rms that never paid dividends
resulting in an increase in market value of payers.
Finally, gure 1.4 depicts graphically the weights used to construct the discount-rates
for the full sample period and for the three sub-periods that are suggested to have
dierent regimes and patterns for the cross sectional distribution characteristics of rms.
As in the Figures described earlier the weights vary signicantly both, across sample
periods and across portfolios. The weight corresponding to the dividend price ratio
is quantitatively the largest but it also varies depending on the sample or the type of
portfolios used in the VAR. Overall, the predominance of DR news coincides with a
larger weight assigned to the residual from the dividend price ratio and the low value
or negative valued weight on the real return. We note here that the return innovation
and the return news component are computed directly while the CF or dividend news
component is obtained as a residual.
The change on the weights from the rst to the second period is behind the dramatic
reversals in the CF and DR variances for all portfolio categories. The real return and
term yield spread weights become smaller while the weight for the dividend yield weight
increases dramatically and the value spread weight is negative. Only in the case of
always dividend companies is the weight on the dividend yield smaller resulting in the
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higher DR variance and lower CF variance than in the other two periods. Finally, in
the last period we nd that CF variance dominates for the case of dividend and always
dividend rms in contrast to the aggregate market case. This is due to the lower value
of the weight on the dividend price ratio for dividend companies. We also note, in
passing, the following intuitive explanation arising from the analysis of the weights: a)
the term yield tracks the business cycle. It is large in the rst period (great depression)
and almost zero during the second period and is large and important during the period
1990-2011 b) the value spread is only positive during the rst sub-period of the 30s with
the exception of all dividend companies and c) the dividend yield variable is important
and is related to dividend growth and return predictability.
1.5.2.2 Comparison with Campbell (1991)
In Table 1.2, we report the results of the variance decomposition using sample periods
similar to that in Campbell (1991); the full period 1927-1988 and sub-periods 1927-51
and 1952-1988. We nd, over the full Campbell sample period, results that are similar
when using the full sample of rms. Also we nd, during the 1927-1951 and 1952-88
sub-periods that the pattern of CF news and DR news are similar.
1.5.2.3 Comparison with Chen, Da and Zhao (2013)
In Table 1.3 we divide the full sample period, 1927-2011, in the following sub-periods
following Chen, Da and Zhao (2013); 1927-2011, 1952-2011 and 1985-2011 to facilitate
comparison with Tables 2 and 4 of their paper. Table 3 shows that for the benchmark
portfolio of all rms and dividend paying rms CF news and DR news are equally
important drivers of real stock returns. However in the case of always dividend paying
rms CF news (43%) is more important than DR news (21%). Using a VARmethodology
Chen, Da and Zhao report, for a similar time period, that CF contributes 79% and DR
news 21% for their longest horizon of 28 quarters. We note that our results are for an
innite horizon. During the 1952-2010 sub-period we nd that DR news (53%) is more
important than CF news (18%). This holds true also for dividend payers as well as rms
that always paid dividends. Our results here are similar to those reported Chen, Da and
Zhao (2013) using a VAR and reporting results for a 20 quarter horizon. Finally, we
nd that for the period 1985-2010, that DR news is more important than CF news for
the benchmark aggregate portfolio. However for dividend payers the importance of DR
news is lower and in the case of rms that always pay dividend CF news (54%) is more
important than DR news (43%). Using their implied cost of capital method, Chen, Da
and Zhao's main result is that CF news (59%) is more important than DR news(41%).
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1.6 Conclusions
A central question in nance is to understand, using a simple present value model, to
what extent asset prices are driven by news about future cash ows or news about future
discount rates or risk premia. The variation of expected returns or alternately the time
variation in the price-dividend ratio is intimately linked to time variation in expected
dividend growth rates through the Campbell and Shiller (1988) return identity. In this
paper, we study for the rst time, as far as we are aware, return decompositions of stock
returns using portfolios of dividend paying rms and excluding non-dividend payers in
whose case the return decomposition is not dened.
Our main result is that the relative importance of cash ows and discount rate news is
intimately related to the cross-sectional variation in the pattern of dividend payers in
the stock market. During periods when there are rapid changes in this composition are
marked by a larger importance for cash ow news while during periods that do not see
much change discount rate news matters more. Specically we nd that in the pre-WW
II period stocks returns were driven by investor's concerns over cash ow rather than
discount rate news. During the period following WW II and till 1990, discount rate
news played a dominant role. In the period after 1990, again cash ow news is gaining
importance reecting the uncertain environment rising from recession and the nancial
crises of 2007-2009.
The empirical analysis in this Chapter is based on U.S market data and in the
environment of the U.S. nancial system. These results are based therefore on the
largest equity market in the world. If a similar analysis is done on smaller markets, e.g
like one the European Union markets, the results are likely to be dierent mainly due
to the smaller size of these markets, the domination of these market by few large rms,
the importance of the bank system in some countries and other legal and institutional
dierences in trading and stock market regulations. An avenue for future work could be
to do a similar analysis of other national stock markets and compared and contrast the
results with those of the U.S market. There are also other limitations to the empirical
analysis in this Chapter. First, the data pertains to the period which is available on
the WRDS database. There are also other pre-1920s data in other sources and the
results we have obtained may be not be possible to generalize to other time periods.
Another limitation is that we have relied largely on the Campbell and Shiller return
decomposition. However, there are other methods that rely on dierent decompositions.
As a consequence, my results are limited to pros and cons of using the Campbell and
Shiller decomposition which are well known and refereed to earlier in the Chapter. In
addition, the same issues as explored in this Chapter can also be based on alternative
approached like the Implied Cost of Capital.
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1.7 Figures and Tables
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Figure 1.1: The percentage of CRSP rms in dierent dividend groups
Note: The CRSP monthly sample includes all available NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq
securities except for ADRs since 1926. A rm is dened as a dividend payer in calendar
year t if its with-dividend return exceeds its without dividend return in any month of year
t. Following Black and Scholes (1974) and Kalay and Michaely (2000), we dene a stock
as a dividend-paying stock if that rm has paid dividends in the past and is expected to
continue paying in a regular basis. We therefore classify IBM, as a dividend paying stock
for all 12 months, not just for the four months of the year a dividend is paid. The two
subgroups of payers and non-payers are rms that have always and never paid dividends
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Figure 1.2: The market value of CRSP rms in dierent dividend groups
Note: The CRSP monthly sample includes all NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq securities
since 1926. We dene a stock as a payer if that rm has paid dividends for all months,
not just for the month that paid dividend. Following the denition of the CRSP value-
weighted index, we have calculated the value weighted of the dierent dividend groups as
the sum of the market value of each group of stocks at the end of the previous trading
period, divided by the total market value of all stock in the CRSP sample that trading
period. The two subgroups of payers and non-payers are rms that have always and never
paid dividends
20
Figure 1.3: The Number of CRSP Firms in Dierent Dividend Groups
Note: The CRSP monthly sample includes all available NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq
securities except for ADRs since 1926. A rm is dened as a dividend payer in calendar
year t if its w ith-dividend return exceeds its without dividend return in any month of year
t. Following Black and Scholes (1974) and Kalay and Michaely (2000), we dene a stock
as a dividend-paying stock if that rm has paid dividends in the past and is expected to
continue paying in a regular basis. We therefore classify IBM, as a dividend paying stock
for all 12 months, not just for the four months of the year a dividend is paid. The two
subgroups of payers and non-payers are rms that have always and never paid dividends
21
Figure 1.4: Weights used to transform residuals into discount rate-news
Note: This Figure depicts graphically the weights used to construct the discount-
rates for the full sample period and for the three sub-periods that are suggested to have
dierent regimes and patterns for the cross sectional distribution characteristics of rms.
Breakpoints are chosen following the patterns showed in gure (1.2)
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Chapter 2
What Drives Stock Returns?
New Evidence from Post-WW II
U.S. Markets
2.1 Introduction
Empirical research on return predictability based on the Campbell-Shiller return
decomposition nds that, in post-WW II U.S. data, the dividend yield can predict
aggregate returns, but not dividend growth. In other words, during this period stock
return variation is largely driven by changes in discount rates rather than changes in
cash ows. In contrast, in pre-WW II U.S. data dividend growth is strongly predictable
by the dividend yield. It has been suggested that this dramatic change is due to
dividend smoothing policies adopted by rms in the post-WW II period. This conclusion
is based on predictive regressions that rely on the Voulteenaho book-to-market ratio
decomposition that uses earnings rather than dividends data. In this Chapter we nd
using standard predictive regressions based on both decompositions, in contrast to prior
work, that cash ow also drives stock return variation during the post-WW II period.
Our result has important implications for asset pricing theory as well as for the related
literature in corporate nance. As Cochrane (2008) notes, "Excess return forecastability
is not a comforting result. .... If all market price-dividend ratio variation comes
from varying expected returns and none from varying expected growth in dividends
or earnings, much of the rest of nance still needs to be rewritten."
To place our results in perspective we note that Chen (2009) is the rst to report that
there is a tale of two periods - dividend growth predictability in the pre-WW II period
and evidence supporting return predictability in the post-WW II period. He also studies
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whether this reversal arises from dividend payout policies by using the earnings-based
book-to-market return decomposition of Vuolteenaho (2002). However, he nds results
similar to those using the Campbell-Shiller return decomposition that employs dividend
data. He conjectures that changing dividend payout policies seem unlikely to fully
explain why there is a reversal of predictability. On the other hand, Chen, Da and Zhao
(2013) using the same book-to-market decomposition report that cash ow explains 34%
of annual return variance in the post-WW II period. Their evidence implies that cash
ow news is important in driving stock returns at the aggregate level when measures of
cash ow dierent from dividends are used.
In this Chapter, we re-visit these conicting results. We show that predictive regressions
based on the book-to-market decomposition are sensitive to the way in which rm-
level data is aggregated i.e. whether the aggregate series are value-weighted or not.
Chen, Da and Zhao (2013), as we describe later, use market value weights to create the
aggregate series used in estimating their predictive regressions. In a dierent context but
in a similar spirit, Rangvid, Schmeling and Schrimpf (2013) use country market value
weights to construct global aggregate series that they then use in standard predictive
regressions. This value weighting diers from that used in Chen (2009) which is similar
to that implicitly used in the literature when aggregate data like the CRSP VW index
are used to construct the aggregate dividend growth and dividend yield series. Our
main contribution in this Chapter is the following. We use rm-level data to construct
the aggregate series used in predictive regressions: the dividend yield, the dividend
growth and the aggregate return using three dierent weighting schemes. The rst is to
calculate total amounts of dividends and market values and calculate annual aggregate
returns, dividend growth and dividend yield. It is common to create dividends from
the CRSP series. On the other hand, the second and the third weighting method
compute rm-level annual dividend growth, dividend yield and returns and collapse
them into value-weighted and equally-weighted aggregate annual time series. We nd
that using the value-weighting, as in Chen, Da and Zhao (2013), predictive regressions
applying the Campbell-Shiller and the Vuolteenaho (2002) return decompositions show
that in post-WW II data both dividend growth and the ROE are strongly predictable.
Hence, predictive regressions are aected by the way the aggregated data is constructed
and changing dividend policies seem unlikely to fully explain why there is a reversal
of predictability because predictability results from using dividends and/or earnings are
similar when the aggregate variables are weighted in a similar manner. We also show that
these dierences in predictability are driven by the weighting implicitly used to aggregate
rm-level data, in the current literature, where the aggregate dividend growth series is
inuenced by the rms that are the largest dividend payers. This specic weighting
scheme has osetting eects on the dividend price ability to predict future dividend
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growth because, in the data for the post-WW II period, we show that it is not always
the largest rms by market capitalization that pay the largest dividends. Hence, this
reversal in predictability is likely caused by the phenomenon seen in the cross-section of
rms and does not arise from dividend smoothing by rms in this period.
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. We begin with a review of selected
related research in Section II. Next, in Section III, we outline the standard methodology
of predictive regressions. Here we also provide details of the data and the construction
of the aggregate return on equity and book-to-market series. Section IV describes
our empirical results. In Section V we report results of tests of robustness. Section
VI presents the results from Monte-Carlo simulations, and Section VII concludes the
Chapter.
2.2 Prior Related Research
The literature on stock return predictability is vast and we refer interested readers to
recent surveys by Goyal and Welch (2008), Koijen and Nieuwerburgh (2011) and Rapach
and Zhou (2013). In this brief review we focus on prior work that uses the present value
model to study the predictive ability of dividend yield for dividend growth and returns.
We next outline related work in corporate nance on changes over time and across the
cross-section in dividend payment patterns of US rms.
The stock return decomposition of Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Campbell (1991)
has been widely used to explore the relative contribution of news about future cash ows
and discount rates to innovations in expected stock returns. For example, in early work,
Campbell and Ammer (1993) nd that excess returns on the aggregate stock market
portfolio are driven largely by news about expected returns (70%) as compared to news
about future cash ows (15%). Using a decomposition of the book-to-market ratio, that
allows for rm-level analysis, Vuolteenaho (2002) nds that cash ow news accounts
for 70-80% of stock return variance. This dierence is attributed to the diversication
away of rm-level cash ow news when forming portfolios leading to the dominance of
discount rate news at the aggregate level.
We now turn to work that is directly related to this Chapter and on which we build.
Chen (2009), using U.S. market data from 1872-2005, nds a dramatic reversal of return
predictability between the pre-WW II and post-WW II data. In the period prior to WW
II cash ow news matters but in the post-WW II period discount rate news dominates.
He considers several likely explanations for this reversal. He nds that the reversal is not
due to either a smaller number of rms in the stock market during the 1872-1926 period
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nor due to rms in specic industry sectors like railroads. He then uses the Vuolteenaho
book-to-market/return on equity decomposition but nds that this evidence is similar to
that using the dividend data i.e. that "changing dividend policies seem unlikely to fully
explain why there is a reversal of predictability". Finally, he also reports that "reduced
cash ow volatility (in THE post-WW II period) is also unlikely to be the direct source
of the reversal of predictability".
Chen, Da and Priestley (2012) focus on explaining why cash ow news is unimportant
in driving stock returns during the post-WW II period. They nd using variants of
the Lintner model a dramatic increase in dividend smoothing by managers during
the post-WW II period relative to the prior period. They conclude that ". as such,
dividends are a poor measure of future cash ows, and it becomes pointless to infer
cash ow predictability from dividend predictability". They use a net payout and
a book-to-market decomposition - since these may be aected by rm-level dividend
smoothing - and estimate the implied predictive regressions. They apply the net payout
decomposition (follows Larrain and Motohiro (2008)) to aggregate annual dividends,
repurchases, and new issue in dollars and book equity obtained by summing these up
across all rms. They then obtain, using the clean surplus formula, earnings data for
each rm year. This data is then used to create an annual aggregate data series that
they term "...the market portfolio... (over) the period 1928-2006".
Our work is closely related to Chen, Da and Zhao (2013). The main focus of this paper is
to estimate an implied cost of capital for rms using earnings forecasts by analysts. Here
we describe only the part of their work that uses predictive regressions and is relevant
to our work. They also use aggregate data i.e. data aggregated from rm-level data
in predictive regressions (again following Larrain and Motohiro (2008)), based on the
net equity payout (dividend plus repurchase minus issuance) similar to Chen, Da and
Priestley (2012). They conclude that there is no reversal in the importance of cash ow
news. Next, they use the Vuolteenaho book-to-market decomposition and nd that cash
ow news accounts for 34% of return variation. We note, in the context of our Chapter,
that here they use aggregate returns, return on equity and book-to market ratios using
value-weighted rm-level data (see their footnote 7, page 21). We also notice that Chen,
Da and Priestly (2013) use the same value weighting scheme for calculating the aggregate
implied cost of capital.
We note here, that an alternate to standard predictive regressions is to use ltering
techniques, relying on the present value model, to extract expected returns and dividend
growth rates using the whole history of these series. Koijen and Binsbergen (2010) nd
that expected returns and dividend growth rates are good predictors of realized returns
and dividend growth rates with R-squares ranging from 8.2% to 8.9% for returns and
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13.9% to 31.6% for dividend growth rates. Kelly and Pruitt (2013) propose a three-
step regression method to incorporate information in the cross-section of rm valuation
ratios. They nd that both returns and cash ow growth are highly predictable by the
dividend yield. Our work is related to Kelly and Pruitt (2013), in that we also use
the information in the cross-section of stocks but rely on standard predictive regression
methods.
Finally, our work is closely linked to the literature in corporate nance that studies the
time series and cross-sectional patterns in dividend payout. For example, DeAngelo,
DeAngelo and Skinner (2004), following up on Fama and French (2001), report that
dividends paid by industrial rms increased over the 1978-2000 period, both in nominal
and in real terms (by 224.6% and 22.7% respectively), although there was a 50% - plus
decline in the number of payers. They show that these secular changes reect high and
increasing dividend concentrations. We build on this work and analyze the relationship
between rm payouts and market capitalization over time and link this to the use of
market value and equal weighting methods in estimating standard predictive regressions.
Boudoukh et al. (2007) and Skinner (2008) nd that after the 1990s repurchases
have become a very important method of returning cash to shareholders. Hence, in
our analysis, we also account for the eect of repurchases when studying the relation
between payouts and rm size over time. Our work is also related to Rangvid, Schmeling
and Schrimpf (2013) who nd that aggregate dividend growth is highly predictable by
dividend yields in medium-sized and smaller countries but not in larger equity markets
like the U.S. In aggregating country-level data to global quantities they also weight
the country markets by market capitalization. This weighting is thus analogous to the
intra-country value weighting by rm market capitalization that we use in creating our
aggregate data. We note that Chen, Da and Zhao (2013) also use the same weighting
criteria in their work as indicated earlier.
To sum up, prior research nds that using standard predictive regressions that expected
returns rather than cash ows matter in the variation of post-WW II U.S. market
returns. On the other hand, ltering methods used to extract the same series from
the entire past history and incorporate cross-sectional information nds that cash ows
do matter. In addition, research in corporate nance nds that there is considerable
variation, across rms, of the proportion of aggregate dividend that individual rms
pay. We reconcile these conicting results by using predictive regressions based on equal
and value weighting schemes. We are able to then account for the fact that the largest
market capitalization rms are not always the rms that pay the largest dollar dividends.
As a result, our predictive regressions are now "balanced" i.e. all variables entering it
are weighted in a similar way. We now turn to a short description of the present value
based predictive regression.
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2.3 Data and Methodology
2.3.1 Methodology
The traditional approach to understand the relative importance of cash ow and discount
rate news is to estimate predictive regressions based on the Campbell and Shiller (1988)
return decomposition. This decompositions provides the underlying framework to study
the predictive ability of dividend yield for stock returns and dividend growth.
pt   dt = 
(1  ) + Et
1X
j=0
j [dt+1+j   rt+1+j ] (2.1)
Equation 2.1 shows that the dividend-price ratio should predict future returns and/or
dividend growth. It also implies that the current log dividend-to-price ratio (d-p) is
positively correlated with future log returns (r) and the future dividend yield at time
t + k and negatively correlated with future log dividend growth (d). Equation 2.1
motivates some of the earliest empirical work in the stock return predictability literature
which regresses returns on the lagged dividend-price ratio.
(rt+1   r) = br(dt   pt) + rt+1 (2.2)
(4dt+1   d) = bd(dt   pt) + dt+1 (2.3)
where r is the log-run mean return and r is a mean-zero innovation. However, the logic
of Equation 2.1 suggests that the dividend-price ratio could predict future dividend
growth rates instead of, or in addition to, future returns. Testing for dividend growth
predictability would lead one to estimate equation 2.3, where d denotes the long-run
mean log dividend growth. Thus, Cochrane (2008) argues that studying the joint
distribution of both the return and dividend coecients provides a more powerful
statistical test than studying them separately. By denition, the variation of the
dividend yield must reect revisions of expected dividend growth and/or expected
returns. Therefore, a null of no return predictability must mean dividend growth
predictability and vice versa. Further, combining the present-value relation with the
standard predictive regressions above and K(dt+K   pt+K) = aKdp + bKdp(dt + pt) + dpt+k,
the identity involving the predictability coecients associated with the dividend yield
(d-p) at horizon K is:
br = 1  + bd (2.4)
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The above equation can also be interpreted as a variance decomposition for the log
dividend yield. Here, the predictive coecients bKr , b
K
d and b
K
dp represent the fraction of
the variance of current d-p attributable to return, dividend growth and dividend yield
predictability respectively.
The general conclusion of the literature, using predictive regressions, is that in the
post-WW II period the dividend-price ratio (i.e., dividend yield) can predict aggregate
returns, but not dividend growth. As indicated earlier, this nding has led to the widely
accepted view that almost all the variation in the dividend yield is driven by the variation
in discount rates (Cochrane 1992, 2008, 2011; Campbell and Ammer 1993). However,
Chen (2009) shows that dividend growth is strongly predictable by the dividend yield
in 1872-1945, but this predictability completely disappears in the post-war period. This
nding raises an interesting paradox because conclusions regarding asset price variations
based on the relative dividend growth/return predictability ndings are diametrically
opposite for the pre- and post-war periods.
In Campbell and Shiller (1988) predictive regressions data on dividend growth is used.
It is possible that the pattern of aggregate dividends may be aected due to dividend
smoothing policies followed by rms (Lintner, 1956). Such policies might make dividend
growth unpredictable in the post-war period. One way to avoid using dividend data
is to study earnings predictability rather than dividend growth predictability since
earnings are less aected by corporate payout policies (see also Ang and Bekaert, 2007).
Specically, Vuolteenahoo (2002) shows that one can express the book-to-market ratio
as
bt  mt = constant+
1X
j=1
j [rt+j 1   roet+j 1] (2.5)
where bt  mt is the log book-to-market ratio, rt is the stock return, and roet is the log
return on book equity (ROE) dened as
roet = ln

Et
Bt 1

(2.6)
where the ROE is the earnings over the last period's book equity. Equation (5) indicates
that we can repeat the earlier predictive regressions by replacing the dividend yield by
the book-to-market ratio and the dividend growth rate by the ROE. Chen (2009) and
Chen, Da and Zhao (2013) use these regressions to avoid any dividend data but arrive
at dierent results. In the next section we show that their diering results arise from
the way the aggregate data is constructed and that dividend smoothing policies seem
unlikely to fully explain why there is a reversal of predictability.
32
In our work, we follow Cochrane (2008, 2011) and estimate direct unweighted long-
horizon regressions for both, the Campbell and Shiller (1988) and the Vuolteenahoo
(2002) return decompositions. For brevity, we only present here the method to estimate
direct un-weighted long-horizon regressions of future log returns, log dividend growth
and the log dividend-to-price ratio on the current dividend-to-price ratio:
rt;t+k = a
K
r + b
K
r (dt   pt) + rt+k (2.7)
4dt;t+k = aKd + bKd (dt   pt) + dt+k (2.8)
where rt;t+k and dt;t+k denote either the unweighted or weighted (by 
j 1) sum of
one period returns and dividend growth, respectively from period t to t+k. The use
of overlapping data implies that the errors, rt+k and 
d
t+k have a moving average
structure of order k-1 by construction. It is standard to rely on Newey and West
(1987) adjusted errors with k-1 lags. However, following Ang and Bekaert (2007) we
only report Hodrick (1992) standard errors as these retain the correct size in small
samples. We also report results using a rst-order VAR model as an alternative to
direct multi-period predictive regressions. The decomposition based on this approach
diers from the variance decomposition implied by direct long-horizon regressions in
that the long-horizon coecients are not estimated directly but are those implied by the
VAR estimates. We note that if a rst order VAR does not fully capture the dynamics
of the data generating process for r, d-p, and d then this variance decomposition may
be a poor approximation of the true decomposition. On the other hand, a VAR may
have better nite-sample properties i.e. there may be a trade o here between power
and misspecication.
2.3.2 Data Construction
We estimate the predictive regressions using annual data for the 1928-2012 period.
For the return and ROE predictability exercises below, we combine the Compustat
annual tape with the CRSP data following Vuolteenaho (2002) and Cohen, Polk,
and Vuolteenaho (2003). The denition of book equity follows Cohen, Polk, and
Vuolteenahoo (2003), and the book equity data for the earlier years are from Davis,
Fama, and French (2000). Earnings for each rm-year are obtained through the clean
surplus formula.1
Ei;t = Bi;t  Bi;t 1 +Di;t (2.9)
1This calculation can potentially include stock repurchases and issuance. We calculate an alternative
ROE following the adjustment in Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenahoo (2003) and nd this does not change
our conclusions.
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That is, earnings at time t are equal to the change of book equity (e.g. retained earnings)
plus dividends payout. The main advantage of the clean surplus earnings is that it allows
us to extend COMPUSTAT with BE data from Davis, Fama and French (2000) and
estimate cash ows starting in 1928.2 We assume that accounting information becomes
public in June to ensure that earnings become public information before we measure
future returns. Book-to-market equity is then calculated as the year-end book equity
divided by market equity at the end of June. We delete rms with zero or negative
book equity and control for outliers as in Vuolteenaho (2002). Our main results on this
Chapter are based on excluding rms with clean surplus earnings more negative than
the market capitalization of stocks (see e.g. Chen, Da and Priestly, 2012).
The specic weighting of rm level ratios has an important impact on the results using
aggregate predictability regressions with earnings as the main cash ow measure. The
following options are available. The rst is to calculate the total amounts of earnings,
dividends, book equity and market values and calculate annual aggregate returns,
aggregate book-to-market ratios and the aggregate ROE. This mechanism, similar to
the standard one used for total returns, aggregate dividend yield and aggregate dividend
growth, is the one used by e.g. Chen (2009) and implicitly assumes a specic weighting
of rm-level ratios. Specically in this case, the aggregate ROE gives a role to the
biggest rms in terms of book equity whereas the aggregate book-to-market gives the
same role to the biggest market capitalization rms. From now, we will refer to this
weighting option as the standard weighting.
The aggregate ROE is computed as follows:
ROEt =
PN
i=1 ei;tPN
i=1 bi;t 1
=
e1;t
b1;t 1
 b1;t 1PN
i=1 bi;t 1
+ : : :+
en;t
bn;t
 bn;tPN
i=1 bi;t 1
(2.10)
where en;t is the clean surplus earnings of the nth rm in the index at time t and bn;t 1
is last period's book equity of the same rm.
It is clear from the above that here the largest book equity rms inuence the behavior
of the aggregate ROE. This contrasts to the aggregate book-to-market ratio in which
the largest market capitalization rms inuence the behavior of the aggregate book-to-
market ratio:
BMt =
PN
i=1 bi;tPN
i=1MVi;t
=
b1;t
MV1;t
 MV1;tPN
i=1MVi;t
+ : : :+
bn;t
MVn;t
 MVn;tPN
i=1MVi;t
(2.11)
2The earnings data in most tests is calculated using the clean surplus formula. This approach helps to
increase our sample length and allows more rms, thus representing the market better. For robustness,
we construct the following alternative: starting from 1950 (the starting year of COMPUSTAT) we only
include those rm years with earnings data available from COMPUSTAT; before 1950 we still use the
clean surplus formula to calculate earnings. We nd that our main conclusions remain unchanged.
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The second option is to calculate these variables at a rm level and collapse them into
value-weighted aggregate annual time-series (see Chen, Da and Zhao (2013) footnote 7,
page 21). Following this procedure all the rm variables receive the same kind of weights
based on market values. We will refer to this weighting option as the value weighted
(VW) method. The aggregate ROE is now computed as:
ROEt =
PN
i=1 ei;tPN
i=1 bi;t 1
=
e1;t
b1;t 1
 MV1;t 1PN
i=1MVi;t 1
+ : : :+
en;t
bn;t
 MVn;tPN
i=1MVi;t 1
(2.12)
where en;t is the clean surplus earnings of the nth rm in the index at time t, bn;t 1 is
last period's book equity of the same rm and MVn;t 1 is its market value.
The aggregate book-to-market ratio is similar to that when using the standard weighting
but now we weigh rm-level variables using last year's market values to avoid a look-
ahead bias:
BMt =
PN
i=1 bi;tPN
i=1MVi;t
=
b1;t
MV1;t
 MV1;t 1PN
i=1MVi;t 1
+ : : :+
bn;t
MVn;t
 MVn;t 1PN
i=1MVi;t 1
(2.13)
Finally, we can give the same weight or importance to each rm in the market. The
weights in this case are given by the total number of rms each year. This specic
weighting is used for example in Vuolteenahoo (2002) VAR analysis and we will refer to
it as the equally weighted (EW) method.
We will use these three specic weighting methods (standard, value-weighted and equally
weighted) and test for aggregate returns and dividend growth predictability. We use the
full sample of rms in the CRSP monthly master le excluding American Depository
Receipts (ADRs) (share code 3). We do this in order to apply the value and equal
weights to our rm-level variables. For each rm, we collect its monthly return, share
volume and prices data. We exclude from the sample all companies without a valid price,
share volume or return. In empirical work, a monthly rm-level dividend is obtained
from the holding period return (ret) and the holding period return without dividends
(retx):
di;t = (reti;t   retxi;t)MVi;t (2.14)
where MVt is the market value of rm i at time t.
These rm-level monthly dividends have a strong seasonal pattern. In order to de-
seasonalize the data, the standard solution when using annual data, is to aggregate the
dividends paid out over the year. Three methods have been used in the literature.3 The
3See e.g. Chen (2009) or Koijen & van Binsbergen (2010) for details.
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rst is to reinvest them at a zero rate i.e. the dividends in the current month and over
the previous eleven months are simply added up. The second is to reinvest dividends at
the risk free rate. The third option is to reinvest the dividends at the cum-dividend stock
market return. For simplicity, our results are based on the risk free rate reinvestment of
dividends.4
2.4 Empirical Results
We now present our main results in three parts. We rst show that predictive regressions
based on the return on equity decomposition are sensitive to the way in which rm-level
data is aggregated thus explaining diering results in Chen (2009) and Chen, Da, Zhao
(2013) using the ROE methodology. We will also try to reconcile these results using
value weighted and equally weighted methods for the Campbell and Shiller (1988) return
decomposition. This is related to Rangvid, Schmeling and Schrimpf (2013) but instead
of focusing on comparing predictability results among global weighted country markets
we analyze the intra-country predictability dierences across dierent weighted schemes
into the U.S. stock market. This will also allow us to explore how heterogeneity in rm-
level dividend payment patterns matters for return and dividend growth predictability.
2.4.1 Aggregate Book to Market Decomposition
We present, in Table 2.1, 'direct' multi-period unweighted predictive regressions using
the return on equity decomposition. Panel A of Table 2.1 reports results of multiperiod
regressions of future ROE and future returns on the lagged log book-to-market ratio for
the 1928-2012 period. In the case of return predictability using the book-to-market, our
ndings for the standard weighting scheme reects the ndings in the literature that uses
U.S. data and the return decomposition (see for example Chen, 2009). Specically, there
is evidence of return predictability at some time horizons but the p-values do not allow
strong rejections of the null of no predictability. We nd similar results when we use the
VW method. Interestingly, there is no evidence of return predictability at any horizon
when applying the equally weighted method. Moreover, the estimated long-run return
coecients are negative in many of the horizons with very low R2 and large p-values
(bigger than > 20% at all time horizons). On the other hand, there is strong evidence of
ROE predictability for all the three weighting methods considered. This is particularly
4Cochrane (2008, 2011) uses the annual CRSP VW index levels to obtain the annual dividend yield
and dividend growth series. This method implicitly assumes that the dividends are reinvested at the
market rate of return. Chen (2009) and Koijen & van Binsbergen (2010) claim that this method is
problematic because it imparts some of the properties of returns to cash ows.
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relevant for the case of the equal and value weighting methods. As for the case of
return predictability, results from the ROE predictability are in line with the current
literature. In Panel B of Table 2.1, when analyzing the post-WW II, is where we nd
the most striking dierences among the dierent weighting schemes. Specically, the
return coecients are very large and signicant for the standard and the VW scheme.
It is interesting that the predictability of total returns remains insignicant using the
equally weighted method. The ROE coecients are large and signicant using the VW
and the EW method with the exception of the very long 20-year horizon in the case of
the value-weighted rm-level analysis. If we use the standard weighting method there is
only some weak evidence of ROE predictability at the longest horizons.
The dierences between the standard and the value-weighted scheme in the post-WW
II period could explain some of the contradictory results in the current literature. For
example, Chen (2009) using clean surplus earnings nds that the evidence using the ROE
data is similar to that using dividends, that is, dividend growth is strongly predictable
in the pre-war periods but this predictability disappears in the post-war years. On
the other hand, Chen, Da and Zhao (2013) nd that when using the ROE as the cash
ow measure, cash ows explains 34% of annual return variance. Table 2.2 helps us
to understand this divergence in results. It reports VAR regressions and hypothesis
testing using book-to-market and return on equity (ROE) for both the whole 1928-2012
and the post-WW II period and for the three aggregate weighting methods described
earlier. Starting from the standard weighting scheme, we nd strong evidence of ROE
predictability for 1928-2012. Moreover, the t-statistic of the ROE coecient (-3.00) is
much larger than that of the return coecient (1.89) in magnitude. Together, the share
of the book-to-market variation due to long-run movements in expected ROE is around
25%. In contrast to that, the ROE coecient is -0.00 and insignicant for the 1950-
2012 period. Accordingly, only 2% of the book-to-market variation is associated with
expected ROE rates. This is in line with the Chen (2009) results regarding the role of
earnings as the main cash ow measure. He claims that changing dividend policies seem
unlikely to fully explain why there is a reversal of predictability. Hence, if we rely on the
standard procedure to account for the aggregate measure of dividend growth or ROE,
we could conclude that dividend smoothing seems unlikely to fully explain why there is
a reversal of predictability in the post-WW II period because the estimated coecients
from both dividend growth and the ROE are very small and insignicant.
In the case of the VW method results are very similar for the full sample and the
post-WW II period. For example, the return coecient is around 0.14 in both sample
periods although the t-statistic is much larger in the 1950-2012 period (1.94 vs. 2.34).
On the other hand, the ROE coecient is highly signicant in both sample periods and
similar in magnitude (around -0.07). This implies that now ROE accounts for around
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34% of annual return variance in both sample periods. These results are similar to
those reported by Chen, Da and Priestly (2013) using their value-weighted aggregate
annual time-series. Focusing only on this specic result we might conclude that, using
an alternative cash ow measure that is less subject to dividend smoothing, we arrive at
a conclusion consistent with Chen, Da and Priestly (2013) i.e. that cash ow news plays
an important role in price variations in the post-WW II period. However, the key point
here is that results depend on the rm-level weighting methods used. For that reason,
in the next section we present results of dividend growth and return predictability using
VW and EW schemes and compare these results with results based on the aggregate
ROE decomposition.
2.4.2 Campbell and Shiller (1988) Decomposition
In order to analyze the importance of the weighting of individual securities for the
outcome of predictability regressions using the return decomposition and to allow the
comparison with the ROE decomposition results, we apply the three weighting schemes
to the Campbell and Shiller (1988) decomposition using the CRSP monthly master le.
The advantage of using the EW and VW methods is that we can explore what drives
return and dividend growth predictability for small and large rms. Moreover, in our
VW method we use dynamic weights for all the variables, such that a rm that grows
in size relative to another rm will also be given a larger weight. On the other hand,
our EW method gives the same weight to each rm in the market.
Table 2.3 shows the descriptive statistics for total returns, dividend growth and the
average dividend yield for the dierent market portfolios. We report these separately
for the full (1928-2012) and the post-WW II (1950-2012) sample periods. There are
large dierences in the average dividend growth rates across the dierent portfolios. For
instance and over the full sample period, we nd the highest average (annual) dividend
growth rates using the VW scheme (13:00%), whereas the lowest average dividend growth
rates is found using the standard weighting method (6:00%). At the same time, we
see that the standard deviation during the full sample is similar among all weighting
schemes (ranging from 12% in the EW to 14% in the VW). During the post-WW II
period, the mean of the (annual) dividend growth is very similar to the full sample using
the three dierent weights, whereas the standard deviation decreases more when we use
the standard and the EW scheme than using the VW method (9% in the case of the VW
compared to 7% in both the EW and the standard methods). The other feature of the
data is the persistence (rst order autocorrelation) of dividend growth in the dierent
portfolios. During the full sample period, the rst order autocorrelation for all the three
weighting schemes is similar (0.31 in the EW, 0.30 in the standard and 0.29 in the VW).
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In the post-WW II period the VW aggregate dividend growth series is twice as highly
positively autocorrelated (0.49) compared to the standard aggregate dividend growth
series (0.21) and it is similar to the EW aggregate dividend growth (0.41).
2.4.2.1 Full-Sample (1928-2012) results
We rst report results, in Table 2.4, for "direct" unweighted multi-period predictive
regressions using Eqs.(5) and (6) respectively. We only report results for the case of the
risk free rate of reinvestment of dividends. In the Internet Appendix we report results
for the two other re-investment strategies: reinvest monthly dividends at zero rate and
at the market rate of return.
In the case of return predictability our ndings for the standard weighting mechanism,
in Table 2.4, resemble the results obtained using applying the ROE decomposition.
Specically, there is some evidence of return predictability at some time horizons but
the p-values do not allow strong rejections of the null of no predictability (p-values lie
in the interval 6-15%). We nd similar results when we use our VW method. There is
also no sign of return predictability in the case of the equally weighted scheme (EW) at
any horizon. Moreover, the estimated long-run return coecients are negative in many
of the horizons with very low R2 and large p-values (bigger than > 20% at all time
horizons).
Table 2.4 also reports results for multi-period long horizon regressions for dividend
growth. The results are striking: using value-weights (VW) we reject the null that
the predictive coecients are zero (p-values ranging from 0.34% to 2.71%) implying
that dividends are strongly predictable by the dividend yield. The extent to which the
dividend yield resulted from the VW method predicts future dividend growth rates is
noteworthy with estimated bd;k values of around -0.16. The R
2 are also important and
around 22%. When we increase the horizon over which we measure dividend growth
(increase k) we see from Table 4 that the associated p-values remain similar. Hence,
the dividend predictability we document using value-weights is large at all horizons with
very high estimated coecients and R2s. As an example, the estimated coecient for
the 20-year horizon is  0:862 with p-value of 9.34 and R2 of 21:81%.
There is, however, no strong evidence for dividend growth predictability using the
standard weights. Dividend growth is predictable at the 1-year and the 15 and 20 year
horizons; the estimates of bd;k are negative and highly signicant (p-values smaller than
5%). However at the intermediate horizons (5, 10 years) there is no evidence supporting
dividend growth predictability. Our ndings for the standard weighting method reect
the general ndings in the literature - dividend growth is not highly predictable for the
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whole sample period. In contrast, using our alternate value-weights we nd striking and
strong evidence for the predictability of dividend growth. The large dierences between
the results using the value-weighted and the standard method arise from the larger
weights given to the biggest rms in the VW scheme in contrast to the larger weights
given to the largest dividend payers in the standard method. It is interesting that the
predictability of dividend growth is insignicant when using equal-weights. With the
exception of the 1-year horizon, the estimated coecients are very low, with very high
p-values and low R2.
Several authors (for example, Cochrane, 2008, 2011) report results using implied multi-
period regressions to infer long-horizon predictability from rst-order VAR models. One
issue with this approach is that if a rst order VAR does not fully capture the dynamics of
the data generating process for r, d-p, and4d, then this variance decomposition will be a
poor approximation of the true decomposition for the dividend yield. On the other hand
VAR coecient estimates may have better nite-sample properties, that is, there might
be a trade o between power and misspecication. While several studies report that
the results using direct and implied long-horizon regressions estimates are qualitatively
similar we do not nd this in our sample. In results (not reported in the interests of
brevity) we nd that, in our data, the implied long horizon return coecients are much
smaller than their direct counterparts. Further, in the case of long run unweighted
dividend growth coecients we see a similar pattern. These results emphasize that care
is needed in drawing long-horizon implications from low-order VAR models.
In view of the above discussion we report in Table 2.5 results for innite-horizon VARs
of returns and dividend growth to carry out joint null hypothesis tests of either blrr = 0,
blrd =  1 or blrr = 1, blrd = 0. In the case of the VW method we do not reject the null
of no return predictability with a t-value of 1.17. On the other hand, we strongly reject
the null of no dividend growth predictability (t-value of -3.92). As outlined in Section
3, Cochrane (2008) shows that - in the same spirit as a variance decomposition - the
long run coecient blrr measures the fraction of dividend-yield variation due to long-run
movements in expected future returns while blrd measures the fraction of variation due to
long-run movements in expected dividend growth rates. The share of the dividend-yield
variation due to long-run movements in expected dividend growth rates is 77% of the
dividend price variation with returns accounting for the remaining 23%. Hence, variance
shares support our conclusion about the importance of dividend growth predictability
using value-weights for the full sample period. Turning to the EW method, we do not
nd evidence of both return and dividend growth predictability.
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2.4.2.2 Results for the Post-WW II (1950-2012) period
Table 2.4 also reports results of direct long horizon regressions for the post-WW II
period i.e. 1950-2012. In contrast to the full sample period, we nd in Table 2.4,
evidence supporting return predictability except in the case of the EW method. In the
case of the standard and the VW schemes, the estimated coecients are very high and
larger than 1 at the 15 and 20 year horizons with p-values generally smaller than 5%.
Consistent with Chen (2009) we nd that there is a reversal in return predictability;
returns are unpredictable for the full sample period but become predictable during the
post-WW II period (1950-2012).
We now turn to results from dividend growth predictability which provide, as in the
case of the full sample period, strong evidence of dividend growth predictability using
value-weights. Dividend growth is strongly predictable with the "right sign" with p-
values lower than 5% and very high R2s. On the other hand, results using standard
weights give a completely dierent picture for dividend growth predictability; dividend
growth is not predictable except perhaps at the very short (1-year) horizon (p-values
are signicant at around the 9% level) and at the very long (20-year) horizon (p-values
around the 6% level). For all the other horizons dividend growth is largely unpredictable.
It is interesting that dividend growth is also predictable using equal-weights with the
exception of the 5-year horizon. The strong evidence of dividend growth predictability
in the weighted portfolios is also supported by variance shares as seen in Table 2.5. The
share of unexpected return variance due to changes in expected dividends is around 40%
using the VW and EW methods. On the other hand, using standard weights the share
due to dividend growth variation is less than 20%. Moreover, we strongly reject the null
of no return predictability for all the portfolios. Finally, we also reject the null of no
dividend growth predictability when using value-weights (t-value of -2.84) in contrast to
using standard weights in where the t-value is only -1.39.
Based on the standard method, there seems to be a reversal in predictability in the
post-WW II period that could not to be explained by changes in payout policies due
to the fact that both dividend growth and the ROE are not predictable in the post-
WW II period. This is exactly the conclusion reached by Chen (2009) when using
both decompositions based on these standard aggregate weights. On the other hand,
dividends are strongly predictable by the dividend yield using value-weights during the
full sample (1928-2012) and the post-WW II period. This is in line with results obtained
when applying the ROE decomposition to value-weighted aggregate time series as in
Chen, Da and Zhao (2013)). We argue, that results from the ROE decomposition using
these value-weighted aggregate time series should be compared to results from applying
the return decomposition to an aggregate VW portfolio. Doing that, we nd that in the
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post-WII period dividend growth and the ROE are highly signicant compared to the
standard weighting method, suggesting that corporate payout policies may not have a
major eect on the predictability of stock returns.
2.4.3 Firm Size and Dividend Payments
We have shown that predictive regressions are aected by the way the aggregate data
is constructed and that changing dividends seem unlikely to fully explain why there is
a reversal of predictability because predictability results from using dividends and/or
earnings are similar when the aggregate variables are weighted in a similar manner. We
will now show that the dierences in predictability between using standard and value-
weights are driven by the weighting implicitly used to aggregate rm-level dividends in
the current literature, where the aggregate dividend growth series is inuenced by the
rms that are the biggest dividend payers. This specic weighting has osetting eects
on the dividend price ability to predict future dividend growth because it happens that
not always the largest rms by market capitalization pay the largest dividends, which is
specially signicant in the post-WW II period. We will now demonstrate this fact in the
data and its eect onto predictability results by forming size portfolio sorts and more
formally by predictive regressions.
We use, for each sample period, all the rms in the CRSP monthly master le excluding
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) (share code 3). We do this in order to replicate
the CRSP value-weighted index that excludes these rms from the index construction.
Following Fama and French (1992), the quintile portfolios are constructed at the end
of each December using previous December market values i.e. we avoid any look-ahead
bias. For each quintile, we construct the three variables (i.e. returns, dividend yield
and dividend growth) following the standard methodology used in the literature and
described earlier. Here Q1 denotes to the highest market capitalization quintile and Q5
the lowest market capitalization rms. Our main purpose is to demonstrate the dierent
behavior of highest and smallest market capitalization rms with respect to dividend
payments and their relation to the weighting used in constructing the standard dividend
growth series. To avoid clutter we report results using only the zero rate re-investment
strategy. In untabulated results we nd that results are qualitatively similar for the
other two dividend re-investment strategies described earlier.
We begin by depicting in Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 the times series of the percentage of
total dividends paid, the dividend growth and the dividend yield over our full sample
period 1928-2012. Our graph shows only Q1 and Q5 for ease of exposition. Next, we
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describe the results of using standard predictability regressions for each of the quintiles
in relation to the benchmark regressions using the full sample of all rms.
Figure 2.1 depicts the percentage of total dividends paid in rms in the largest size
quintiles Q1 and Q2 (Q1+Q2) clubbed together compared to the smallest size quintiles
Q4 and Q5 (Q4+Q5). We see that the percentage of the total dividends paid by rms
in two largest size quintiles (Q1+Q2) and the two smallest size quintiles (Q4+Q5) has
changed considerably over time. If the biggest dividend payers are also the largest
market capitalization rms we would expect that dividends paid in the Q1 and Q2
quintiles together would be higher than 40%. On the other hand, we would also expect
the opposite to be the case for the quintiles Q4 and Q5 with the smallest market
capitalization rms. However, Figure 1 shows that this is not the case over the 1928-
2012 period. For example, both in the pre- and post-WW II period and particularly
during the late 90s the total dividends paid by the biggest market capitalization rms
decreased substantially. However, at the same time the smallest market capitalization
rms increased their share of the total dividends paid. This does not however imply that
the total amount of dividends paid decreased during that period. DeAngelo, DeAngelo
and Skinner (2004) report that while the number of rms paying out dividends has
decreased the total amount of dividends paid out has actually increased during the 1978-
2000 period. These facts of the data are important for the study of dividend growth
predictability. It is possible however, that this pattern might arise due to the largest
market value rms repurchasing shares instead of paying dividends. We will, in a later
section, report results where also we account for both dividends as well as repurchases
and obtain similar results.
Next, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 depict changes in the log dividend growth and log dividend
yield series, over the 1928-2012 period, for all rms - the benchmark sample - and for
rms in Q1 (largest market cap) and Q5 (the smallest market cap). We see that during
the earlier part of the sample period both the log dividend yield and dividend growth
series vary in a similar way for the quintiles and the full sample of rms. However
their behavior diers dramatically starting in the early 1980s. There is in particular,
during the 1990s, a large fall in the dividend price ratio for the Q1 portfolio and for the
portfolio consisting of all sample rms while the Q5 dividend price ratio remains at.
During the most recent period in the sample- around 2011 - we nd that the dividend
price ratio for the Q1 and for the full sample rise to reach the level seen in the 1980s.
This is due to the increase of the percentage of total dividends paid by rms in Q1.
We note here that all quintiles contain the same percentage of the total market value.
Thus the reason why the Q1 level is the same as for Q5 is due to the increase in the
percentage of total dividends paid by the biggest market capitalization rms. Finally,
the return decomposition implies that for Q1 and for the portfolio containing all rms
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the low dividend price ratios in the 1990s should forecast a dividend increase i.e. prices
high relative to current dividends should mean that future dividends will be higher. We
see, in Figure 3, that this only happens for the Q1 portfolio after the 1990s. This is
due to the weighting of dividends that results in the dividend growth from all rms to
behave like the dividend growth of Q5 i.e. relatively low and stable during this period.
We now report in Table 2.6, to provide a more formal analysis of the discussion about
Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 earlier, results of univariate predictive regressions using annual
data for the full sample of rms and for each of the market capitalization quintile
portfolios separately for the full sample 1928-2012 and the post-WW II (1950-2012)
period. We estimate using annual data:
(rt   r) = r(dpt 1   dp) + rt (2.15)
(4dt   d) = d(dpt 1   dp) + dt (2.16)
where rt and 4dt denote one-period returns and dividend growth, r and d the long-run
mean return and dividend growth, and rt , 
d
t mean-zero innovations. We also report
the long-run coecients bblr and bbld (based on a VAR(1)), which can be interpreted as
the fraction of the variance of dividend yields that can be attributed to time-varying
expected returns and to time-varying expected dividend growth respectively. We conrm
the current nding in the literature that for the full sample of rms in the post-WW II
period the dividend price ratio predicts aggregate returns but not dividend growth. We
nd that, under the no-reinvestment assumption, the return predictability coecient r
is 0.123 for the 1950-2012 period, with a t-stat of 2.31 and an R2 of 8.74%. Otherwise,
the point estimate for the dividend growth coecient d is -0.035 with a t-stat of -1.79
and a R2 of 5.35%. In fact, expected returns explains a much larger fraction of the
variance of dividend yields during the post-WW II period as measured by the estimatedbblr coecient (bblr=0.778).
We nd, in Table 2.6, dramatically dierent results for predictive regressions when using
quintile portfolios. Based on these quintile regressions we are able to go behind the
results reported for the aggregate market and uncover the size portfolios that drive
results seen for the aggregate market portfolio. We nd that the results for dividend
growth predictability regressions for the 1950-2012 period are highly signicant for 3 out
of the 5 market value quintiles (Q1, Q2 and Q5). The dividend growth point estimate
d for the Q1 is -0.075 with a t-stat of -2.90 and an R
2 of 11.75%. On the other hand,
Q2 dividend growth point estimate (-0.757) is also signicant with a t-stat of -2.81 and
the R2 is 9.41%. Finally, in the case of Q5 the dividend growth point estimate (-0.062)
is also signicant with a t-stat of -2.31 and the R2 is 6.01%. This is also translated into
the long-run coecient bbld. Almost half of the variation in the dividend yield can be
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accounted by long-run movements in expected dividend growth rates in the Q1 (bbld=-
0.414) compared to the case of all rms where bbld is only -0.222.
Overall this evidence supports the view that the predictability of dividend growth is
aected by the way dividends are weighted to form aggregate series. While dividend
growth is not predictable for the full sample of all rms, we nd that it is highly
predictable for the biggest and the smallest market capitalization quintiles. In these
cases, as we have shown, the signal coming from the dividend growth series is not
blurred by the dierences between biggest market capitalization rms and biggest
payers. These ndings suggest that the fact that not always the largest rms by market
capitalization pay the largest dividends is aecting aggregate returns and dividend
growth predictability. These dynamics explain the dierences between predictability
results from using standard and value-weights.
2.5 Additional Results
In this section, we conduct several robustness checks to the main empirical results.
2.5.1 Allowing for Stock Repurchases
We now turn to the question of whether allowing for share repurchases, which are
particularly important after 1990, aect our nding about the fact that not always
the largest rms by market capitalization pay the largest dividends, which is especially
signicant in the post-WW II period. It might be argued that the reduction in the
percentage of dividend paid by the rms in the largest two market capitalization quintiles
is due to the largest market value rms turning to share repurchases instead of paying
dividends.
We use the most straightforward estimate of shares repurchased by a rm as the decrease
in shares outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted for other activities that aect the
number of shares outstanding, such as stock dividends and stock splits. We do not
oset monthly decreases in shares outstanding with increases in other months because
increases can occur for a variety of reasonsincluding new stock issues, the distribution
of shares to employee benet plans, or the exercise of stock options. Since these
increases are unrelated to repurchase activity and bias repurchase estimates downward,
we record monthly increases in shares outstanding as a zero decrease. If repurchases
and distributions of shares occur in the same month, however, they will oset each
other, and the monthly decrease in CRSP shares outstanding will understate actual
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shares repurchased. We recognise that there are alternative methods of calculating
share repurchases. For example, Fama and French (2001) and Skinner (2008) use
the changes in Treasury stocks from COMPUSTAT to proxy for share repurchases.
However, the advantage of the method employed in the paper is that it allows us to have
monthly cumulative data for repurchases for a longer period of time. We have also tried
alternative methods of share repurchases using COMPUSTAT cash ow and balance
sheet statements and our results are qualitative similar.
We dene repurchases, following Chen, Da and Priestley (2012), as:
rp =
Pt+1
Pt
 [1 min(nt+1
nt
; 1)] (2.17)
Here rp denotes the repurchase return. Also when there is a repurchase nt+1nt < 1 and
[1 min(nt+1nt ; 1)] is the proportional repurchase. As in the case of dividends, we calculate
repurchases in dollars for each rm month and then sum them across months to get the
annual dollar amount for each rm.
Figure 2.4 depicts the time series of the percentage of total dividends paid including
repurchases for quintiles Q1 and Q2 together compared to Q4 and Q5 together. We
focus on these two combinations of quintiles (Q1+Q2) and (Q4+Q5) to avoid clutter.
We clearly see that including repurchases does not change the time series behavior
noted earlier in Figure 2.2 including for the late 90s period. In fact, we now see a more
pronounced eect: payouts from the Q1 and Q2 together are reduced to about 10% at
the end of 1999 while after the year 2000 rms in Q1 and Q2 shows higher dividends
plus repurchases than seen for the quintiles Q4 and Q5.
We now turn to Table 2.7, which reports predictive regressions and quintile portfolios for
the full sample and the post-WW II period. We nd that, for the full sample of rms, we
reproduce the standard result reported in prior literature; dividend growth in the post-
WW II period is unpredictable. We see that although the point estimate for dividend
growth is -0.128 and the R2 is large (7.75%), the standard error is too large for statistical
signicance at conventional levels (t-stat of -1.44). In contrast, when we look at Q1 (the
highest market capitalization rms) the dividend growth coecient is -0.135 with a t-
stat of -3.24 and a R2 of 11.19%. For comparison - in the case without repurchases in
Table 7 - we nd that the Q1 dividend growth coecient is -0.075 with a t-stat of -2.90
and a R2 of 11.75%. After allowing for repurchases our evidence using our alternate
dividend growth series is that we continue to nd dividend growth predictability for Q1
rms. In fact the evidence is stronger than when using only dividends as the cash ow
measure. However, this is not the case now with Q2 portfolio which has an estimated
coecient of -0.106, a t-stat of -1.18 and R2 of 3.83%.
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An important result in Table 2.7 is that dividend growth is highly predictable by the
repurchases-adjusted dividend price ratio for the smallest market capitalization quintiles.
The Q4 coecient is -0.289 with a t-stat of -2.24 and R2 of 19.00%; the Q5 coecient
is -0.214 with a t-stat of -2.34 and R2 of 16.47%. Considering the results from long-run
horizon regressions, a signicant proportion of the variation in the dividend yield for the
smallest market capitalization quintiles can be accounted for by the estimated bbld. In
the results for Q4, news about future dividends clearly dominate as the main driver of
the variation in dividend yields, now twice as high than when considering only dividends
as the cash ow measure. This is also the case for the Q3 and the Q5 where bbld changes
from -0.194 to -0.405 and from -0.329 to -0.492, respectively. On the other hand, Q1
and Q2 point estimates do not see a change when a broader denition of dividends is
used. These results imply that accounting for repurchases aects predictability results
more for the smallest market capitalization rms than those for the largest market
capitalization quintiles. Further it also explains why there is no signicant improvement
in the predictability of dividend growth during the post-WW II period when repurchases
are taken into account.
2.5.2 Dividend Yield Portfolios
We now use portfolios sorted on dividend yield, available from Kenneth French's
webpage, and estimate predictive regressions using these. We do this as an alternative
to our market capitalization or size quintile portfolio regressions in order to show
that our results are not driven by the way our data is sorted. These dividend yield
portfolios exclude rms with zero dividends and unlike the Fama-French size portfolios
contain almost equal proportions of the total market capitalization in each quintile. For
example, the average market capitalization of the Fama-French size portfolio containing
the bottom 30% of stocks (denoted by L) for the 1928-2012 period is 3.73% and 4.44%
for the post-WW II period. On the other hand, the average market capitalization for
the portfolio with the top 30% of stocks (H) is 83.92% for our full sample period and
82.25% for the post- WW II (1950-2012) sub-period. Hence, using size portfolios makes
any comparison of dividend yields and dividend growth impracticable because the H-
portfolio contains the major proportion of the total market value.
We again focus attention on the lowest and the highest dividend yield quintiles which
clearly shows the contrast compared to the the all-rm portfolio. The average market
capitalization of the lowest 20% dividend yield portfolio is 24.49% of the total value
of all rms for the 1928-2012 period and 23.53% for the post-WW II sub period. The
highest 20% dividend yield portfolio contains on average 13.22% of the total market of
all rms for the entire sample period and 14.62% for the 1950-2012 sub period. As in
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Cochrane (2008), we construct the annual dividend-price ratio and dividend growth by
combining the series on total return and return without dividends.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 depict the annual log dividend price ratios and dividend growth
rates over the period 1928-2012 for the lowest 20% and the highest 20% dividend yield
portfolios. We focus attention on the last part of the sample period where both variables
- log dividend growth and log dividend yield - dier dramatically. We see that in the
1990s there is a large fall in the dividend price for the lowest 20% quintile compared to
the relatively stable behavior of the highest 20% quintile. This is consistent with the
behavior of Q1 and Q5 in our market capitalization-based quintile analysis. While the
biggest market capitalization rms have a very low dividend price ratio, the dividend
yield from the smallest capitalization rms remains at during this time period. We
note here that each of our quintiles contains the same percentage of total market equity.
Hence, the low dividend price ratio only aects the biggest rms and this also hold for
the lowest 20% dividend yield portfolio. As indicated earlier, the return decomposition
implies that the low dividend yield for the lowest 20% portfolio in the late 1990s should
forecast a dividend increase. We see, in Figure 2.8 that this is what happens after
the 1990s. Again, this is consistent with the behavior of Q1. On the other hand, the
stable dividend price ratio in the highest 20% portfolio is accompanied by a at dividend
growth in the 2000s.
2.5.3 Only Dividend Paying Firms Portfolios
We now report results for return and dividend growth predictability using portfolios that
consist only of dividend payers. We construct portfolios of "dividend payers" following
Fama and French (2001) and Kelly and Pruitt (2013). We dene a rm as a dividend
payer in calendar year t if its with-dividends return exceeds its return without dividends
in some month of year t (ret and retx codes in the CRSP monthly master le). We
consider all regularly scheduled dividend payments (monthly, quarterly, and yearly)
when classifying rms as dividend-paying. We know that in the standard construction
of dividend yield and aggregate returns all rms - even those that do not pay dividends
and for whom these ratios are not dened- are included. As a result, using portfolios that
consist only of dividend paying rms can help us to focus on predictability regressions
that do not include the confounding eects of non-payers. We also exclude dividend
initiations and omissions imposing the company to pay dividends for at least two years.
Including these observations do not alter our main conclusions.
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We report results only for "direct" multi-period regressions and long-run horizon VARs
under the risk free rate of reinvestment. Our results, in Table 2.8, using "direct" multi-
period return predictive regressions show that during both, the full sample (1928-2012)
and the post-WW II periods, the estimated return coecients are signicantly higher
for dividend payers than for the whole sample of all rms. This is especially important
in the post-WW II period. For example, the 1-year estimated return coecients for the
standard and value-weighted methods are around 0.17 compared to 0.12 in the case of all
rms. It is even more signicant when using equal-weights. When non-dividend payers
are excluded, this 1-year estimated coecient moves from 0.08 to 0.26. Moreover, we
now nd that all the return coecients in the EW method are now positive and even
signicant at the 10% level in the post-WW II period (with the exception of the very
long 20-year horizon). These results using equal-weights are related to the dividend
disappearing phenomena rst reported by Fama and French (2001). The reason why
this improvement is more signicant in the case of the EW method is due to the fact
that this important decline in the fraction of rms that paid dividends is substantially
smaller when weighted by market capitalization. The evidence for return predictability
during the whole sample period is slightly stronger over all the time horizons and
particularly for the shorter ones, although the p-values do not allow for strong rejections
of the null of no predictability. For some time-horizons it is possible to nd estimate
coecients signicant at the 10% level and with high R2. On the other hand, results for
the post-WW II period reinforces the evidence for return predictability found using all
rms with p-values smaller than 3% for all the horizons for the standard and the VW
methods. Returns using equal-weights are also signicant in the post-WW II period as
we mentioned before.
We also nd, in Table 2.8, an important improvement with respect to dividend growth
predictability. This also aects the behavior using the standard aggregation method in
where we nd estimated dividend growth coecients and R2 much higher than when
using portfolios containing all rms. In spite of that, this enhancement is not translated
to the p-values that instead of improving get worse at most of the time horizons.
On the other hand, forming portfolios of only dividend payers clearly reinforces the
results obtained using value-weights and especially for the post-WW II period where the
declining number of dividend payers has been more pronounced. This can be applied to
all the time-horizons (p-values are always smaller than 4%) with the exception of the
very long 20-year dividend growth coecient in the post-WWII period. In this case, the
estimated dividend growth coecient is only -0.255 with a very high p-value of 26:27%
and a very low R2 of 0:52%. The behavior of this 20-year time-horizon is similar to
the case of using the ROE decomposition and contrast to using standard weights where
the estimated coecient is high and signicant. Results using equal-weights are also
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aected when using only dividend payers showing that dividend growth predictability is
high and important and particularly for the post-WW II period.
Finally, Table 2.9 reports results for long-horizon VARs of returns and dividend growth
to carry out joint null hypothesis tests of either return or dividend growth predictability.
Again, the main picture for Table 2.9 is that dividend growth is very important for
both the whole and the post-WWII period and for the EW and VW weighting schemes
compared to the standard weighting method. Around 80% of the dividend price variation
is associated with dividend growth predictability in the full sample period and nearly
50% in the post-WII period when using value-weights. Moreover, we cannot reject the
null of no return predictability for the whole sample period but we reject both nulls of
no dividend growth and no return predictability for the case of the 1950-2012 period.
The same happens when using equal-weights although the percentage of the dividend
yield variance explained by dividend growth is slightly higher for the full sample period
and smaller for 1950-2012. In the case of the standard method, the null of no dividend
growth predictability is still not rejected and the variance explained by dividend growth
is less than 20%. To sum up we nd that our main results are strengthened further
when using a sample of only dividend paying rms, that is, dividend growth is strongly
predictable during the post-WW II period but this predictability is hidden by the way
market portfolios are constructed in the current literature.
2.6 Monte Carlo Simulations
In this section, we conduct a Monte-Carlo simulation to analyze the size and power of
the asymptotic t-statistics for the return and dividend growth predictive coecients of
the aggregate VW and EW portfolios based on the rst-order VAR estimated in the
previous section.
Equation (2.4) implies that we can infer the data, coecients, and errors of any one
equation from those of the other two. In other words when we want to test, for example
br = 0, we have to change the dividend growth coecient bd or the dividend price
ratio autocorrelation coecient () accordingly. We thus have to choose two variables
to simulate and then the third follows from the identity in equation (2.4). Here, we
simulate the dividend growth and dividend-yield system using the dierent denitions
of our market portfolios. Our null hypothesis takes the form:
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dt+1
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3775 (2.18)
We follow Cochrane (2008) and draw the VAR residuals assuming they are jointly
normally distributed. The dividend yield for the base period d0   p0 is drawn from
the unconditional density d0   p0  N [0; 2("dp)=(1  2)]. We then draw dt and dpt as
random normals and simulate the system forward (10,000 times). For the multiperiod
returns and dividend growth rates, we follow a similar simulation procedure, but now
we compute rt;t+1 and dt from the simulated data and regress these onto dt   pt ,
and collect the coecients. Then, we compute the fractions of simulated estimates for
the return/dividend growth coecients that are higher than the estimates found in the
data, that is, p(br;k > br;k) and p(bd;k > bd;k). We also calculate the joint probabilities,
p(br;k > br;k and bd;k > bd;k).
Table 2.10 shows, for the whole sample 1928-2012 and the post-WW II period, the
term-structure of the probabilities that the return coecients are higher than the
corresponding estimates under the null of no return predictability. We also report
the probabilities that both slopes are jointly higher than the corresponding samples
estimates at each horizon. The marginal distribution of the return-forecast coecient
br provides weak evidence against the unforecastable-return null for the standard and
the value-weighted methods; producing coecients larger than the sample estimate,
as seen in the Table, between 18% and 40% for all the time horizons. Taken on its
own, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the return-forecasting coecient br is zero at
the conventional 5% level. In contrast to that, in the case of using equal-weights the
probability of nding return coecients higher than the corresponding estimates is very
high ranging from 40% to 90%. This is not strange when the estimated coecients in
the EW method are negative in most of the time horizons and hence, it is very easy to
nd simulated coecients higher than the estimated ones.
The null of no return predictability must assume that dividend growth is forecastable.
As a result, almost all simulations should give a large negative dividend growth forecast
coecient bd. In the case of the standard market method, the probability of nding
simulated coecients higher than the direct estimates is very low with the exception
of the 15 and 20 year horizons with simulated dividend growth coecients 17% and
33% larger than their sample estimates. In contrast to that, using value-weights the
probability of nding simulated coecients larger than their sample estimates is very
high with p-values bigger than 30% for the long run horizons. It is also important to note
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that the estimated coecients in the case of the VW method are much bigger for all the
time-horizons compared to the standard method. Therefore, even in those cases where
the probability of nding dividend growth coecients bigger than the sample estimates
is not very high, the sample estimated coecients are high and strongly signicant
compared to using standard weights. The 5-year long-run dividend growth coecient is
a clear example of this situation. The estimated coecient for the standard portfolio is
only -0.154 with a p-value of 14:23%, and the probability of nding simulated coecients
bigger than this -0.15 is 0%. On the other hand, the 15-year long run estimated coecient
using value-weights is more than two times bigger (-0.402) with a p-value of 2:71%. We
can nd simulated coecients bigger than this -0.402 in more than 4% of the cases. On
the other hand, the probability of nding simulated dividend growth coecients using
equal-weights is very low and never bigger than 20%. Finally, the dierences among the
joint probabilities for the dierent weighting schemes is also signicant and particularly
important in the VW method.
To sum up, the presence of dividend forecastability using value-weights gives far stronger
statistical evidence in favor of the null than does the presence of return forecastability
for the period 1928-2012. On the other hand, results using standard weights are
similar to those in Cochrane (2008). The lack of dividend forecastability in the data
gives far stronger statistical evidence against the null than does the presence of return
forecastability. This fact is used by Cochrane (2008) to conclude that the absence of
dividend growth predictability gives stronger evidence than does the presence of return
predictability. He claims that if returns are not predictable, dividend growth must be
predictable, to generate the observed variation in dividend yields. In contrast to that, we
have shown that dividend growth is strongly predictable when using the value-weights.
In the case of the post-WW II 1950-2012 period and similar to the full sample,
the marginal distribution of the return-forecast coecient br does not lead to strong
rejections of the null hypothesis of return unpredictability using standard and value-
weights. The Monte Carlo draw produces a coecient larger than the sample estimate
around 20%-40% of the time. However, under that null and similar to the full sample
period, we must have dividend growth predictability of sucient magnitude. The
simulated dividend growth forecasting coecients using the standard method are only
signicantly larger than their estimated values at the very long 20-year horizon (p-
values around 50%). For the rest of the time-horizons, we do not nd dividend growth
forecasting coecients larger than their sample estimates. These results show that the
lack of dividend growth forecastability in the data using standard weights in the post-
WW II period gives far stronger statistical evidence against the null than does the
presence of return forecastability. Again as in the case of the full sample period and in
line with the current literature, when the post-WW II data is considered the absence of
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dividend growth predictability gives stronger evidence than does the presence of return
predictability.
On the other hand, we nd that the joint hypothesis testing framework provides much
stronger evidence in favor of the null of no return predictability when using market-value
weights. The simulated dividend growth forecasting coecients are always larger than
their estimated values for more than 60% of the time with the exception of the 1 and
5-year horizons. As in the case of the full sample period, it is important to note that
although the probabilities of nding simulated values bigger than the sample estimates
for the case of the 1 and 5 year horizon are relatively small, the estimated coecients are
very high and signicant. Compared to standard weights, the 1-year coecient is around
6 times bigger and the 5-year coecient more than 30 times. The joint probability is
also quite high with p-values bigger than 10% for all the horizons with the exception of
the k=1 year.
To sum up, we nd strong evidence for dividend growth predictability in the data for the
post-WW II period when using the value-weighted scheme. This cast doubt on studies
that nd stronger evidence for the absence of dividend growth predictability. We nd
that this is driven by the way rm-level variables are weighted into aggregate annual
series rather than due to the absence of dividend growth predictability.
2.7 Conclusion
The question of whether stock returns are predictable is important not only for academics
but also for practitioners. Not surprisingly, it has attracted a large amount of research.
In this Chapter we focus on the dramatic dierence, reported in the literature, between
pre- and post-WW II periods; in the former period divided growth is predictable where
as in the latter period dividend growth is largely unpredictable. Thus cash ow growth
does not seem to explain variation in stock returns which appear to be driven mainly
by changes in the discount rate. This nding is disconcerting and if it holds has major
consequences for nance theory and practice as highlighted by Cochrane (2008).
In this Chapter we revisit these important issues and nd evidence, in contrast to prior
work, that in fact cash ow growth matters in the post-WW II period or that dividend
growth has predictive ability for dividend yield. We nd that the key issue is the
manner of aggregation of rm-level data used in estimating predictive regressions based
on both the Campbell-Shiller and the Vuolteenaho decompositions. Indeed the implicit
value weighting of aggregate series used in previous work based on the Vuolteenaho
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decomposition while not using this method in constructing series used in the Campbell-
Shiller approach lies at the heart of the dierent results. We reconcile this and nd
that when we use value-weights both decompositions lead to similar results i.e. in post-
WW II data cash ow growth is also important. We then investigate what drives these
results and why the manner of aggregation matters. We nd that in the data, during
the post-WW II period the largest market capitalization rms are not those that pay
the largest dollar dividends or report the largest dollar earnings. Once the aggregation
method takes these stylized facts of the data into account and is reected in the aggregate
series, predictive regressions yield compatible results dismissing the eect of dividend
smoothing policies followed by rms in the predictability of dividend growth during
the post-WW II period. Our evidence is also similar to that reported in recent work
using innovative ltering techniques. It also nds stronger evidence for dividend growth
predictability by including information available in the cross section and past history of
returns and dividends.
In this Chapter, we take a rst stab at identifying what drives this dividend growth
predictability. Consensus on these empirical issues is important for both theory and
practice in asset pricing and corporate nance. However much work still remains to be
done in this area using other relevant return decompositions but we leave this for the
future.
The empirical analysis in this Chapter is based on U.S market data and in the
environment of the U.S. nancial system. These results are based therefore on the
largest equity market in the world. If a similar analysis is done on smaller markets, e.g
like one the European Union markets, the results are likely to be dierent mainly due
to the smaller size of these markets, the domination of these market by few large rms,
the importance of the bank system in some countries and other legal and institutional
dierences in trading and stock market regulations. An avenue for future work could be
to do a similar analysis of other national stock markets and compared and contrast the
results with those of the U.S market. There are also other limitations to the empirical
analysis in this Chapter. First, the data pertains to the period which is available on
the WRDS database. There are also other pre-1920s data in other sources and the
results we have obtained may be not be possible to generalize to other time periods.
Another limitation is that we have relied largely on the Campbell and Shiller and the
book-to-market decompositions. However, there are other methods that rely on dierent
decompositions. As a consequence, these results are limited to pros and cons of using
these return decompositions which are well known and referred to earlier in the Chapter.
In addition, the same issues as explored in this Chapter can also be based on alternative
approached like the Implied Cost of Capital.
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2.8 Tables and Figures
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Figure 2.1: The fraction of aggregate dividends paid by size quintiles, 1928-2012
Note: We have depicted the percentage of total dividends pais by rms into the biggest
size quintiles Q1 and Q2 (Q1+Q2) clubbed together compared that to the smallest size
quintiles Q4 and Q5 (Q4+Q5). Following Fama and French (1992), the quintile portfolios
are constructed at the end of each December using previous December market values i.e.
we avoid any look-ahead bias.
Figure 2.2: Log dividend growths by size quintiles
Note: We have depicted the log dividend growth series for the biggest size quintiles Q1
and Q2 (Q1+Q2) clubbed together compared that to the smallest size quintiles Q4 and
Q5 (Q4+Q5) and the full sample of all rms. Following Fama and French (1992), the
quintile portfolios are constructed at the end of each December using previous December
market values i.e. we avoid any look-ahead bias.
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Figure 2.3: Log dividend yields by size quintiles
Note: We have depicted the log dividend yield series for the biggest size quintiles Q1
and Q2 (Q1+Q2) clubbed together compared that to the smallest size quintiles Q4 and
Q5 (Q4+Q5) and the full sample of all rms. Following Fama and French (1992), the
quintile portfolios are constructed at the end of each December using previous December
market values i.e. we avoid any look-ahead bias.
Figure 2.4: The fraction of aggregate payouts by size quintiles, 1928-2012
Note: We have depicted the percentage of total dividends and repurchases paid by rms
into the biggest size quintiles Q1 and Q2 (Q1+Q2) clubbed together compared that to
the smallest size quintiles Q4 and Q5 (Q4+Q5). Following Fama and French (1992), the
quintile portfolios are constructed at the end of each December using previous December
market values i.e. we avoid any look-ahead bias.
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Figure 2.5: Log dividend yields using Fama and French dividend yield quintiles
Note: We have depicted the log dividend yield series for the corresponding lowest and
highest Fama and French dividend yield quintiles using Kenneth R. French data library.
Figure 2.6: Log dividend growths using Fama and French dividend yield quintiles
Note: We have depicted the log dividend growth series for the corresponding to lowest
and highest Fama and French dividend yield quintiles using Kenneth R. French data library
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Table 2.1: Multiperiod Unweighted Direct Regressions for returns and ROE
predictability
Panel A : 1928  2012
Standard VW EW
k bbr=ROE;k PH R2 bbr=ROE;k PH R2 bbr=ROE;k PH R2
Total Returns
1 0:143 10:06 6:38 0:147 11:13 7:18 0:054 28:64 1:23
5 0:394 4:56 18:63 0:372 5:63 17:58 0:100 35:12 1:62
10 0:510 8:20 18:82 0:443 10:11 14:91  0:108 38:02 1:28
15 0:777 4:92 26:61 0:671 6:56 21:98  0:131 38:27 1:29
20 0:989 1:76 33:33 0:854 2:66 28:36  0:184 32:02 1:76
ROE
1  0:048 1:08 21:54  0:076 0:57 21:70  0:132 0:00 41:89
5  0:186 0:20 21:83  0:298 0:00 40:36  0:585 0:00 49:15
10  0:325 0:00 22:97  0:504 0:00 39:44  1:033 0:00 42:69
15  0:506 0:00 28:35  0:670 0:18 29:89  1:369 0:00 37:92
20  0:460 0:00 20:94  0:411 4:41 8:59  1:548 0:00 30:55
Panel B : 1950  2012
Standard VW EW
k bbr=ROE;k PH R2 bbr=ROE;k PH R2 bbr=ROE;k PH R2
Total Returns
1 0:137 1:84 9:76 0:142 1:79 9:96 0:100 7:44 2:96
5 0:487 4:80 30:63 0:542 5:19 29:70 0:209 25:13 3:31
10 0:811 5:35 47:47 0:821 5:67 44:96  0:086 44:13 0:25
15 1:168 2:61 51:80 1:226 2:43 53:33  0:365 29:20 2:74
20 1:423 0:95 49:30 1:476 0:91 50:09  0:382 30:85 1:73
ROE
1  0:003 42:45 0:00  0:071 1:58 11:82  0:220 0:00 27:22
5  0:037 27:56 1:94  0:336 0:30 32:66  1:023 0:00 49:05
10  0:157 14:73 4:20  0:583 0:68 34:85  1:908 0:00 42:32
15  0:391 1:11 53:18  0:821 0:79 23:60  2:417 2:91 32:70
20  0:297 4:24 48:00 0:025 47:25 0:00  2:115 0:00 14:37
Note: This table shows results for multiperiod regressions, post-WW II period (1950-2012),
of future ROE and future returns on the lagged (log) book-to-market for the U.S. market
and two portfolios, namely the value-weighted or the equally-weighted market portfolio.
Dividends are assumed to be reinvested at the zero rate of return. We report the long-run
coecient, from one to 20 years, of regressing returns and the ROE on the lagged log
book-to-market ratio (bd;k), the one-sided p-value using Hodrick (1992) standard errors
(PH) and the R-squared (R
2).
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Table 2.2: Joint Hypothesis Tests for returns and ROE predictability
Panel A : 1928  2012bb t(bb) bblr tblr=0 tblr=1
Standard
r 0:143 1:89 0:748 8:19  2:75
roe  0:048  3:00  0:252 8:19  2:75
VW
r 0:147 1:94 0:660 6:63  3:42
roe  0:076  3:87  0:340 6:62  3:42
EW
r 0:054 0:71 0:290 1:40  3:43
roe  0:132  6:95  0:710 1:40  3:43
Panel B : 1950  2012bb t(bb) bblr tblr=0 tblr=1
Standard
r 0:137 2:25 0:980 11:89  0:25
roe  0:003  0:18  0:020 11:89  0:25
VW
r 0:142 2:34 0:669 5:38  2:66
d  0:071  2:19  0:331 5:38  2:66
EW
r 0:100 1:44 0:313 1:81  3:96
roe  0:220  7:15  0:687 1:81  3:96
Note: This Table reports results for long horizon VAR regressions
and joint hypothesis tests for the U.S. market and two portfolios,
namely the value-weighted or the equally-weighted market
portfolio constructed from aggregating all the rms in the CRSP
monthly master le excluding American Depository Receipts
(ADRs) over the full sample (1928-2012) and the post war period
(1950-2012). The variables in the VAR are the log stock return
(r), log roe (roe), and log book-to-market ratio (bm). blr denote
the long-run coecients (innite horizon). t(blr=0) and t(blr=1)
denote the t-statistics associated with the null hypothesis H0 :
blrr = 0, b
lr
r oe=-1 and H0 : b
lr
r =1, b
lr
r oe=0, respectively.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for the market strategies
Panel A : 1928  2012
Returns Dividend Y ield Dividend Growth
Mean Stdev: (1) Mean Stdev: (1) Mean Stdev: (1)
Standard 0:11 0:20 0:04  3:38 0:45 0:86 0:06 0:13 0:30
VW 0:11 0:20 0:04  3:33 0:43 0:84 0:13 0:14 0:29
EW 0:17 0:27 0:04  3:49 0:45 0:77 0:10 0:12 0:31
Panel B : 1950  2012
Returns Dividend Y ield Dividend Growth
Mean Stdev: (1) Mean Stdev: (1) Mean Stdev: (1)
Standard 0:12 0:17  0:09  3:53 0:41 0:90 0:07 0:07 0:21
VW 0:12 0:17  0:09  3:46 0:39 0:87 0:14 0:09 0:49
EW 0:19 0:24  0:10  3:61 0:38 0:79 0:10 0:07 0:43
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for the log market return (r), log dividend-
to-price ratio (d-p), log standard dividend growth (d) and log market value weighted
dividend growth (d) under the risk free rate of reinvestment. The sample corresponds
to annual data for the 1928-2012 period and post-WW II 1950-2012. (1) designates the
rst-order autocorrelation.
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Table 2.4: Multiperiod Unweighted Direct Regressions for returns and dividend
growth predictability
Panel A : 1928  2012
Standard VW EW
k bbr=d;k PH R2 bbr=d;k PH R2 bbr=d;k PH R2
Return Predictability
1 0:055 14:46 1.53 0:046 19:70 1.25 0:014 39:65 0.00
5 0:329 6:19 14.09 0:334 6:51 14.06 0:169 21:57 2.82
10 0:508 9:85 19.03 0:505 10:39 18.16  0:127 36:88 1.54
15 0:762 6:05 21.15 0:743 6:75 19.23  0:127 40:62 1.00
20 0:740 7:44 14.81 0:707 8:24 12:56  0:273 33:73 3.32
Dividend Growth Predictability
1  0:114 1:73 14.63  0:155 0:38 21.83  0:108 0:64 15.41
5  0:154 14:23 4.49  0:402 2:71 24.69  0:085 21:89 1.79
10  0:225 15:83 45.42  0:687 1:59 44.15  0:116 24:33 2.99
15  0:435 4:61 11.31  0:865 0:48 33.72  0:244 10:59 8.93
20  0:505 3:01 15.27  0:862 0:34 21:81  0:302 11:24 14.81
Panel B : 1950  2012
Standard VW EW
k bbr=d;k PH R2 bbr=d;k PH R2 bbr=d;k PH R2
Return Predictability
1 0:122 1:47 8:66 0:122 1:57 7:84 0:076 15:23 1:53
5 0:461 3:72 33:81 0:484 3:41 33:56 0:113 34:10 0:89
10 0:781 5:13 48:06 0:844 4:23 49:59  0:239 32:07 2:70
15 1:110 2:74 43:77 1:183 2:30 46:85  0:410 29:00 5:04
20 1:098 2:59 24:45 1:192 1:79 27:33  0:821 15:68 11:46
Dividend Growth Predictability
1  0:026 9:13 2:79  0:084 2:25 11:95  0:055 0:83 10:17
5  0:006 47:75 0:00  0:383 4:67 27:71  0:086 16:93 3:73
10  0:083 36:15 3:37  0:773 2:02 47:09  0:268 2:85 27:33
15  0:226 22:90 12:75  0:767 1:98 21:99  0:340 3:68 31:26
20  0:457 6:34 38:16  0:650 2:32 7:62  0:522 1:93 51:17
Note: Panel A shows results for multiperiod regressions over the full sample period (1928-
2012), of future returns and future dividend growth on lagged (log) dividend yield for
the U.S.. market and two portfolios, namely the value-weighted or the equally-weighted
market portfolio constructed from aggregating all the rms in the CRSP monthly master
le excluding American Depository Receipts (ADRs). Panel B reports results for the
post-WW II period (1950-2012) for the same market portfolios. We report the long-run
coecients, from one to 20 years, of regressing returns and dividend growth on the lagged
log dividend yield (br=d;k), the one-sided p-value using Hodrick (1992) standard errors
(PH) and the R-squared (R
2).
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Table 2.5: Joint Hypothesis Tests for returns and dividend growth predictability
Panel A : 1928  2012
Standard VW EWbblr tblr=0 tblr=1 bblr tblr=0 tblr=1 bblr tblr=0 tblr=1
r 0:324 1:57  3:27 0:230 1:17  3:92 0:000 0:00  1:65
d  0:676 1:57  3:27  0:770 1:17  3:92  1:000 0:00  1:65
Panel B : 1950  2012
Standard VW EWbblr tblr=0 tblr=1 bblr tblr=0 tblr=1 bblr tblr=0 tblr=1
r 0:825 6.52  1:39 0:593 4:13  2:84 0:582 2:26  1:62
d  0:175 6:52  1:39  0:407 4:13  2:84  0:418 2:26  1:62
Note: This Table reports results for long horizon VAR regressions and joint hypothesis
tests for the U.S. market and two portfolios, namely the value-weighted or the equally-
weighted market portfolio constructed from aggregating all the rms in the CRSP monthly
master le excluding American Depository Receipts (ADRs) over the full sample (1928-
2012) and the post-WW II period (1950-2012). The variables in the VAR are the log
stock return (r), log dividend growth (d), and log dividend-to-price ratio (d-p). blr
denote the long-run coecients (innite horizon). t(blr=0) and t(blr=1) denote the t-
statistics associated with the null hypothesis H0 : b
lr
r = 0, b
lr
d =-1 and H0 : b
lr
r =1, b
lr
d =0,
respectively.
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Table 2.6: Univariate predictive regressions for the quintile portfolios
Panel A : Return Predictability
1928  2012 1950  2012
r t  stat R2 bblr r t  stat R2 bblr
All F irms 0:057 1:00 1:68 0:330 0:123 2:31 8:74 0:778
Q1 0:074 1:37 3:57 0:388 0:106 1:90 8:94 0:586
Q2 0:068 1:27 2:55 0:387 0:158 3:05 13:05 0:735
Q3 0:063 1:20 2:45 0:358 0:113 2:05 8:74 0:806
Q4 0:044 0:76 0:98 0:264 0:109 2:08 7:29 0:789
Q5 0:037 0:55 0:49 0:177 0:127 2:37 5:89 0:671
Panel B : Dividend Growth Predictability
1928  2012 1950  2012
d t  stat R2 bbld d t  stat R2 bbld
All F irms  0:115  2:14 14:69  0:670  0:035  1:79 5:35  0:222
Q1  0:116  2:68 12:56  0:612  0:075  2:90 11:75  0:414
Q2  0:108  2:68 15:70  0:613  0:057  2:81 9:41  0:265
Q3  0:113  2:23 16:54  0:642  0:027  1:36 5:81  0:194
Q4  0:122  2:11 14:37  0:736  0:029  1:28 2:14  0:211
Q5  0:170  2:29 17:64  0:823  0:062  2:31 6:01  0:329
Note: Panel A reports the standard univariate regressions of annual log returns on the
lagged log dividend yield for the whole sample of all CRSP rms except for ADRs and
for the market value quintiles over the full sample 1928-2012 and the 1950-2012 period.
Panel B reports the standard univariate regressions of log dividend growth on the lagged
log dividend yield over the same sample periods and equity portfolios. In each panel,
the rst column reports the regression coecient, the second column the Newey West
t-statistic, the third column the R-square and the fourth column the dividend growth and
total returns long-run predictive coecients (bblr and bbld) based on a VAR (1).
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Table 2.7: Univariate Regressions for the repurchases adjusted series.
Panel A : Return Predictability
1928  2012 1950  2012
r t  stat R2 r t  stat R2
All firms 0:102 1:26 2:49 0:205 2:94 10:71
Q1 0:123 2:27 6:16 0:148 2:66 10:80
Q2 0:125 1:92 4:64 0:229 3:67 16:14
Q3 0:102 1:39 2:89 0:188 3:05 9:91
Q4 0:032 0:36 0:22 0:147 1:81 5:01
Q5 0:073 0:78 1:07 0:221 2:86 9:60
Panel B : Dividend Growth Predictability
1928  2012 1950  2012
d t  stat R2 d t  stat R2
All firms  0:278  3:15 25:82  0:128  1:44 7:75
Q1  0:123  3:86 19:90  0:135  3:24 11:19
Q2  0:202  2:59 14:18  0:106  1:18 3:83
Q3  0:298  3:44 26:40  0:129  1:50 6:36
Q4  0:413  4:34 34:98  0:289  2:46 19:00
Q5  0:364  3:61 32:41  0:214  2:34 16:47
Note: Panel A reports the standard univariate regressions of annual log
returns on the repurchases adjusted lagged log dividend yield for the
whole sample of CRSP rms excluding American Depository Receipts
(ADRs) and for the market value quintiles over the full sample 1928-
2012 and the 1950-2012 period. Panel B reports the standard univariate
regressions of the repurchases adjusted log dividend growth on the
repurchases adjusted lagged log dividend yield over the same sample
periods and equity portfolios. In each panel, the rst column reports
the regression coecient, the second column the Newey West t-statistic
and the third column the R-squared.
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Table 2.8: Multiperiod Unweighted Direct Regressions for portfolios of only dividend
payers
Panel A : 1928  2012
Standard VW EW
k bbr=d;k PH R2 bbr=d;k PH R2 bbr=d;k PH R2
Total Returns
1 0:067 12:44 1:85 0:054 18:45 1:16 0:051 29:65 0:58
5 0:369 5:31 14:32 0:368 5:68 13:49 0:453 5:95 12:26
10 0:547 9:73 17:92 0:527 10:44 15:63 0:302 26:19 4:81
15 0:792 6:57 20:89 0:746 7:42 18:37 0:444 22:19 8:89
20 0:744 8:95 15:22 0:681 10:19 12:81 0:209 35:89 2:08
Dividend Growth
1  0:127 1:48 17:25  0:198 0:21 25:20  0:247 0:46 25:13
5  0:168 14:84 5:73  0:536 2:07 26:18  0:234 17:45 3:75
10  0:263 10:51 22:97  0:940 1:18 38:86  0:332 15:50 4:43
15  0:443 5:46 14:46  1:058 0:77 26:08  0:602 3:24 7:87
20  0:529 3:06 21:43  0:909 1:21 12:82  0:809 1:72 9:95
Panel B : 1950  2012
Standard VW EW
k bbr=d;k PH R2 bbr=d;k PH R2 bbr=d;k PH R2
Total Returns
1 0:171 0:32 11:91 0:166 0:33 10:57 0:262 0:34 11:28
5 0:613 1:41 42:56 0:642 1:14 42:49 1:077 0:30 37:09
10 1:020 2:59 59:71 1:100 1:73 61:86 1:064 2:62 37:40
15 1:354 1:71 54:92 1:416 1:35 57:65 0:955 7:17 28:51
20 1:152 2:93 27:31 1:204 2:18 28:99 0:243 30:75 1:79
Dividend Growth
1  0:037 5:46 4:20  0:133 0:78 14:20  0:134 1:99 9:26
5  0:017 44:36 0:17  0:607 2:37 27:64  0:146 18:23 0:93
10  0:113 32:59 3:38  1:176 0:97 37:63  0:441 2:92 3:17
15  0:207 26:26 7:45  0:932 3:07 12:14  0:463 2:03 2:08
20  0:426 8:71 20:48  0:255 26:27 0:52  0:692 0:00 3:28
Note: This Table shows results for multiperiod regressions, over the full sample (1928-2012)
and the post war period (1950-2012), of future dividend growth on lagged (log) dividend
yield for the U.S. market and two portfolios, namely the value-weighted or the equally-
weighted market portfolio constructed from aggregating all the rms in the CRSP monthly
master le excluding American Depository Receipts (ADRs). Dividends are assumed to
be reinvested at the zero rate of return. We report the long-run coecient, from one to 20
years, of regressing dividend growth on the lagged log dividend yield (bd;k), the one-sided
p-value using Hodrick (1992) standard errors (PH) and the R-squared (R
2).
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Table 2.9: Joint Hypothesis Tests for portfolios of only dividend payers
Panel A : 1928  2012bb t(bb) bblr tblr=0 tblr=1
Standard
r 0:067 1:03 0:346 1:79  3:39
d  0:127  2:38  0:654 1:79  3:39
VW
r 0:054 0:78 0:215 1:23  4:48
d  0:198  3:52  0:785 1:23  4:48
EW
r 0:051 0:48 0:171 0:84  4:04
d  0:247  3:60  0:829 0:84  4:04
Panel B : 1950  2012bb t(bb) bblr tblr=0 tblr=1
Standard
r 0:171 2:93 0:822 7:88  1:71
d  0:037  1:73  0:178 7:88  1:71
VW
r 0:166 2:97 0:555 4:31  3:47
d  0:133  2:22  0:445 4:31  3:47
EW
r 0:262 3:57 0:661 5:42  2:78
d  0:134  2:22  0:339 5:42  2:78
Note: This Table reports results for long horizon VAR regressions
and joint hypothesis tests for the U.S. market and two portfolios,
namely the value-weighted or the equally-weighted market
portfolio constructed from aggregating all the rms in the CRSP
monthly master le excluding American Depository Receipts
(ADRs) over the full sample (1928-2012) and the post war period
(1950-2012). Dividends are assumed to be reinvested at the zero
rate of return. The variables in the VAR are the log stock
return (r), log dividend growth (d), and log dividend-to-price
ratio (d-p). blr denote the long-run coecients (innite horizon).
t(blr=0) and t(blr=1) denote the t-statistics associated with the
null hypothesis H0 : b
lr
r = 0, b
lr
d =-1 and H0 : b
lr
r =1, b
lr
d =0,
respectively.
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Table 2.10: Monte Carlo Simulation Results for returns and dividend growth
predictability
Panel A : 1928  2012
Standard VW EW
k br > br bd > bd br > br br > br bd > bd br > br br > br bd > bd br > br
bd > bd bd > bd bd > bd
1 30:66 2:18 1:43 36:09 13:28 6:80 65:42 0:00 0:00
5 20:27 0:12 0:12 20:28 4:34 3:73 43:61 0:00 0:00
10 24:48 1:91 1:90 25:06 30:66 21:19 85:70 0:15 0:15
15 18:07 17:47 12:66 19:70 53:86 19:66 86:41 6:19 6:19
20 28:67 33:29 23:85 31:09 60:31 30:90 92:35 19:22 19:22
Panel B : 1950  2012
Standard VW EW
k br > br bd > bd br > br br > br bd > bd br > br br > br bd > bd br > br
bd > bd bd > bd bd > bd
1 16:78 0:00 0:00 19:29 0:57 0:49 32:10 0:00 0:00
5 20:10 0:03 0:03 20:62 12:51 10:00 59:58 0:00 0:00
10 18:96 1:88 1:78 18:06 57:78 18:05 89:62 5:81 5:81
15 12:36 17:30 8:94 12:75 62:55 12:75 93:91 26:80 26:80
20 22:98 50:23 21:87 21:31 64:17 21:27 97:67 57:55 57:55
Note: This Table shows the simulated p-values for joint tests of multi-period returns and
dividend growth rates under the null of no return predictability over the full sample (1928-
2012) and the post-WW II period (1950-2012). We follow Cochrane (2008) and draw the
VAR residuals assuming they are jointly normally distributed. The dividend yield for the
base period d0 p0 is drawn from the unconditional density d0 p0  N [0; 2("dp)=(1 2)].
We then draw dt and 
dp
t as random normals and simulate the system forward (10,000
times). For the multiperiod returns and dividend growth rates, we follow a similar
simulation procedure, but now we compute rt;t+1 and dt from the simulated data and
regress these onto dt   pt , and collect the coecients. Then, we compute the fractions of
simulated estimates for the return/dividend growth coecients that are higher than the
estimates found in the data, that is, p(br;k > br;k) and p(bd;k > bd;k). We also calculate
the joint probabilities, p(br;k > br;k and bd;k > bd;k).
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Chapter 3
Exploring the Anatomy of Firm
Payouts: Who Pays, How Much
and When?
3.1 Introduction
The pattern of payouts by rms, both over time and across rms has attracted much
attention. In a classic paper, Lintner (1956) proposed a time series model for dividend
payouts. More recently, the focus of empirical research on dividends has been on
analyzing not just cash dividends but all payouts including shares repurchases and new
issues. For example in an important paper Fama and French (2001) provide evidence that
the number of listed U.S. rms paying cash dividends declines dramatically after 1978,
and that this can only be partly attributed to changes in the characteristics of publicly-
held rms. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004) revisit the Fama and French (2001)
results and suggest that while many fewer rms paid dividends in the late 1990s that did
in the mid-1970s, aggregate dividends increased over that period, both in nominal and
in real terms. Hence, it is not that dividend themselves were disappearing but they were
concentrated in a fewer number of rms. In subsequent work, Boudoukh et al. (2007) and
Skinner (2008) report that after the 1980s repurchases have become a very important
method of returning cash to shareholders. The advantages of stock repurchases over
dividends led to suggestions in the popular press that the disappearance of dividends
would be just a matter of time. However, recent work by Floyd, Li and Skinner (2013)
that compares payout policies of U.S. industrial and nancial rms reports that dividends
have bounced back strongly thus reviving the dividend puzzle (Black, 1976).
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The strong growth of total payouts-dividends and repurchases over the past decade is
also related to the fact that U.S. corporations are holding record-high amounts of cash.
A close look at the balance sheets of publicly trade U.S. rms show that their cash
holdings increased dramatically since the mid-1990s except for a slowdown around the
nancial crisis. The two explanations most frequently given for the growth in cash
pertain to scal policy and structural factors. Fiscal policy is related to the tax cost
for public rms to bring their overseas prots back to the U.S. and the uncertainty
about the increase on future taxes. Other explanations point to gradual changes in the
nature of the operations of a rm. Firms hold cash and equivalent liquid assets because
they provide the exibility that rms need in their transactions. Two factors interact
directly with this proposed explanation: uncertainty and credit constraints. Firms facing
uncertainty about future transactions, either due to rm-specic or aggregate factors,
may nd it benecial to pile up signicant amounts of cash as a cushion. For example,
a rm may want to hold cash to be able to act fast when an acquisition is possible. A
rm may also hold cash and postpone investment until uncertainty about scal policies
is resolved. Recent research suggests that the behavior of rms in sectors more intensive
in R&D is crucial to understanding cash holdings. Although it is not the purpose of this
Chapter, the fact that rms are distributing the bulk of their earnings to stockholders
means that they aren't investing in the equipment or undertaking the research that leads
to future improvements in productivity, earnings and job creation.
In this Chapter we build on recent payout policy research but we oer a more detailed
analysis than that available in the current literature by analyzing the anatomy of US
rms' payouts using novel ways of classifying rms and over a long period from 1927 (the
start of the CRSP database) up till 2012. Thanks to this detailed analysis of corporate
payouts we have been able to consider the impact of sample composition changes thanks
to the analysis of the dierent industries, indexes and years since the rm was included
into thee CRSP database. We begin by replicating and updating previous work that
analyzes patterns in the time series and cross-sectional behavior of payouts by U.S. rms.
This also facilitates comparison with our work. We then turn to our main contribution
and study dividend and repurchases patterns across industry groups including the most
recent crisis period. Based on the SIC classication of industries we sort rms available
in the CRSP into dierent industry groups. To our knowledge this level of detail has
not been analyzed previously using U.S. market data for the sample period we cover.
We do this for all rms in the CRSP database including those traded on the NYSE,
NASDAQ, AMEX, ARCA and other exchanges. Finally, we also track payout policy
from the perspective of rm age i.e. from the time the rm is rst listed in our CRSP
database.
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Our main conclusions are as follows. First, we nd that after 1990, the following
industry groups: Chemicals, Communications and Depository Institutions together paid
about half of all dividends paid by US rms. However during the recent nancial crisis
the fraction of dividends paid by Depository Institutions fell to less than 5%, while
Communications also reduced its share to less than 7% but Chemicals maintained its
position as the largest payer at around 15%. Despite the eect of the nancial crisis,
the concentration of industrials dividends reported by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner
(2004) extends to industry groups. In short, while in the 1930s and the 1940s four
Manufacturing groups were paying between 10% and 15% of all dividends, after the
1990s we only nd one group (Chemicals) paying between 10% and 15% of all dividends.
The concentration of industrial rms' dividends reported by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and
Skinner (2004) extends to repurchases although they are undertaken by a more diverse
group of industries. This is also the case for nancials in where dividends are mainly
paid by Depositary Institutions, while stock repurchases are distributed among a more
diverse group of nancials.
Second, we nd that payouts are concentrated in rms listed in certain specic years.
For example, we nd that after the year 2000, rms listed in 1926 and 1973 paid around
20% and 35% of the total dividends paid. Third, we conrm the results of Floyd, Li
and Skinner (2013) and nd that it is the youngest and the oldest rms who are mainly
responsible for the growth of dividends and repurchases after 2001. Specically, we nd
that prior to the current nancial crisis, the youngest rms (those listed after 1986)
mainly drive the growth of dividends. After the crisis (2009) the growth of dividends is
mainly by both younger (listed after 1989) and also by older rms (listed after 1963).
The growth of repurchases however, after 2000 and during the nancial crises comes
mainly from the same younger rms that are also driving the growth in dividends.
This chapter is organized as follows. We begin with a review of selected related research
in Section 2. Section 3 replicates the main ndings of recent US payout policy. Section
4 looks closely at aggregate payouts from the perspective of rm type, market index
and rm age. Section 5 reports evidence on several aspects of payout policy and how
it changes over time from the perspective of rm size. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
Chapter.
3.2 Literature Review
Why, when and in what form do rms pay dividends? This is one of the most important
and enduring research questions in corporate nance. It has attracted extensive attention
- see Farre-Mensa and Michaely (2014) for a recent review. In this brief review, we
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however focus specically on the literature that analyzes patterns in the the time series
and cross-sectional behavior of payouts by U.S. rms.
In their classic work Miller and Modigliani (1961) observed that in a world without taxes
and other frictions, dividends should be indierent to investors and rms. Firms that
pay dividends oer less price appreciation but must provide the same total return to
stockholders, given their risk characteristics and the cash ows from their investment
decisions. Thus, if there are no taxes, or if dividends and capital gains are taxed at the
same rate, investors should be indierent to receiving their returns in dividends or price
appreciation. But also why rms pay dividends is dicult to explain when dividends
are normally taxed at a higher rate than capital gains and put dividend paying rms at
a competitive disadvantage since they have a higher cost of equity than rms that do
not pay.
In an important recent study, Fama and French (2001) document the disappearing
dividends phenomena: from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s, the fraction of U.S.
companies that paid dividends fell from about two-thirds to one-fth. Their analysis
indicates that this dramatic change in the patterns of dividend payments is in part due
to both an increasing tilt of publicly traded rms that do not pay dividends combined
with a reduced propensity to pay dividends by rms that in the past would distribute
cash to stockholders. Although Fama and French (2001) carefully state that their
ndings show only a reduction in the number and percent of dividend-paying rms,
their evidence is commonly interpreted as indicating that dividends themselves were
disappearing. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004) revisited Fama and French (2001)
results and suggested that while many fewer rms paid dividends in the late 1990s than
did in the mid-1970s, aggregate dividends increased over that period, both in nominal
and in real terms. Hence, it is not that dividends themselves were disappearing but
they were concentrated in a fewer number of rms. The combination of a decreased
number of payers and increased aggregate dividends reected high and increased earnings
concentration.
In subsequent work, Boudoukh et al. (2007) and Skinner (2008) report that after
the 1980s repurchases have become a very important method of returning cash to
shareholders. According to Skinner (2008), there are, in the period since 1980, two
groups of rms that pay out cash to stockholders: rms that both pay dividends and
make repurchases and rms that only make repurchases. He nds that the larger,
more protable, and more mature rms that previously paid dividends now pay both
dividends and repurchases, that managers of these rms coordinate their payouts
decisions, and that overall payouts are well-explained by earnings. He also nds that
managers have become increasingly reluctant to increase dividends, apparently because
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the emergence of repurchases provides them with an alternative way of distributing
earnings increases. Finally, he reports that aggregate repurchases reached approximately
the same magnitude as aggregate dividends. In scal 2004 (net) repurchases for U.S.
industrials were $155 billion while dividends were around $135 billion.
It is important to note here that repurchases enjoy several advantages with respect to
dividends. Dividends are taxed as income at investors's marginal tax rate, which is
usually substantially higher than the long-term capital gains rate that would be relevant
if investors sold into a repurchase as well as share repurchases being more exible because
they do not commit companies to keep making more repurchases in the future as in
the case of dividends. These advantages drove many to think that the disappearance
of dividends would be just a matter of time. Moreover, if dividends are an inferior
payout mechanism and in long-run decline, the economic shock associated with the
global nancial crisis (the largest economic shock since the Great Depression) should
hasten their demise. But based on recent research by Floyd, Li and Skinner (2013),
which compare the payout policies of U.S. industrial and nancial rms, dividends
have bounced back strongly, fueling a massive surge in overall payouts and reviving
the dividends puzzle. After sluggish growth in the 1990s, aggregate dividends have
more than doubled in real terms over the same period, from $134 billion in 2002 to $276
billion in 2012 (these are 2012 constant dollars). One of the reasons dividends survive
is that the commitment involved is benecial and it disciplines management investment
decisions. For industrials, dividends grow in aggregate, are increasingly smooth, and
are concentrated among a relatively small group of large mature rms, consistent with a
free cash ow explanation. In contrast, the majority of nancials pay dividends, which
increase robustly over the past 20 years, consistent with the signaling theory.
In the case of repurchases, they nd that managers's use of repurchases has
systematically changed since the 1980s while early repurchases were strategically timed
to take advantage of low valuations, the use of repurchases a payout vehicle has made
them strongly pro-cyclical. Moreover, the concentration of industrial rms's dividends
has continued to increase and extends to repurchases. Finally, they nd that repurchases
increase strongly for both sets of rms, pushing aggregate payouts to historic levels that
raise questions about aggregate investment.
This evidence is also related to recent literature (for example Floyd, Li and Skinner
(2013)) which shows that dividends, as opposed to repurchases or total payouts, matters
to investors, and that managers are strongly reluctant to reduce dividends, as originally
proposed by Lintner (1956). Leary and Michaely (2011) observe that managers's
tendency to smooth dividends has become steadily more pronounced over the past
century, a trend that predates the availability of repurchases. They nd that smoothing
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is more prevalent among large mature rms with large free cash ows. Finally, Michaely
and Roberts (2012) provide evidence that public rms smooth dividends more than
private rms, consistent with the importance of dividends being linked to public listing
status.
3.3 Data Description
Our data is from CRSP and covers the period 1927-2012. Following Fama and French
(2001) we sample CRSP rms incorporated in the U.S. (share codes of 10 or 11 in
the CRSP monthly master le). Our sample consists of all rms incorporated in the
U.S. including nancials or utilities. Fama and French (2001) and other work on payout
policy focus only on industrial rms. However, Floyd, Li and Skinner (2013) also include
nancial rms. In our study we consider nancials as well as utilities. This coincides
with our objective in this Chapter to provide a more detailed analysis, than available
in the current literature, by partitioning rms on the basis of: size, age, stock market
index and industry group.
In order to be included in our sample, a rm must have market equity data (price and
share outstanding) for December of year t to be in the sample that year. We assume,
for convenience, that an annual rm level dividend amount is being obtained using rm
monthly data. For that reason, we require non-missing monthly lagged ex-dividend price
and cum-dividend and ex-dividend returns to compute monthly rm dividends.
Dt = (Rt  RXt)Pt (3.1)
We use the most straightforward estimate of shares repurchased by a rm as the decrease
in shares outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted for other activities that aect the
number of shares outstanding, such as stock dividends and stock splits. We do not
oset monthly decreases in shares outstanding with increases in other months because
increases can occur for a variety of reasonsincluding new stock issues, the distribution
of shares to employee benet plans, or the exercise of stock options. Since these
increases are unrelated to repurchase activity and bias repurchase estimates downward,
we record monthly increases in shares outstanding as a zero decrease. If repurchases
and distributions of shares occur in the same month, however, they will oset each
other, and the monthly decrease in CRSP shares outstanding will understate actual
shares repurchased. We are aware that there are alternative methods of calculating
share repurchases. For example, Fama and French (2001) and Skinner (2008) use
the changes in Treasury stocks from COMPUSTAT to proxy for share repurchases.
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However, the advantage of the method employed in the paper is that it allows us to have
monthly cumulative data for repurchases for a longer period of time. We have also tried
alternative methods of share repurchases using COMPUSTAT cash ow and balance
sheet statements and our results remain robust.
We dene repurchases in the CRSP database following Chen, Da and Priestly (2012) as:
rp =
Pt+1
Pt
 [1 min(nt+1
nt
; 1)] (3.2)
When there is a repurchase, nt+1nt < 1 and [1   min(
nt+1
nt
; 1)] is the proportional
repurchase; rp then captures the repurchase return. As in the case of dividends, we
calculate repurchases in dollars for each rm month, and we sum them across months
to the get the annual numbers for each rm.
3.4 Replication of Selected Prior Work
We begin with Fama and French (2001) who document that, from the mid-1970s to the
late 1990s, the fraction of U.S. companies that paid dividends fell from about two-thirds
to one-fth. Their analysis indicates that this dramatic change in dividend practices
from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s was due both to changes in the population of rms
that were publicly held in that time, and to a reduced propensity to pay dividends by
rms whose characteristics would have led them to distribute cash to stockholders. We
will start our payout policy analysis by updating their work.
Fama and French (2001) use data from 1927 to 1996. We extend this up to 2012.
Figure 3.1 replicates and extends the Fama and French (2001) analysis by plotting the
fraction of payers and non payers from 1927 until 2012. For simplicity, we have only
considered two groups of rms: payers and non-payers. Payers pay dividends in time
t; non-payers do not. A rms in the CRSP sample is dened as a dividend payer in
calendar year t if its with-dividend return exceeds its without-dividend return in any
month of year t. Figure 3.1 is very similar to Figure 3.2 in Fama and French (2001)
although we have not excluded utilities and nancials rms from the sample and we have
placed dierent requirements on the data (e.g. rms must stay in the market for at least
two years). Despite these dierences, we can arrive at the same conclusions as Fama
and French (2001) when looking at the same sample period from 1927 to 1996. There
is an important decline in the incidence of dividend payers among NYSE, AMEX and
NASDAQ rms after 1978. Their analysis indicate that this dramatic change in dividend
practices was in part due to both an increasing tilt of publicly traded rms towards the
characteristics of rms that never paid dividends, and to a reduced propensity to pay
75
dividends by rms whose characteristics historically would have led them to distribute
cash to their stockholders.
We nd by extending the sample period to 2012, similar to Floyd, Li and Skinner (2013),
the following: First, after 2002 the percentage of payers among public U.S. rms has
started to grow up again. Second, although it was aected by the nancial crisis in
2007, the percentage of dividend payers has also continued to increase after 2009. At
the end of 2012, our sample tells that 45% of all rms are dividend payers compared
to 2002 where only 32% of all rms were paying dividends. We are not the rst to
document this upsurge in the percentage of dividend payers in the last 12 years and
Floyd, Li and Skinner (2013) is a very recent example of this renewed interest in US
payout policy. The importance of this increase in the percentage of dividend payers for
the reviving of the dividend puzzle has led some authors to call this the "reappearing
dividend phenomena" to compare it to Fama and French (2001) ndings.
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004) revisited Fama and French (2001) results and
suggested that while many fewer rms paid dividends in the late 1990s than did in the
mid-1970s, aggregate dividends increased over that period, both in nominal and in real
terms. Figure 3.2 analyzes this and tracks aggregate dividends and repurchases for all
rms incorporated into the US over 1927-2012. It is divided into two subgraphs (1927-
1977 and 1978-2012) in order to closely analyze the disappearing dividend phenomena
after 1978 described by Fama and French (2001), and the irruption of stock repurchases
in the early 1980s as documented by Skinner (2008). This gure shows not only that
aggregate dividends increased steadily over the full sample period despite the fact that
the number of dividend payers decreased by over 50% as Fama and French (2001)
documented and we showed in Figure 3.1, but also that stock repurchases emerged as a
signicant payout mechanism in the early 1980s, which increased noticeably in the late
1990s. We nd by extending the sample up to 2012 that since 2001 not only has there
an increase in the number of payers as we showed in Figure 3.1, but also these dividend
payers have increased payouts (dividends and repurchases) to the massive levels before,
and more recently after the nancial crisis, although repurchases have not reached yet
the pre-crisis levels. Finally, dividends have shown strong resilience during the nancial
crisis in comparison to repurchases that were cut aggressively as it is reported in Figure
3.3, which plots aggregate dividends and aggregate payouts growth. Moreover, it shows
that repurchases have been actively growing since the 1990s with the exception of 1991,
2001 and the nancial crisis, while dividends have been doing it since 2000.
Looking closely at the eect of the nancial crisis, we see that from a peak of $273 billion
in 2007, dividends declined to $262 billion in 2008 and to $236 billion in 2009 (by 20%
overall). Aggregate dividends subsequently increased to $261 billion in 2010, $261 billion
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in 2011 and then to $330 billion in 2012. This important increase in dividend payments
during the last year of our sample coincides with an upsurge of dividend payers during
2012 after 5 years of constant reduction. The number of payers declined from 1615 in
2007 to 1364 in 2011, but from 2011 to 2012 has increased again to 1492 payers. In
strong contrast, U.S. rms cut repurchases from $526 billion in 2007 to $394 billion in
2008 and then to $149 billion in 2009 (by 70% overall). Aggregate repurchases rebound
to $279 billion in 2010 and then to $397 billion in 2011, well in excess of dividends
again. The strong growth of dividends during 2012, together with the reduction in stock
repurchases left both payout gures at the same level of $329 billion in 2012.
The strong irruption of stock repurchases in the payout policy picture drove some authors
to examine the relationship between dividend payers and rms making repurchases.
Skinner (2008) found that since the emergence of repurchases in the 1980s two groups of
payers appear: rms that both pay dividends and make repurchases and rms that only
make repurchases. We follow him and we rst plot in Figure 3.3 the fraction of rms in
four dierent payer groups. We also plot, now in Figure 3.4, the fraction of total payouts
(dividends and repurchases) by the same payer groups. Skinner (2008) divided the entire
sample of rms into four groups or categories: (1) rms that pay both dividends and
repurchases, (2) rms that pay only dividends, (3) rms that pay only repurchases, (4)
rms that do not pay out cash to stockholders. As Skinner (2008) stated, this approach
understates the number of rms that both pay dividends and make repurchases (group
(1)) and overstates the number of rms that only pay dividends (group (2)) if rms with
an ongoing policy of paying dividends and repurchases do not make repurchases in every
year.
Figure 3.4 plots the fraction of rms in the dierent payout categories. It is similar to
Figure 3.1 where we plotted payers and non-payers. Payers in Figure 3.4 are contained
Groups A and B, while non-payers includes Groups C and D. Thanks to this gure,
we can have a better picture of the drivers of payouts in the US stock market. Similar
to Figure 3.1, we nd that the number of rms that pay only dividends - Group B -
has experienced an important decline over time. They were the most important group
until 1983, when they were surpassed by Group D- rms that do not pay out cash to
stockholders. After 2000 where they reached their minimum, the number of rms into
Group B has stabilized and it has been moving between 10% and 17% of all rms for the
last 12 years. On the other hand, rms that do not pay cash out to stockholders were
signicant as a consequence of the shock produced by the 1930s crisis. At that point in
time, this group represented more than 60% of all rms in 1933. After that, and since
the 1940s paying dividends was very common for US rms and non-payers dropped
signicantly representing less than 10% of all rms during the 1950s. We needed to
wait for the NASDAQ and AMEX inclusion into the CRSP sample to nd an upsurge
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in the number of non-payers, and specially to the late 1970s for the so called "Dividend
Disappearing Phenomena" documented by Fama and French (2001). During the 1990s,
the percentage of non-payers stabilized around 40%. It is from the late 1990s where the
percentage of non-payers has started to decline. It went from 46% in 1999 to only 27%
in 2012. It seems that this decline is due to the increasing importance of rms making
only repurchases - Group C - and at the end of the sample for the increasing importance
of rms paying dividends and making repurchases - Group A. The irruption of Group
C coincides with the emerge of repurchases in the early 1980s and it was increasing at
the same time as non-payers until the end of the 1990s. Since then, it has to continue
to increase (despite some drops between 1998-1999 and 2002-2003) and at the end of
2012 these rms constituted more than 27% of all rms into the market. It is worth
mention that despite the big drop in the total amount of repurchases, the number of
rms making only repurchases increased from 2007 to 2008. Finally, Figure 3.4 shows
that since the 1990s rms that pay both dividends and repurchases - Group A - accounts
for more than 20% of all rms. Moreover, although the nancial crisis impacted them
heavily - the percentage of rms in Group A decreased from 30% in 2007 to 21% in
2009- they have recovered their previous levels very fast and at the end of 2012 29% of
all rms were paying dividends and making repurchases.
Figure 3.5 plots the fraction of aggregate payouts (dividends and repurchases)
represented by rms in dierent payer categories from 1927 to 2012. Here we see the
increased dominance of rms that both pay dividends and make repurchases. At the end
of 2012, they are responsible for 80% of all cash payouts. As we discussed above, this
group of rms never represents more than 30% of all rms in the market. However, since
the emergence of repurchases in the early 1980s, this set of rms dominates aggregate
payouts. Beginning in 1984, these rms account for between 50% and 85% of all payout
dollars, with lows (of just 50%) in the early 1990s recession years and highs of more
than 80% over 2004-2008. Thus, these are the rms largely responsible for the explosive
growth of payouts during the 2000s. Before the mid-1980s, dividend-payers dominate
the overall supply of cash payouts (e.g. from 1950 to 1970 this Group paid more than
80% of all cash payouts). After the 1970s, however, there is a signicant transition, with
the proportion of total payout attributable to dividend-payers dropping sharply (in 2007
they paid less than 5% of all cash payouts) while the proportion attributable to rms
paying both increasing aggressively.
It is also interesting to analyze the behavior of these rms during the nancial crisis.
The resilience of dividends and the big drop in repurchases help to explain why only
dividend payers moved from paying less than 5% of all dividends in 2007 to around 20%
in 2009, and rms paying both decreased from paying around 85% to 70% in 2009. After
the crisis, rms have continued to increase dividends and repurchases and at the end
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of 2012 80% of payouts are coming from rms paying both, and the remaining 20%, is
divided half between rms that only make repurchases and rms that only pay dividends.
Although it is true that repurchases have become an important payout mechanism and
it has surpassed dividends many times during the last years, if we consider only the
fraction of aggregate dividends paid in each of these groups we will see that rms that
pay both, dividends and repurchases, are also those that pay the majority of dividends.
At the end of the sample, 80% of all dividends were paid by these rms and the remaining
20% by only dividend payers.
At this point, some authors try to dismantle aggregate dividends and repurchases for
dierent types of rms. It is common to focus on industrials but recent papers have
also included nancial rms because of their increasing importance after the 1990s.
We have also decided to include nancials together with utilities into the sample. We
restrict our attention to the period between 1978 and 2012 in order to make our results
comparable to other studies. Before that, the majority of dividends were paid by
industrials rms and the same conclusions as in Figure 3.2 apply. Figure 3.6 plots
dollar values of aggregate dividends on the left hand side and aggregate repurchases
on the right hand side for industrials, nancials and utilities, respectively from 1978-
2012. Our ndings are similar to Floyd, Li and Skinner (2013), which use the Compustat
North America annual data from 1980 to 2011 in real terms. Looking rst at industrials,
aggregate dividends increased in modest terms over the 1990s (around 45% overall) at the
same time as the number of dividend-payers declined (see Figure 3.1), consistent with
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004) results on increased dividend concentration.
But what is relevant during the 1990s is the growth of repurchases (around 166% from
1990 to 1999), from levels well below dividends to levels at or above them by the end
of the decade. After declining in 2001 due to the recession, aggregate stock repurchases
increased dramatically until the nancial crisis in 2007 (more than 325% from 2001
to 2007). Aggregate dividends paid by industrials also increased signicantly during
this period and nearly doubled the 2001 numbers with the exception of 2004-2005 in
where they decreased by 15% in one year as it is shown in Figure 3.7, which plots
yearly dividend and payouts growth. This drop could be explained by the incidence of
the special dividend paid by Microsoft during 2004. We will see later that this special
dividend represented around 20% of all aggregate dividends paid in 2004. This big
increase in dividends payments during the 2000s explains why industrials kept paying
between 60% and 70% of all dividends during these years as it is shown in Figure 3.8,
which plots fractions of aggregate payouts for industrials, nancials and utilities. On
the other hand, as the nancial crisis took hold in 2007, industrials reduced dividends
modestly as we can see in the same Figure 3.7. While aggregate dividends decreased by
20% between 2007 and 2009, industrials reduced dividends only from 2008 to 2009 and
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by 2%. Moreover, from 2007 to 2008 not only dividends did not decrease by they grew
by 1%. Hence, it seems that nancials and/or utilities are responsible for the big drop in
aggregate dividends during the nancial crisis. On the other hand, repurchases were cut
aggressively. From levels far above dividends in 2007, they were reduced to levels below
aggregate dividends in 2009 (by around 70% overall). This drop is similar to what we
found for the case of aggregate repurchases. In the recent years, repurchases increased
signicantly after 2009 but have not reached the same impressive levels found before the
nancial crisis. Moreover, during 2012 stock repurchases have started to decrease again
from $340 billion to $268 billion (by around 30%). Finally, aggregate dividends paid
by these rms subsequently increased after 2009 (by 50% overall until 2012) to reach
similar levels as repurchases in 2012 ($264 billion vs. $268 billion).
We next discuss payouts -dividends and stock repurchases - for nancials. Compared to
industrials, these rms increased dividends signicantly during the 1990s (by 185% from
1991 to 2000) and the 2000s (by 128% from 2001 to 2007). This drove nancials to pay
around 30% of all dividends during the 2000s as it is shown in Figure 3.8. Moreover,
the big increase in the fraction of dividends paid by nancials since the 1990s is not
at the expense of industrials that were constantly paying between 60% and 70% of all
dividends, but it aected the fraction of dividends paid by utilities whose dividends
did not grow signicantly during these years as it is shown in Figure 3.7. However, in
contrast to the case of industrials, the growth for repurchases is not as important and
is similar to that of dividends from 2001 to 2007 (by 180% overall). Despite of this
smaller growth, nancials accounted for around 30% of all stock repurchases during the
late 1990s and the rst years of the 2000s. Financials also reduced their payouts in
the wake of the nancial crisis but in ways dierent from those of industrials: They
cut aggregate dividends sharply between 2008 and 2009 by 63%. This big drop is the
main driver of the decrease in aggregate dividend payments between 2007 and 2009 as
we shown in Figure 3.2. To get an idea of the importance of this sector, we found
before that in 2007 30% of all dividends were coming from these nancial rms. After
the nancial crisis, in 2009 less than 10% of all dividends were attributable to the
nancial sector. This likely reects the nancial circumstances of many of these rms
and the regulatory intervention to control dividend payments (they started to reduce
dividends signicantly in 2009 rather than 2008). As we would expect, and similar to
what we see for industrials, nancials cut repurchases aggressively during the nancial
crisis (around 76% from 2007 to 2009). After that, and similar to industrials, there has
been a rebound in stock repurchases. From 2010 to 2012, stock repurchases by both,
nancials and industrials, have increased by 120%. Moreover, in contrast to industrials,
during 2012 stock repurchases went up by 6%. Finally, in the case of utilities, aggregate
dividends are relatively stable over the 1990s and the nancial crisis (dividends even
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increased by 13% from 2007 to 2009). On the other hand, utilities cut repurchases
aggressively during the nancial crisis by more than 91% from 2007 to 2009. In sum,
while the drop in dividends is under the responsibility of nancial rms as it is clearly
shown in Figure 3.7, the cut in repurchases was similar among all types of rms. This
is the reason why repurchases were so seriously aected by the nancial crisis. On the
other hand, the rebound in dividends and stock repurchases after 2009 is shared between
both, industrials and nancials, but with nancial rms a bit more active.
3.5 A Closer Look at Aggregate Payouts
3.5.1 Aggregate Payouts and Firm Type
Until now, we have replicated some of the main analysis by recent papers in payout
policy. From now, we will get deeper into these aggregate tendencies found from Figures
3.1 to 3.5. For that reason, we will start by using the SIC divisions and major groups
used in the United States Department of Labor. We will follow their letters and numbers
notation for the rest of the paper to allow for comparison and replication. The SIC
manual consists of J divisions: The Division A corresponds to Agriculture, Forestry, and
Fishing; Division B to Mining; Division C to Constructing; Division D to Manufacturing;
Division E to Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services;
Division F to Wholesale Trade; Division G to Retail Trade; Division H to Finance,
Insurance, and Real Estate; Division I to Services; and nally, Division J to Public
Administration. As it was the case with the other gures, Figure 3.9 plots dollar values
of aggregate dividends (on the left hand side) and aggregate repurchases (on the right
hand side) for all the previous divisions. On the other hand, Figure 3.8 reports the
fraction of dividends and repurchases paid on each division in order to analyze the
contribution of each of the divisions to the total amount of payouts.
Figure 3.9 shows some clear similarities with Figure 3.6 where we divided all rms
into industrials, nancials and utilities. For example, division H corresponds to our
nancials variable in Figure 3.6, and Division E contains, among others, the major
group 49: Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services which we considered as utilities in
the same Figure 3.6. Industrials would consist of all the rest of the divisions where
Division D: Manufacturing; the remaining major groups of Division E: Transportation,
Communications; Division I: Services; and Division G: Retail Trade stand out in terms of
total dividends paid as it is shown in Figure 3.10. We will avoid describing the behavior
of rms in Division H because the same conclusions as in the case of nancials, and
reported in Figures 3.6 , 3.7 and 3.8, can be applied to them.
81
According to Figure 3.9, the main contributor for dividend payments is the
manufacturing division. Moreover, dividends paid by manufacturing companies have
increased steadily over time - during the 1990s dividends paid in this Division increased
by 56% and from 2000 to 2007 by 44% - and were reduced modestly as a consequence of
the nancial crisis in 2007. From 2007 to 2009 dividends in the Manufacturing Division
decreased by only 7%. It is also true that for the whole group of industrials dividends
increased by 1% during the nancial crisis. This behavior contrasts to the case of
repurchases that these rms reduced dramatically after the nancial crisis (by around
65%). Both, dividends and repurchases, follow similar patterns to the ones shown in
Figure 3.6 when we were analyzing the whole group of industrials. In sum, and according
to Figure 3.10, Division D is the main contributor to the total amount of dividends and
repurchases paid. This division was paying more than 60% of total aggregate dividends
until the 1970s in where nancials (Division H) started to be much more signicant in
aggregate terms (the nancials division payed more than 30% of total dividends and
around 24% percentage of repurchases in 2006 right before the nancial crisis). Starting
from the rst years of the 1980s where stock repurchases emerged as an important
payout mechanism, the Manufacturing Division accounts for between 37% and 76% of
all aggregate repurchases, with lows (of 37%) in the early 2000s and highs of more than
70% over the late 1980s. Finally, the contribution of the Manufacturing Division to the
whole amount of repurchases has been stable and around 40%  50% during the last 10
years of our sample.
On the other hand, it is important to note that division E: Transportation,
Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services is also an important contributor
for aggregate dividends and repurchases. At the beginning of the sample and according
to Figure 3.10, 30% of total dividends were paid by this division. It was the second
contributor after manufacturing for total dividends paid until the mid-1990s when
nancials increased their payouts signicantly. The nancials crisis helped Division
E to recover its second position, not only because nancials cut aggregate dividends
sharply, but also because the nancial crisis did not aect dividend payments from this
Division. From 2007 to 2009 they increased by more than 40% and were only aected
by the posterior economic crisis decreasing by 11% from 2009 to 2010. After 2010, they
have increased again by around 20% in 2 years. In contrast to the case of dividends,
repurchases were heavily aected by the nancial crisis and decreased by more than 84%
between 2007 and 2009. Aggregate repurchases rebound in 2010 and at the end of 2012
they have increased by more than 320% in Division E. This division was responsible for
around 10% of the total amount of repurchases in 2012. It is important to note that
this Division includes what we have dened as utilities in previous Figures.
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Finally, it is worth looking at the behavior of dividends paid by Division I. This Division
experienced a big increase in 2004 due to the eect of the special dividend paid by
Microsoft. To get an idea of the the impact of this special dividend, in 2004 Division I
paid around 20% of all aggregate dividends. Moreover, dividends paid in this Division
increased by 647% from 2003 to 2004. The magnitude of this special dividend helps to
explain why dividends paid by industrials decreased by 15% from 2004 to 2005, while
dividends paid by the manufacturing Division were increasing by more than 10%. This
short-lived dividend heavily aected dividends paid by Division I, which decreased by
more than 80% from 2004 to 2005. Despite of this special dividend, at the end of 2012
Division I was paying more than 8% of all dividends into our sample of public U.S. rms.
On the other hand, this division was also important in terms of repurchases before the
nancial crisis. In 2006 more than 15% of all stock repurchases were made by this
division as it is shown on the right hand side of Figure 3.10. Moreover, at the end of
2012 it accounted for more than 10% of all the aggregate repurchases.
Based on the importance of Divisions D, E and H into the total amount of dividends
paid and repurchases made, and thanks to the SIC Manual, we are able to divide these
divisions into major groups with the objective of isolating the origin of these patterns
in total aggregate dividends and repurchases. We will start by analyzing the dierent
major Groups of Division D: Manufacturing. In the SIC Manual, this Division consists
of 20 major Groups: from Group 20 to Group 39. Our approach to the analysis of
these groups starts by plotting the dollar value of aggregate dividends from 1927 to
2012. As we did for Figure 3.2 and for clarity, we divided the whole sample into two
sub-graphs from 1927 to 1977 and from 1978 to 2012. The result of this can be seen
in Figure 3.11. Together with this, we have also calculated the fraction of dividends
paid on each division with respect to the total amount of all aggregate dividends (left
hand side of Figure 3.12) and to the total sum of dividends in Division D (right hand
side of Figure 3.12). Figure 3.11 shows that there are several major groups that are
driving the behavior of this division over time, with Group 29: Petroleum and Rening
and Related Industries standing out from the 1950s to the late 1980s and Group 28:
Chemicals and Allied Products from the late 1980s until the end of the sample period.
On the other hand, Figure 3.10 reects high and increasing dividend concentration in
fewer groups. It seems that not only dividends have been concentrated in fewer rms
as it was documented by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004), but also that this
concentration can be applied to Major Groups of rms. In short, during the 1930s
and the 1940s four major groups are paying between 10% and 15% of all dividends and
between 15% and 25% of the total dividends paid in Division D. After the 1990s, we only
nd one Major Group (Group 28) that is paying between 10% and 15% of all dividends
and between 20% and 35% of the total dividends paid in Division D. Moreover, it is
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far from the second Major Group (Group 29), which is paying less than 8% of total
aggregate dividends and around 15% of the total dividends paid in Division D.
Group 37: Transportation Equipment stands out at the beginning of the sample paying
more than 15% of all dividends in 1927 and 1937. It is later replaced by Group 29 since
1950, which was paying around 15% of all dividends and 20% of the total dividends
paid by rms in Division D. This group was predominant in the Manufacturing Division
for more than 30 years and it was paying nearly 20% of total aggregate dividends right
before the oil crisis in the 1970s as it is reported in Figure 3.12. For example, from
1950 until 1984 dividends increased in this group by more than 1200%. It is important
to note that this group was clearly beneted by the oil crisis in the 1970s. In the 70s
decade, the aggregate dividends paid by that group nearly double. During the late years
of the 1980s, this group reduced dividends signicantly but this did not last long, and in
the 1990s they recovered the same levels paid in the rst years of the 1980s. Since then,
dividends paid in this group have been constantly increasing and were not aected at
all by the nancial crisis in 2007. This was not enough to reach again the rst position
in terms of dividend payments because of the strong growth experienced by Group 28.
Finally, at the end of 2012 Group 29 paid more than 7% of all dividends and more than
10% of all the dividends paid in the Manufacturing Division.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the group 28 replaced Petroleum as the main contributor
for dividends payments in the Manufacturing division. Moreover, it has continuously
been the main provider of manufacturing dividends until the end of 2012 where this
group contributed with around 15% of total dividends paid and 20% of all dividends
paid in the Manufacturing division. The nancial crisis also aected this group but only
from 2008 to 2009 where dividends paid by this group were reduced by around 10%. But
from 2010 to 2012 dividends paid have increased by 24%, consistent with the rebound
documented by Floyd, Li and Skinner (2013) for the entire group of industrials after the
crisis.
Another three major groups are worth mentioning in this brief analysis: Group 20:
Food and Kindred Products; Group 35: Industrials and Commercial Machinery and
Computer Equipment; and Group 36: Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and
Components. Food and Kindred Products contributed providing 5% of total dividends
in 2012 and more than 7% of all the dividends paid in the Manufacturing Division
according to Figure 3.12. It is also important to mention how the dierent crisis impact
this Group. For example, these companies were not only aected by the shock produced
by the nancial crisis in 2007, but also by the posterior economic crisis in 2010. This is
dierent from the picture drawn for the whole group of industrials where after 2010 they
experienced an important rebound. Industrials, Commercial Machinery and Computer
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Machinery also show a peculiar behavior. It ended 2012 being the second contributor for
dividend payments in the Manufacturing Division (more than 11% of the dividends paid
in the entire Division) and paying more than 7% of all dividends in 2012. It was between
2006 and 2007 right before the crisis where it moved from being the sixth contributor
in dividends to reaching the second position. In just one year, dividends paid by this
group increased by more than three times. The nancial crisis also impacted this group
and the reduction in dividends only lasted for two years from 2008 to 2010. From 2010
to 2012 dividends paid by this group increased signicantly, as it is the case for the
whole division of industrials. Finally, the Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment
and Components group is worth a mention. In 2012 it contributed with around 5% of
total dividends paid and more than 7% into the Manufacturing Division. It is relevant
in this group that the big decrease in dividends payments happened right before the
crisis between 2006 and 2007 where they reduced dividends by around 60%. Since then,
dividends paid by this group has modestly increased until the last year of the sample in
where dividends increased more than 40%.
We follow the same procedure when analyzing stock repurchases but we start from 1978
instead of 1927 following the emergence of stock repurchases in the 1980s. Figure 3.13
plots dollar values of repurchases in each of the Major Groups of Division D. On the other
hand, Figure 3.14 reports the fraction of repurchases made in each of the groups with
respect to the total value of aggregate repurchases (left hand side of Figure 3.14) and
to the total amount of repurchases made in Division D (right hand side of Figure 3.14).
There are 4 major groups that drive the impressive growth in total repurchases seen in
the industrials group right before the nancial crisis and mainly during the 2000s. In
contrast to the case of dividends, we do not see an increasing concentration of repurchases
over time in any specic major group. This also diers from the higher concentration
found in total aggregate repurchases by Floyd, Li and Skinner (2013). It is worth noting
that none of these Groups coincide in the year in where they reach their maximum dollar
value of repurchases and start their decline. It is the Electronic and Other Electrical
Equipment and Components Group that reaches its maximum before and back to 2004,
in where this Group contributed with more than 24% of all repurchases made that
year and more than 40% into the Manufacturing Division. After 2004, it experienced a
dramatic decrease and only started to recover slightly after 2010. After this Group, the
Chemicals and Allied Products Major Group reaches its maximum value of repurchases
made in 2006. After that, repurchases declined only for two years until 2009. Moreover,
the decline in this Group was the least dramatic compared to other groups where stock
repurchases were close to disappearing during the nancial crisis as it is shown in Figure
3.12. Repurchases in this Group declined by 58% overall in these two years. Compared
to the next Group, Industrials and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment,
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the decline was much less dramatic. The Industrials and Commercial Machinery and
Computer Equipment Group reached its maximum value of repurchases made in 2007.
The value of repurchases was also similar to the Industrials and Commercial Machinery
and Computer Equipment. The main dierence is that the amount of repurchases made
in this group was reduced by more than 80% in two years from 2007 to 2009. Finally, the
growth of repurchases in the Petroleum Group is also signicant, reaching similar values
as the two previous groups. In this case, the maximum is reached in 2008 but the decline
is very similar to the Industrials and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment
Group. On the other hand, its rebound after 2010 is signicant but it is not enough
to reach the previous maximum levels. Finally, as was the case for the whole group
of industrials, repurchases decreased in the majority of groups of the Manufacturing
Division from 2011 to 2012.
Figures 3.15 to 3.18 report similar information to the previous gures apart from Division
E. This division is made up of 10 Major Groups from Group 40 to Group 49. According
to Figure 3.1), Communications (Group 48) and Electric, Gas and Sanitary Products
(Group 49) are the main drivers for dividend payments in this Division since the 1980s.
Before that, Railroad Transportation was also important in terms of payments until
the 1950s. Moreover, at the beginning of the sample it was paying more than 20% of
all dividends. As we discussed before, the Electric, Gas and Sanitary Products Major
Group corresponds to what we have called utilities in Figures 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8. This
Group is also the main contributor to dividend payments with the exception of 2009
where communications reached its maximum value of dividend payments. Utilities are
usually excluded from these analysis because of their unstable payout policy compared
to other sectors. Even so, we nd in the data that dividends paid by this group seem
not to be aected by the nancial crisis at all (we saw before that dividends increased by
13% from 2007 to 2009 in the Utilities Group). On the other hand, dividends from these
rms show an erratic behavior during the 1990s but since then, they have experienced
a continuous growth until the end of the sample. This is not the case for repurchases,
which were seriously aected by the nancial crisis in 2007 as is the case for other
divisions and groups. The Communications Group is worth mentioning in this analysis
as it is also part of what we dened as industrials before. This Major Group experienced
an impressive growth in dividend payments since 1984. That year it only represented
5% of all dividends paid in that Division. In 2009 it paid more than 50% of all dividends
paid in the same division. Moreover, it accounted for more than 12% of all dividends
paid that year. It also seems that the shock produced by the nancial crisis in 2007 did
not aect this Group because dividends paid by the Communications Group increased
by 80% from 2007 to 2009. It was between 2009 and 2010 when it was aected by the
posterior economic crisis and the need of these rms to reduce dividends in order to
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balance their accounts. At the end of 2012, this Group contributed with around 8% of
all dividends paid that year. In contrast, repurchases made by this group were seriously
aected by the nancial crisis after reaching its maximum in 2007. Despite this, at the
end of 2012 they recovered their 2007 levels making around 8% of all repurchases in
2012.
We now move to the nancials division. This division is divided into 8 Major Groups
from Group 60 to Group 67. Figures 3.19 to 3.22 oer the same analysis as in Division
D and E. First, Figure 3.19 shows us that the Group responsible for the impressive
growth of dividends into the nancial sector in the late 1990s and specially during the
2000s relies on the Depositary Institutions Major Group. Thanks to the impressive
increase in dividends payments by the this Major Group, the nancial division paid in
2007 30% of the total dividends. As an example, from 1992 to 2007 dividends paid by
depositary institutions increased more than 2462%. If this increase is impressive, the
reduction in dividends payments after 2007 is also worth to mention. From 2007 to
2010 dividends paid by depositary institutions decreased nearly 90%. In only two years,
dividends paid by this group returned to the late 1990s levels. Based on these numbers,
it is easy to understand how the nancial sector went from paying 30% to less than 10%
of all dividends in less than 3 years as it is shown in Figure (3.20). It is also interesting
to analyze the behavior of Group 67: Holding and other Investment Oces before the
mid 1990s. This Major Group was the main contributor for dividend payments until
the irruption of Depositary Institutions. Moreover, according to Figure 3.20 for more
than 10 years since the mid 1980s this division contributed with more than 10% of all
dividends paid. Later on, not only was it replaced by the impressive payments made
by the depositary institutions, but also it started to reduce its dividends signicantly.
If 10% of total dividends were coming from this Group in the 1990s, now it is less than
1%. This helps us to get an idea of the decline of this Group during the last 30 years.
The case of repurchases is also signicant although it shows some important dierences
with respect to dividends as it is seen in Figures 3.21 and 3.22. First of all, we do not
nd as high a concentration as in the case of dividends because not only depositary
institutions were responsible for the growth of repurchases, but also the Insurance
Carriers Group with an even bigger growth than Depositary Institutions; the Security
and commodity brokers, dealers, exchange, and services Group; and nally the non-
depositary Credit Institutions Group to a lesser extent. While these groups did not
increase their dividends payments, they used repurchases extensively. For that reason,
total repurchases made by nancials experienced a much bigger growth than dividends.
If we only consider depositary institutions, which are responsible for the bulk of dividends
in the 2000s, the amount of repurchases they made in 2007 was much smaller than
the dividends they paid that year. Hence, while this group was mainly responsible
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for dividend payments, repurchases were used by other groups and this explains why
repurchases were aected so heavily by the nancial crisis. Finally, it is also important
to mention that in 2012 insurance carriers have recovered their previous dollar values of
repurchases. This helps them to be responsible for 10% of all the repurchases made in
2012.
We have not yet considered in our analysis the role of the dierent theories about
the existence and importance of dividends. One possibility is that dividends, because
they represent an ongoing commitment to pay out cash, are useful in resolving the
agency costs of free cash ow (Jensen (1986); LaPorta et al.,2000). Alternatively, the
ongoing commitment inherent in dividends could signal managers' condence in their
rms' underlying protability (Miller and Rock, 1985; Baker and Wurgler, 2012), or
that managers are responding to the preferences of certain investors for cash dividends
(Baker, Nagel, and Wurgler, 2007; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005; Shefrin and Statman,
1984). Recent research by Floyd, Li and Skinner (2013) concludes that the behavior of
industrial rms ts more with the cash ow explanation, while nancial rms are more
consistent with signaling. Based on the behavior of the dierent Divisions and Major
Groups with respect to dividends and stock repurchases this drives us to believe that
the answer about the existence and the role of dividends is not as simple as it could be
when analyzing the whole group of industrials and nancials. As in the case of Floyd, Li
and Skinner (2013), we will use the crisis as a shock to help dierentiate these stories by
comparing the payout policies of the dierent Divisions and Major Groups rather than
focusing on the whole group of industrials and utilities. We will leave this analysis for a
near future.
3.5.2 Aggregate Payouts and Stock Market Indexes
Figure 3.23 plots aggregate dividends (left hand side of Figure 3.23) and repurchases
(right hand side of Figure 3.23) paid by each of the indexes contained in the CRSP
sample: NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ, ARCA and other exchanges. By contrast, Figure
3.24 reports the fraction of payouts represented by rms in the dierent indexes. As it
is shown in Figure 3.23, the majority of dividend payments are coming from rms in
the NYSE. In 1964 the AMEX index was included in the CRSP sample but dividend
payments from this group never exceed the maximum value of 6% of total dividends
paid in 1964. In 1973 the NASDAQ index was included in the CRSP sample. Dividend
payments made by this index were continuously increasing until paying more than 20%
of all dividends in 2004. For example, during the 1990s dividends paid by rms in
the NASDAQ index increased by 24% and from 2000 to 2007 by more than 288%.
Moreover, in only one year, from 2003 to 2004, rms into this index increased their
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dividend payments by more than three times. This lasted for one year because from
2004 to 2005 dividends were reduced by 60%. On the other hand, the nancial crisis
did not aect this index at all because rms reduced dividends only by 5% from 2007 to
2009. In the last year of the sample, dividends paid by rms into the NASDAQ index
have increased signicantly (108% from 2010 to 2012) helping this index to contribute
with around 20% of total aggregate dividends paid at the end of 2012.
In the case of the NYSE, dividends paid by this index have been continuously increasing
over time until the nancial crisis in 2007. Like NASDAQ rms, these rms increased
their dividend payments signicantly during the 1990s (by 61% overall between 1990
and 1999) and the 2000s (by 94% from 2000 to 2007). NYSE rms also reduced their
dividends in the wake of the nancial crisis. From 2007 to 2009 dividends decreased
by more than 20%. Finally, after 2009 dividends have increased by 40% from 2009
to 2012. On the other hand, Figure (3.22) shows that NYSE rms have always been
paying between 80% and 100% of all aggregate dividends, with lows (of 80%) in 2004 and
2012 as a consequence of the strong growth of dividends paid by NASDAQ rms before
and after the nancial crisis. Thus, we nd that not only NASDAQ rms increased
their dividend payments signicantly more than NYSE rms before (since 2000 because
during the 1990s NYSE rms increased their dividends more extensively) and after the
nancial crisis, but also that their dividends were much more resilient during the global
nancial crisis.
Since the 1990s, repurchases have been distributed uniformly with the NYSE index
making around 80% and the NASDAQ the remaining 20%. Although repurchases made
by the NYSE index increased signicantly more during the 2000s than in the case of
the NASDAQ (from 2000 to 2007 repurchases made by NYSE rms increased by 313%
compared to 217% in the case of NASDAQ rms), the nancial crisis in 2007 aected
repurchases in a similar way because in both indexes repurchases were reduced by around
70% from 2007 to 2009. On the other hand, after 2009 and until 2012 repurchases have
again upsurged with an increase of 127% for NYSE rms and 100% for NASDAQ rms.
3.5.3 Aggregate Payouts and Firm Age
The following gures track payout policy from the perspective of rm age. We have
dened rm age as the time since the date of its inclusion in into the CRSP sample.
We are aware of the limitations of this denition of age but this is what the data has
allowed us to do. The main purpose of this Chapter is to analyze the main patterns of
corporate payout polices by analyzing the anatomy of U.S. rms' payouts. In the future
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we will try to get deeper into the specic set of CRSP rms that drive the behavior of
dividends and stock repurchases.
Figure 3.25 reports annual aggregate dividends by groups of rm age and Figure 3.26
the fraction of dividends represented by the same rm age groups. Figures 3.27 and
3.28 do the same but for the case of stock repurchases. In contrast, Figure 3.29 tries
to analyze the concentration of dividend and repurchases on these age groups. We have
built 9 age groups in order to track the behavior over time for the dierent rms into
the market.
Starting from Figure 3.25, we see that over time the oldest rms are increasing their
dividend payments during the whole sample period. The way we have dened these age
groups, together with the increasing payments from the oldest rms explain why we see
those increasing "waves" in Figure 3.25. At the end of each age group (each age group
lasts for 10 years with the exception of the >80 age group), the oldest rms get into the
following group until we have covered the 9 age groups at the end of the sample. If for
example none of the dividends were coming from the oldest rms, we would not see any
drop in dividend payments at the end of each of the age groups. The fact that this is
not happening in the data, together with the growth of dividends as long as we move
forward in each of the oldest age groups show the importance of the oldest rms into
the total aggregate payments over time.
On the other hand, we also see in Figure 3.26 that the fraction of dividends paid by the
oldest rms is decreasing over time because new rms are getting into the market and
starting to pay dividends. For example, at the beginning of our sample when we move
from 1936 to 1937 we see that rms that stayed in the market for less or equal to 10 years
went from paying 100% of all dividends to only 28%. These mean that the oldest rms
(those that are 10 years old in 1937) accounted for more than 70% of all payments while
new rms (less or equal to 10 years of life) accounted for the remaining 30%. Moreover,
the age group > 10 <= 20 keeps increasing its fraction of dividends as long as we move
into the sample and it is including younger rms into it (those rms between 10 and 20
years old). On the other hand, dividend payments into the <= 10 age group decrease
until they stabilize in the 1940s containing around 14% of all dividends. This pattern
is maintained in our gure every ten years when we are considering new groups of rms
based on age and shows the importance of the oldest rms in the aggregate payouts over
time. If all groups of age rms were paying the same percentage of dividends every 10
years, the oldest rm age groups should decrease their fraction of payments in order to
distribute the same amount over all age rm groups. Despite of the importance of these
oldest rms, it is also true that the fraction of dividend paid by these rms is decreasing
over time with the exception of the late 1990s. The cutting point in 1987 and 1997 is
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similar (around 20%) for the > 60 <= 70 and the > 70 <= 80 groups showing that the
rest of the rms that are in the market during those years are not able to replace the
dividend payments by the oldest rms that year.
The last years of the sample are of special importance for our analysis. We have
mentioned many times that dividends have been increasing robustly over the last 10
years. Based on Figures 3.25 and 3.26, we will be able to nd which age groups are
responsible for this strong growth. According to Figure 3.25, it is of special importance
the behavior found in the case of the relatively younger rms, between 10 and 20 years,
in terms of dividend payments during the rst years of 2000s (these rms are born
in the 1980s). For example, in 2004 this group paid more than 30% of all dividends
compared to the oldest rms that paid less than 20%. It is also important to mention
the contribution during these years of those rms born between 30 and 40 years (these
rms are included in the CRSP sample in the 1970s). In 2007 their payments exceed
24%. These rms were also the main contributors for dividend payments in the late
years of the 1990s. At that point in time, they were placed in the > 20 <= 30 age group
and paid more than 20% of all the dividends from 1994 to 2000. These age groups,
together with the oldest rms, which paid between 20% and 25% of all dividends during
the rst years of 2000s (the width of the wave is bigger for these rms), were the main
contributors for these dividends reappearing. On the other hand, the main drivers for
the dividend reviving after the nancial crisis are mainly the same age rms with the
inclusion of the youngest ones. At the end of 2012, the oldest rms (>80 years into the
market) provided around 20% of all dividend payments. After them, we can nd the
20-30 age group with more than 15% of all dividend payments. Moreover, the youngest
rms (less than 20 years into the market) were paying more than 20% of all dividends.
We turn next to repurchases. As before, we start from 1978 following the emergence of
stock repurchases in the 1980s. Figure 3.27 plots dollar values of repurchases in each of
the age groups. On the other hand, Figure 3.28 reports the fraction of repurchases in
each of these age groups. According to both Figures, stock repurchases seem to be much
more homogenously distributed among the dierent age groups than dividends, specially
during the 2000s and after the global nancial crisis. Moreover, the youngest rms are
very active in terms of stock repurchases (58% in 1980; 39% in 1983; 28% in 1992; 24%
in 2000; 23% in 2009). On the other hand, the same age groups that stand out for the
dividend reappearing in the 2000s are also important in terms of stock repurchases. For
example, we found before that during the late 1990s those rms aged between 20 and 30
years were the main contributors for dividend payments. It is also the same for the case
of stock repurchases. For example, these rms made more than 36% of repurchases in
1997. After them, we nd that the youngest rms were responsible for around 20% of all
repurchases during the late 1990s. The strong growth in repurchases seen right before
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the nancial crisis also relies on the same age groups that drove the growth in dividends.
For example, the oldest rms are making more than 30% of all stock repurchases in 2003.
After them, rms aged between 10 and 20 years are responsible for more than 25% of
all stock repurchases from 2001 to 2002 and from 2004 to 2007. We also nd that rms
aged between 30 and 40 years are contributing with amounts exceeding 20% in 2004.
In addition to them, we nd that the youngest rms (with 20% of all repurchases in
2001) and rms aged between 20 and 30 years (with 20% in 2002 and 2003) are also big
contributors for the increase in repurchases, even when their dividend payments were
not very signicant during these years. As the nancial crisis takes hold, all age groups
reduced repurchases signicantly. Among the 9 age groups, 6 of them reduced stock
repurchases between 70% and 80%. The biggest drops are seen in those rms that drove
the growth in repurchases. In contrast, the youngest rms reduced stock repurchases by
60%; the oldest rms by 46% and nally those rms aged between 60 and 70 years only
by 39%. The upsurge in stock repurchases seen after 2009 is shared among several age
groups. It is especially signicant for the youngest and the oldest rms (both groups
making more than 20% each in 2009).
We perform a very simple analysis to test for dividends and stock repurchases
concentration on rm age. Figure 3.29 plots the cumulative sums of the fraction of
dividends (left hand side) paid and repurchases (right hand side) made on each age
group. Looking rst at dividends, we can easily distinguish which age groups are driving
the strong growth of dividends over the last ten years. As we shown above, it is of special
importance the behavior of rms aged between 10 and 20 years, those between 30 and 40
and nally the oldest rms. Moreover, during the 1990s and the early 2000s the youngest
rms (<= 30 years) are responsible for around 40% of all dividend payments. Together
with those rms aged between 30 and 40, we nd that right before the nancial crisis,
the group of rms with less than 40 years into the market are paying more than 60% of
all dividends. In contrast, we see that dividends payments from rms between 40 and 50
and between 60 and 70 years do not contribute at all to the growth of dividends before
the nancial crisis (the width of the bands is very small). This concentration shows the
importance of relatively younger rms into the growth of dividends during the last years
of the sample. On the other hand, the youngest rms (<= 10), rms between 40 and 50
years into the market and rms with more than 70 years show strong resilience during
the nancial crisis. In strong contrast, rms between 10 and 40 years together with rms
between 60 and 70 are seriously aected by the nancial crisis. With the exception of
rms between 20 and 30, none of them have recovered their pre-crisis levels.
The growth of stock repurchases is also related to the behavior of the youngest rms.
In this case, those rms aged <= 20 are making around 40% of all stock repurchases
during the 2000s. Instead, the same fractions of dividends were reached by rms aged
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<= 30. Thus, the concentration of repurchases into the youngest rms is much bigger in
the case of stock repurchases. Moreover, during the rst years of the 2000s, rms with
less than <= 30 years were making more than 60% of all stock repurchases. In contrast,
with the exception of the oldest rms (>=80) and rms between 30 and 40 after 2002,
the rest of the oldest rms (between 40 and 70 years into the market) are not very active
in terms of stock repurchases. For that the reason, the width of the bands among them
is very small since the 1990s.
Based on the importance of these results, we will now analyze these age patterns without
relying on age groups and looking at individual rm ages every year. Thanks to these
Figures, we are going to be able to analyze if dividends and/or stock repurchases are
also concentrated in rms born in specic years in the sample. We restrict our attention
to the last part of the sample, from 2000 to 2012, in order to cover the so called dividend
reappearing phenomena. All of these graphs can be found in the Appendix.
Figures A.1 to A.13 report the fraction of dividends paid and repurchases made by
rm age every year from 2000 to 2012. Looking at these Figures as a whole, we can
conclude that dividends are concentrated in rms listed in specic years of the sample.
It is specially signicant the fraction of dividends paid by the oldest rms in the CRSP
sample. We shown before that these rms have been constantly paying high amounts of
dividends during the whole sample period and it is also the case for the last 12 years of
our sample. But this is mainly happening with those rms that were originally listed in
the CRSP sample in 1926. From 2000 to 2012 they paid between 12% and 18% of all
dividends every year. We need to wait for rms listed in 1930 to nd again considerable
amounts of dividends but far from those paid by the oldest rms (between 2% and 6%
during these years). After rms listed in 1930, we can not nd signicant amounts of
dividends paid by rms included in the CRPS index during the 1930s and the beginning
of the 1940s. This could be explained by the eect of the 1930s crisis. Those rms listed
during these years probably decided not to distribute dividends when they got into the
market (Figure 3.1 shows tgat during the 1930s non-payers exceeded 60% of all rms)
and have been reluctant to do it since then. The situation changes in the mid 1940s
when we nd that rms listed in 1945 and 1947 are paying each between 2% and 6%
of all dividends during the last 12 years. On the other hand, it is dicult to nd rms
listed in the 1950s that pay signicant amounts of dividends. According to Figure 3.1,
during the 1950s 90% of all rms were paying dividends. It could be the case that rms
listed during these years never paid high amounts of dividends or that they reduced
them as a consequence of the dividend disappearing phenomena. According to our data,
during the 1950s these rms were not paying signicant amounts of dividends. Later
on, we will also check which type of rms (in terms of size, index, group and type) were
listed in the 1950s in order to better understand this behavior. During the 1960s, we
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nd that rms listed in 1964 constantly pay between 2% and 4% during the 2000s and
until the end of the sample.
It is during the 1970s, and specially in 1973, where we nd rms paying similar amounts
of dividends to those paid by the oldest rms. During the last 12 years, rms listed
in 1973 contributed with between 8% and 15% of all dividend payments. Remember
that these rms were part of the > 20 <= 30 and > 30 <= 40 age groups during the
2000s as we shown before. If we consider both groups of rms, those listed in 1926
and those included in 1973, we nd that they were paying between 20% and 35% of all
dividends from 2000 to 2012. After these rms, we need to wait for rms listed in the
1980s (specically in 1985 and 1987) to nd again signicant fractions of total dividends
paid each year since 2000. These rms were paying between 2% and 8% of all dividends
from 2000 to 2012 with the exception of 2004. Again, we are able to understand the
magnitude of the dividend paid by Microsoft. According to Figure A.5, rms listed in
1987 (Microsoft among them) paid more than 20% of all dividends. This contrasts to
the oldest rms that paid 14% and rms listed in 1973 that paid 12% of all dividends
in 2004. Finally, although the youngest rms (listed between the 1990s and the 2000s)
do not stand out in terms of single year payments (with the exception of 2009 and with
rms listed in 2008 that paid 5% of all dividends), they became important after 2000
and all together paid around 20% of all dividends. This is in line with our ndings
with respect to the youngest groups of age rms and their importance for the growth of
dividends before and after the nancial crisis.
We now exploit the dierential eect of the crisis on these rms by plotting on Figure
A.14 the dividend growth for the largest dividend payers by rm age. We have included
a secondary axis in order to accommodate the eect of the Microsoft special dividend
into the dividend growth. Thus, the scale for the analysis of the 1987 dividend growth
is on the right hand side. Before the nancial crisis, the youngest rms (included after
1989) together with those born in 1987 are driving the aggregate dividend growth after
2000. When the crisis takes hold, dividends paid by rms included in 1963, 1970, 1973
and 1987 are seriously aected. In 2009, these rms reduced dividends by 29%,53%,
50% and 43% respectively. On the other hand, we nd that the oldest (1926 and 1947)
and the youngest (>= 1990) rms decreased dividends modestly. Moreover, dividends
increased in the case of rms included in 1930, 1947 and 1985 during 2008 and 2009.
After 2009, the growth in dividends is mainly driven by rms included in 1970, 1963
and again by the youngest rms (included after 1989).
We turn next to stock repurchases. The growth of repurchases during the 2000s, before
and after the nancial crisis, is mainly due to the same rms that are driving the growth
in dividends, together with the youngest rms (those rms included in the CRPS sample
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after the 1990s). From 2000 to 2012, rms included between 1990 and 2011 made more
than 20% of all stock repurchases each year. Moreover, after 2007 they have been
constantly making more than 30% of all repurchases, with highs of 37% and 39% in 2009
and 2011 respectively. Finally, the big drop in stock repurchases experienced during the
nancial crisis seems not to aect the youngest rms at all. In 2008 and 2009 they made
31% and 37% of all stock repurchases. We also nd that in 2009 more than 10% of all
repurchases were coming from rms included in 2000. It is also interesting to see how
these rms are always making more repurchases than dividends from 2000 and 2012.
They were born or included when making repurchases was very common among public
U.S. rms. In spite of this, it is also true that after 2001 dividends paid by the youngest
rms have been increasing signicantly and they are in part responsible for the upsurge
of dividends after 2001 (and specially after 2009). On the other hand, as it was the
case with dividends, stock repurchases are not very important for rms included in the
1930s, in the rst years of the 1940s, in the 1950s, and in the late 1970s.
Figure A.15 includes repurchases into the calculation of dividend growth for the largest
dividend payers based on age. As in the case of the dividend growth, we have included
a secondary axis in order to accommodate those rms included in 1970 - these rms
increased repurchases by more than 260% in 2010 - and again rms from 1987. When
we include repurchases into the dividend growth, we nd that the series become much
more volatile. Moreover, with the exception of the high ups and drops in the case of
rms from 1926, 1930, 1945 and 1987, the rest of the rms follow similar growth paths
from 2001 to 2009. In the case of the youngest rms, dividend growth is increasing by
around 40% each year from 2004 to 2007. It is also signicant during these years for rms
included in 1930 (dividend growth increased by more than 50% each year from 2004 to
2006). All of these age groups of rms reduced dividends and stock repurchases during
2009, compared to 2008 where in some age groups dividend growth was still increasing.
Moreover, with the exception of rms from 1945, payouts decreased by more than 35%
in 2009 (in 2008 only the 1973 age group reduced payouts by more than 30%), with lows
of 80% for 1970 rms and 66% for 1987 rms. After the nancial crisis, it took more
time for some age groups to recover payouts. It is the case for the 1926, 1945 and 1963
age groups in 2010 where they still reduced payouts by 25%, 31% and 18%. It is in 2011
when these rms increased payouts signicantly (by 75%, 54% and 60% respectively).
In the case of the rest of the groups, payouts from the youngest rms increased by 40%
during 2010 and 2011. The growth in the case of rms from the 1970s is also signicant
(250% and 12% for rms included in 1970 and 58% and 31% for 1973 rms).
Finally, the reduction in the amount of payouts seen in 2012 (remember that dividends
increased during 2012) is in part driven by the behavior of the youngest rms, which
reduced repurchases by 32% at the same time that they were increasing dividends
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signicantly (by more than 52%). For that reason, payouts from the youngest rms only
decreased by 10%. It is also the case for rms from 1970, which reduced repurchases by
45% while they were increasing dividends by 37%. This drove payouts from these rms
to decrease by only 17%. The same happened with rms from 1926 and 1930. Firms
from 1926 reduced repurchases by 11% while they were increasing dividends by 9%. As
a consequence, their payouts only decreased by 2%. And rms from 1930 reduced stock
repurchases by 42% at the same time that they were increasing dividends by 15%, which
drove their payouts to decrease by 7%.
Finally, the role of the youngest rms in the growth of aggregate payouts (dividends and
repurchases) in the last 12 years should help us to reconsider the role of the dierent
theories about the existence and importance of dividends.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the anatomy of corporate payouts. We start by replicating
and updating recent work that analyzes patterns in the time series and cross-sectional
behavior of payouts (dividends and stock repurchases) by U.S. rms. Similar to recent
research by Floyd, Li and Skinner (2013), we document that dividends have bounced
back strongly, fueling a massive surge in overall payouts and reviving the dividend puzzle.
We nd that since 2001 not only has there been an increase in the number of dividend
payers, but also these dividend paying rms have increased payouts to the massive levels
before, and more recently after the nancial crisis, although stock repurchases have not
reached yet the pre-crisis levels.
Industrials and nancials both increase payouts signicantly in the years prior to the
crisis. For industrials, the growth of stock repurchases is much larger than the growth
of dividends. However, unlike industrials, the growth of repurchases is not as important
for nancial rms and is similar to the increase on dividends. Moreover, the big increase
in the fraction of dividends paid by nancials since the 1990s is not at the expense of
industrials that were constantly paying between 60% and 70% of all dividends, but it
aected the fraction of dividends paid by utilities because their dividends did not grow
signicantly during these years.
As the nancial crisis took hold in 2007, industrials and nancials reduced payouts
in dierent ways. While industrials reduced dividends modestly, nancial rms cut
dividends aggressively. They moved from paying 30% of all dividends at the end of
2007 to less than 10% in 2009. On the other hand, the reduction of stock repurchases
was similar among all types of rms. This explains why repurchases were so seriously
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aected by the nancial crisis compared to dividends. Finally, the rebound in dividends
and stock repurchases after 2009 is shared between both, industrials and nancials, but
with nancial rms a bit more active.
There are noticeable dierences between the dividend and repurchase policies of the
dierent types of industrial and nancial rms, including how these policies evolve over
time and respond to the crisis. Starting from industrials, we nd that the Manufacturing
Division is the main contributor for dividends and repurchases. This Division was paying
more than 60% of all total aggregate dividends until the 1970s when nancials started
to pay signicant amounts of dividends. At the end of 2012 they paid more than 50%
of all dividends. The same happened with stock repurchases. Manufacturing rms
have been responsible for more than 40% of all stock repurchases made since the late
1970s with highs of 70% in the 1980s and lows of 37% in the early 2000s. The dividend
concentration of industrial rms dividends reported by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner
(2004) extends to the Major Groups of the Manufacturing Division. In short, during
the 1930s and the 1940s four major groups were paying between 10% and 15% of all
aggregate dividends and between 15% and 25% of the total dividends paid in Division
D. After the 1990s, we nd that only the Chemicals and Allied Products Group have
been paying between 10% and 15% of all dividends and between 20% and 35% of the
total dividends paid in Division D. Moreover, it is far from the second Major Group
(Group 29: Petroleum and Rening Products), which is paying less than 8% of total
aggregate dividends and around 15% of the total dividends paid in Division D. The story
of repurchases is slightly dierent and we can nd several groups making substantial
repurchases before and after the nancial crisis. This explains why stock repurchases
have been increasing so fast and well in excess of dividends before and after the nancial
crisis.
Similar to Manufacturing companies, dividends paid by nancial rms are concentrated
in two Major Groups. Before the late 1990s, Holding and other investment oces rms
concentrated the majority of all dividend payments. This helped these rms to pay
around 10% of all dividends since the 1980s until the late 1990s. After that, these
rms reduced them signicantly until the last years of the sample. After the late 1990s,
depositary institutions are fueling the dividend payments of nancial rms. Thanks
to them, nancial rms were able to pay more than 30% of all dividends right before
the nancial crisis. As an example, from 1992 to 2007 dividends paid by depositary
institutions increased more than 2462%. If this increase is impressive (none of the
industrial Groups show similar growths), the reduction in dividends payments after 2007
is also worth mentioning. From 2007 to 2010 dividends paid by depositary institutions
decreased around 90%. In only two years, dividends paid by this group returned to the
late 1990s levels. Based on these numbers, it is easy to understand how the nancial
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sector went from paying 30% to less than 10% of all dividends in less than 3 years. In
contrast, repurchases made by nancial rms are shared among several Major Groups.
Moreover, Depositary Institutions used repurchases less extensively than dividends.
Financial rms also cut repurchases aggressively during the nancial crisis. In contrast,
after 2009 only Insurance Carriers rms are driving the rebound of repurchases made
by nancial rms.
The analysis of rm age is very informative in helping to understand the upsurge of
payouts for both industrials and nancials beginning around 2001. Thanks to this
analysis, we have found that dividends and stock repurchases are also concentrated
in rms included in specic years of the CRSP sample and that the growth of payouts
over the last 12 years is not shared among all age groups. For example, we have seen that
during the last 12 years only those rms included in 1926 and 1973 were paying between
20% and 35% of all dividends. Before the nancial crisis, the youngest rms (included
after 1989) together with those included in 1987 are driving the growth of dividends.
When the crisis took hold, dividends paid by rms included in 1963, 1970, 1973 and
1987 were seriously damaged. On the other hand, we nd that the oldest (included in
1926 and 1947) and the youngest (included since 1990) decreased dividends modestly.
Moreover, dividends increased in the case of rms included in 1930, 1947 and 1985 during
2008 and 2009. After 2009, the growth in dividends is mainly driven by rms included
in 1970, 1963 and again by the youngest rms (included after 1989). The growth of
repurchases during the 2000s, before and after the nancial crisis, is mainly due to the
same rms that are driving the growth in dividends, together with the youngest rms
(those rms included in the CRPS sample after the 1990s).
We will include earnings into the analysis of U.S. corporate payouts by looking at the role
of earnings and payout ratios for the dierent groups of rms, market indexes and rm
age. This help us to re-visit the related issue of return and dividend growth predictability
and the role of dividend smoothing as an explanatory factor in the changes seen in the
relative importance of cash ows and discount rate news in driving stock returns. We
are also studying the role of the dierent theories about the existence and importance
of dividends based on the behavior of the dierent type of rms, stock market indexes
and age groups. We use the crisis as a shock to help dierentiate these theories. We
have preliminary results that throw new light on these important issues and we hope to
add these in the next version of this Chapter.
The empirical analysis in this Chapter is based on U.S market data and in the
environment of the U.S. nancial system. These results are based therefore on the
largest equity market in the world. If a similar analysis is done on smaller markets, e.g
like one the European Union markets, the results are likely to be dierent mainly due
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to the smaller size and corporate payout policies of these markets, the domination of
these market by few large rms, the importance of the bank system in some countries
and other legal and institutional dierences in trading and stock market regulations. An
avenue for future work could be to do a similar analysis of other national stock markets
and compared and contrast the results with those of the U.S market. There are also
other limitations to the empirical analysis in this Chapter. First, the data pertains to the
period which is available on the WRDS database. There are also other pre-1920s data
in other sources and the results we have obtained may be not be possible to generalize
to other time periods. Moreover, other denitions of corporate payout variables could
aect the patterns found in this Chapter.
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3.7 Figures and Tables
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Figure 3.1: The fraction of CRSP rms in dierent dividend groups, 1927-2012
Note: The CRSP sample includes NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ securities with shares
codes of 10 and 11. A rms must have market equity data (price and shares outstanding)
for any month of year t and t-1 to be in the sample for that year. We consider all
rms incorporated into the U.S. without excluding utilities or nancial rms. Payers pay
dividends in year t; non-payers do not. A rm in the CRSP sample is dened as a dividend
payer for calendar year t if its with-dividend return exceeds its without dividend return
in any month of year t.
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Figure 3.2: Aggregate dividends and repurchases for all rms incorporated into the
U.S., 1927-2012
Note: The sample includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX rms on CRSP that have share
codes 10 or 11. We calculate dividends and repurchases in dollars for each rm-month,
and we aggregate them over the year. For that reason, we require non-missing monthly
lagged ex-dividend price and cum-dividend and ex-dividend returns to compute monthly
rm dividends. We estimate monthly shares repurchased by a rm as the decrease in
shares outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted for other activities that aect the number
of shares outstanding, such as stock dividends and stock splits.
Figure 3.3: Aggregate dividends and payouts growth for all rms incorporated into
the U.S., 1927-2012
Note: The sample includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX rms on CRSP that have share
codes 10 or 11. We calculate dividends in dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate
them over the year. For that reason, we require non-missing monthly lagged ex-dividend
price and cum-dividend and ex-dividend returns to compute monthly rm dividends.
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Figure 3.4: The fraction of rms in the dierent payout categories, 1927-2012
Note: Following Skinner (2008), we divide the entire sample of CRSP rms into four
dierent groups: (Group A) rms that both pay dividends and make stock repurchases,
(Group B) rms that pay only dividends, (Group C) rms that make only stock
repurchases and (Group C) rms that do not pay out cash to stockholders.
Figure 3.5: The fraction of aggregate payouts represented by rms in dierent payer
categories, 1927-2012
Note: Following Skinner (2008), we divide the entire sample of CRSP rms into four
dierent groups: (Group A) rms that both pay dividends and make stock repurchases,
(Group B) rms that pay only dividends, (Group C) rms that make only stock
repurchases and (Group C) rms that do not pay out cash to stockholders.
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Figure 3.6: Aggregate dividends and repurchases for industrials, nancial and
utilities, 1927-2012
Note: The sample includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX rms on CRSP that have share
codes 10 or 11. The SIC codes for industrial rms are outside the range of 4900 to 4949
and 6000 to 6999. Financial rms are in the range of 6000 to 6999 and utilities between
4900 and 4949. We calculate dividends and repurchases in dollars for each rm-month,
and we aggregate them over the year. For that reason, we require non-missing monthly
lagged ex-dividend price and cum-dividend and ex-dividend returns to compute monthly
rm dividends. We estimate monthly shares repurchased by a rm as the decrease in
shares outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted for other activities that aect the number
of shares outstanding, such as stock dividends and stock splits.
Figure 3.7: Dividends and payouts growth for industrials, nancials and utilities,
1927-2012
Note: The sample includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX rms on CRSP that have share
codes 10 or 11. The SIC codes for industrial rms are outside the range of 4900 to 4949
and 6000 to 6999. Financial rms are in the range of 6000 to 6999 and utilities between
4900 and 4949. We calculate dividends and repurchases in dollars for each rm-month,
and we aggregate them over the year. For that reason, we require non-missing monthly
lagged ex-dividend price and cum-dividend and ex-dividend returns to compute monthly
rm dividends. We estimate monthly shares repurchased by a rm as the decrease in
shares outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted for other activities that aect the number
of shares outstanding, such as stock dividends and stock splits.
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Figure 3.8: The fraction of aggregate dividends and aggregate stock repurchases for
industrials, nancials and utilities, 1927-2012
Note: The sample includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX rms on CRSP that have share
codes 10 or 11. The SIC codes for industrial rms are outside the range of 4900 to 4949
and 6000 to 6000. Financial rms are in the range of 6000 to 6999 and utilities between
4900 and 4949. We calculate dividends and repurchases in dollars for each rm-month,
and we aggregate them over the year. For that reason, we require non-missing monthly
lagged ex-dividend price and cum-dividend and ex-dividend returns to compute monthly
rm dividends. We estimate monthly shares repurchased by a rm as the decrease in
shares outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted for other activities that aect the number
of shares outstanding, such as stock dividends and stock splits.
105
Figure 3.9: Aggregate dividends and repurchases by SIC Divisions, 1927-2012
Note: The SIC manual consists of Divisions A-J: Division A corresponds to Agriculture,
Forestry, and Fishing; Division B to Mining; Division C to Constructing; Division D
to Manufacturing; Division E to Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and
Sanitary Services; Division F to Wholesale Trade; Division G to Retail Trade; Division
H to Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; Division I to Services; Division J to Public
Administration. We calculate dividends and repurchases in dollars for each rm-month,
and we aggregate them over the year. For that reason, we require non-missing monthly
lagged ex-dividend price and cum-dividend and ex-dividend returns to compute monthly
rm dividends. We estimate monthly shares repurchased by a rm as the decrease in
shares outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted for other activities that aect the number
of shares outstanding, such as stock dividends and stock splits.
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Figure 3.10: The fraction of aggregate dividends and repurchases paid by SIC
Divisions, 1927-2012
Note: The SIC manual consists of J Divisions: Division A corresponds to Agriculture,
Forestry, and Fishing; Division B to Mining; Division C to Constructing; Division D
to Manufacturing; Division E to Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and
Sanitary Services; Division F to Wholesale Trade; Division G to Retail Trade; Division
H to Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; Division I to Services; Division J to Public
Administration. We calculate dividends and repurchases in dollars for each rm-month,
and we aggregate them over the year. For that reason, we require non-missing monthly
lagged ex-dividend price and cum-dividend and ex-dividend returns to compute monthly
rm dividends. We estimate monthly shares repurchased by a rm as the decrease in
shares outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted for other activities that aect the number
of shares outstanding, such as stock dividends and stock splits.
Figure 3.11: Aggregate dividends paid by the Major Groups of Division D:
Manufacturing, 1927-2012
Note: In the SIC Manual, Division D consists of 20 Major Groups: from Group 20 to
Group 39. We calculate dividends in dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate them
over the year. For that reason, we require non-missing monthly lagged ex-dividend price
and cum-dividend and ex-dividend returns to compute monthly rm dividends.
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Figure 3.12: The fraction of dividends paid on each Major Group of Division D,
1927-2012
Note: In the SIC Manual, Division D consists of 20 Major Groups: Groups 20 to 39.
On the left hand side we can nd the fraction of dividends paid on each Major Group of
Division D with respect to the total amount of all aggregate dividends paid, and on the
right hand side the fraction of dividends paid on each Major Group of Division D with
respect to the total sum of all dividends paid in Division D. We calculate dividends in
dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate them over the year. For that reason, we
require non-missing monthly lagged ex-dividend price and cum-dividend and ex-dividend
returns to compute monthly rm dividends.
Figure 3.13: Aggregate stock repurchases made by the Major Groups of Division D:
Manufacturing, 1978-2012
Note: In the SIC Manual, Division D consists of 20 Major Groups: Groups 20 to
39. We calculate repurchases in dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate them over
the year. We estimate monthly shares repurchased by a rm as the decrease in shares
outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted for other activities that aect the number of
shares outstanding, such as stock dividends and stock splits.
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Figure 3.14: The fraction of stock repurchases made on each Major Group of Division
D, 1978-2012
Note: In the SIC Manual, Division D consists of 20 Major Groups: Groups 20 to
39. On the left hand side we can nd the fraction of stock repurchases made on each
Major Group of Division D with respect to the total amount of all aggregate repurchases
made, and on the right hand side the fraction of stock repurchases on each Major Group
of Division D with respect to the total sum of all repurchases made in Division D. We
calculate repurchases in dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate them over the
year. We estimate monthly shares repurchased by a rm as the decrease in shares
outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted for other activities that aect the number of
shares outstanding, such as stock dividends and stock splits.
Figure 3.15: Aggregate dividends paid by the major groups of Division E:
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services, 1927-2012
Note: In the SIC Manual, Division E consists of 10 Major Groups: from Group 40 to
Group 49. We calculate dividends in dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate them
over the year. For that reason, we require non-missing monthly lagged ex-dividend price
and cum-dividend and ex-dividend returns to compute monthly rm dividends.
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Figure 3.16: The fraction of dividends paid on each Major Group of Division E,
1927-2012
Note: In the SIC Manual, Division E consists of 10 Major Groups: from Group 40 to
Group 49. On the left hand side we can nd the fraction of dividends paid on each Major
Group of Division E with respect to the total amount of all aggregate dividends paid, and
on the right hand side the fraction of dividends paid on each Major Group of Division E
with respect to the total sum of all dividends paid in Division E. We calculate dividends
in dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate them over the year. For that reason, we
require non-missing monthly lagged ex-dividend price and cum-dividend and ex-dividend
returns to compute monthly rm dividends.
Figure 3.17: Aggregate stock repurchases made by the major groups of Division E:
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services, 1978-2012
Note: In the SIC Manual, Division E consists of 10 Major Groups: from Group 40
to Group 49. We calculate repurchases in dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate
them over the year. We estimate monthly shares repurchased by a rm as the decrease in
shares outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted for other activities that aect the number
of shares outstanding, such as stock dividends and stock splits.
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Figure 3.18: The fraction of stock repurchases made on each Major Group of Division
E, 1978-2012
Note: In the SIC Manual, Division E consists of 10 Major Groups: from Group 40
to Group 49. On the left hand side we can nd the fraction of stock repurchases made
on each Major Group of Division E with respect to the total amount of all aggregate
repurchases made, and on the right hand side the fraction of stock repurchases on each
Major Group of Division E with respect to the total sum of all repurchases made in
Division E. We calculate repurchases in dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate
them over the year. e estimate monthly shares repurchased by a rm as the decrease in
shares outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted for other activities that aect the number
of shares outstanding, such as stock dividends and stock splits.
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Figure 3.19: Aggregate dividends paid by the major groups of Division H: Finance,
Insurance and Real Estate, 1927-2012
Note: In the SIC Manual, Division H consists of 8 Major Groups: from Group 60 to
Group 67. We calculate dividends in dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate them
over the year. For that reason, we require non-missing monthly lagged ex-dividend price
and cum-dividend and ex-dividend returns to compute monthly rm dividends.
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Figure 3.20: The fraction of dividends paid on each Major Group of Division H,
1927-2012
Note: In the SIC Manual, Division H consists of 8 Major Groups: from Group 60 to
Group 67. On the left hand side we can nd the fraction of dividends paid on each Major
Group of Division H with respect to the total amount of all aggregate dividends paid, and
on the right hand side the fraction of dividends paid on each Major Group of Division H
with respect to the total sum of all dividends paid in Division H. We calculate dividends
in dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate them over the year. For that reason, we
require non-missing monthly lagged ex-dividend price and cum-dividend and ex-dividend
returns to compute monthly rm dividends.
Figure 3.21: Aggregate stock repurchases made by the major groups of Division H:
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, 1978-2012
Note: In the SIC Manual, Division H consists of 8 Major Groups: from Group 60 to
Group 67. We calculate repurchases in dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate
them over the year. We estimate monthly shares repurchased by a rm as the decrease in
shares outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted for other activities that aect the number
of shares outstanding, such as stock dividends and stock splits.
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Figure 3.22: The fraction of stock repurchases made on each Major Group of Division
H, 1978-2012
Note: In the SIC Manual, Division H consists of 8 Major Groups: from Group 60
to Group 67. On the left hand side we can nd the fraction of stock repurchases made
on each Major Group of Division H with respect to the total amount of all aggregate
repurchases made, and on the right hand side the fraction of stock repurchases on each
Major Group of Division H with respect to the total sum of all repurchases made in
Division H. We calculate dividends in dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate them
over the year. We estimate monthly shares repurchased by a rm as the decrease in shares
outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted for other activities that aect the number of
shares outstanding, such as stock dividends and stock splits.
Figure 3.23: Aggregate dividends and aggregate stock repurchases paid by stock
market indexes
Note: We use the primary exchange variable in the CRSP database to identify the
primary exchange on which the security trades. The indexes contained in the CRSP sample
are: NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ, ARCA and other exchanges. We calculate dividends and
repurchases in dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate them over the year. For
that reason, we require non-missing monthly lagged ex-dividend price and cum-dividend
and ex-dividend returns to compute monthly rm dividends. We estimate monthly shares
repurchased by a rm as the decrease in shares outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted
for other activities that aect the number of shares outstanding, such as stock dividends
and stock splits.
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Figure 3.24: The fraction of aggregate dividends and aggregate stock repurchases
paid by stock market indexes
Note: We use the primary exchange variable in the CRSP database to identify the
primary exchange on which the security trades. The indexes contained in the CRSP sample
are: NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ, ARCA and other exchanges. We calculate dividends and
repurchases in dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate them over the year. For
that reason, we require non-missing monthly lagged ex-dividend price and cum-dividend
and ex-dividend returns to compute monthly rm dividends. We estimate monthly shares
repurchased by a rm as the decrease in shares outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted
for other activities that aect the number of shares outstanding, such as stock dividends
and stock splits.
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Figure 3.25: Aggregate dividends paid by rms in dierent age groups, 1927-2012
Note: We have divided the CRSP sample into 9 age groups based on the years since a
rm has been included in the CRSP sample: <= 10;> 10 <= 20;> 20 <= 30;> 30 <=
40;> 40 <= 50;> 50 <= 60;> 60 <= 70;> 70 <= 80;> 80. We calculate dividends in
dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate them over the year. For that reason, we
require non-missing monthly lagged ex-dividend price and cum-dividend and ex-dividend
returns to compute monthly rm dividends.
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Figure 3.26: The fraction of aggregate dividends paid by rms in dierent age groups,
1927-2012
Note: We have divided the CRSP sample into 9 age groups based on the years since a
rm has been included in the CRSP sample: <= 10;> 10 <= 20;> 20 <= 30;> 30 <=
40;> 40 <= 50;> 50 <= 60;> 60 <= 70;> 70 <= 80;> 80. We calculate dividends in
dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate them over the year. For that reason, we
require non-missing monthly lagged ex-dividend price and cum-dividend and ex-dividend
returns to compute monthly rm dividends.
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Figure 3.27: Aggregate stock repurchases made by rms in dierent age groups,
1978-2012
Note: We have divided the CRSP sample into 9 age groups based on the years since a
rm has been included in the CRSP sample: <= 10;> 10 <= 20;> 20 <= 30;> 30 <=
40;> 40 <= 50;> 50 <= 60;> 60 <= 70;> 70 <= 80;> 80. We calculate repurchases in
dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate them over the year. We estimate monthly
shares repurchased by a rm as the decrease in shares outstanding reported by CRSP,
adjusted for other activities that aect the number of shares outstanding, such as stock
dividends and stock splits.
118
Figure 3.28: The fraction of aggregate stock repurchases made by rms in dierent
age groups, 1978-2012
Note: We have divided the CRSP sample into 9 age groups based on the years since a
rm has been included in the CRSP sample: <= 10;> 10 <= 20;> 20 <= 30;> 30 <=
40;> 40 <= 50;> 50 <= 60;> 60 <= 70;> 70 <= 80;> 80. We calculate repurchases in
dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate them over the year. We estimate monthly
shares repurchased by a rm as the decrease in shares outstanding reported by CRSP,
adjusted for other activities that aect the number of shares outstanding, such as stock
dividends and stock splits.
Figure 3.29: The cumulative sum of the fraction of aggregate dividends and aggregate
repurchases paid in the dierent age groups, 1927-2012
Note: We have divided the CRSP sample into 9 age groups based on the years since a
rm has been included in the CRSP sample: <= 10;> 10 <= 20;> 20 <= 30;> 30 <=
40;> 40 <= 50;> 50 <= 60;> 60 <= 70;> 70 <= 80;> 80. We calculate dividends
and repurchases in dollars for each rm-month, and we aggregate them over the year. For
that reason, we require non-missing monthly lagged ex-dividend price and cum-dividend
and ex-dividend returns to compute monthly rm dividends. We estimate monthly shares
repurchased by a rm as the decrease in shares outstanding reported by CRSP, adjusted
for other activities that aect the number of shares outstanding, such as stock dividends
and stock splits.
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Appendix A
Appendix
Figure A.1: The fraction of total dividends paid and repurchases made by rm age
in 2000.
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Figure A.2: The fraction of total dividends paid and repurchases made by rm age
in 2001.
Figure A.3: The fraction of total dividends paid and repurchases made by rm age
in 2002.
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Figure A.4: The fraction of total dividends paid and repurchases made by rm age
in 2003.
Figure A.5: The fraction of total dividends paid and repurchases made by rm age
in 2004.
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Figure A.6: The fraction of total dividends paid and repurchases made by rm age
in 2005.
Figure A.7: The fraction of total dividends paid and repurchases made by rm age
in 2006.
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Figure A.8: The fraction of total dividends paid and repurchases made by rm age
in 2007.
Figure A.9: The fraction of total dividends paid and repurchases made by rm age
in 2008.
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Figure A.10: The fraction of total dividends paid and repurchases made by rm age
in 2009.
Figure A.11: The fraction of total dividends paid and repurchases made by rm age
in 2010.
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Figure A.12: The fraction of total dividends paid and repurchases made by rm age
in 2011.
Figure A.13: The fraction of total dividends paid and repurchases made by rm age
in 2012.
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Figure A.14: Dividend growth for the largest dividend payers by age from 2000 to
2012.
Figure A.15: Payout growth for the largest dividend payers by age from 2000 to 2012.
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